

# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

Volume XXIX

JANUARY 1934

Number 1

## THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE. II

By JAKOB A. O. LARSEN

IT NOW remains to be seen whether defensive wars were in the same position and also needed the decision of the assembly, or whether a member of the League when attacked could expect the other members, or at least Sparta herself, to come to its aid without waiting for the action of the assembly. It can be said at the outset that the members of the League clearly felt that they had a right to be defended against aggression, and that this was provided for in the constitution.<sup>57</sup> It is also clear that Sparta's leadership and the cohesion of the League depended largely upon the ability of Sparta and the League to give security to its members. The analogy of other treaties makes it natural to suppose that in addition to the general clause concerning the sharing of friends and enemies there was also given a more special pledge promising aid against aggression.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, it is

<sup>57</sup> The threat to secede unless aid was given is reported to have been made by the Corinthians in 432 (Thuc. i. 71) and by the Achaeans in 389 (Xen. *op. cit.* iv. 6. 2 f.).

<sup>58</sup> On account of the lack of detailed information for the period before the Peloponnesian War, no very early example can be cited. A clause of the kind seems to have been included in the treaty of 433 between Athens and Coreyra (Thuc. i. 44. 1) and in the treaty of 422 between Athens and the Bottiaeans (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 89). Since the Bottiaeans are in the position of inferior allies, they do not make any special promise to defend Athenian territory against aggression but pledge themselves in a more general way to follow the leadership of Athens in questions of foreign policy. Other examples of special clauses promising aid against aggression are found in the following treaties: treaty between Athens and Sparta of 421 (Thuc. v. 23); Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, 420 (*ibid.* 47); Athens and Boeotia, 396/5 (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 122). It is scarcely necessary to say that similar clauses were common in later treaties.

also clear that in an organization of the nature of the Peloponnesian League it would be impossible to allow any member to involve the entire League in war merely by reporting that it was being attacked. If this were permitted, there would be too great a temptation for some state to start an aggressive war and misrepresent it as a defensive war. It is also clear that there might be many cases in which a state honestly would think that it was acting on the defensive while neutral opinion would regard it as an aggressor. Thus, it is obvious that some authority must decide in each case whether a particular member of the League was the object of hostile aggression and had a right to expect intervention in its favor. Since the aggressor might be another member of the League, it is still more clear that it was necessary to have a decision made by a third party. Since members of the League could carry on separate wars, there was nothing to prevent individual members from going to the aid of another member, but it is clear that action by the League as such could not be secured without the co-operation of Sparta. If Sparta would not summon the assembly of the League, a decision by the League as such could not be secured;<sup>59</sup> and if Sparta would not take the lead, it was impossible to secure military action by the League as such. On the other hand, it is clear that Sparta herself could intervene without calling on the League. Thus it seems that there are only two questions in this connection that need cause us further trouble. First, there is the question whether members of the League were legally entitled to protection from the entire League, or only from Sparta. Second, if the members were entitled to protection from the entire League, could Sparta call on the allies for such intervention without consulting the assembly of the League, or were the members required to intervene only after a decision by the assembly?

The treatment of these problems by scholars has depended and probably must depend on their general interpretation of the League as a whole. Kahrstedt, who believes that the only basis for the League was treaties between Sparta and individual members, believes that the individual members were pledged to support Sparta when she was attacked, and that in turn only Sparta and not the other members of

<sup>59</sup> To give an illustration, Thucydides (i. 68) represents the Corinthians as stating in 432 that they already had complained repeatedly of Athenian aggression but that Sparta hitherto had refused to act on these complaints.

the League were pledged to support any individual member that was attacked, though such an attack could be made the occasion for declaring a League war.<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, Busolt believes that when a member of the League was attacked, Sparta had a right to call out the League forces without consulting the assembly.<sup>61</sup> The writer has already expressed the view that at least before the Peloponnesian War it is unlikely that Sparta could call out the allies in such cases without first consulting them.<sup>62</sup>

Both Kahrstedt and Busolt give examples of appeals made to Sparta from allies that claimed to be suffering from aggression. It must be admitted that the examples cited do not help much in determining what was the law of the League. Examples earlier than the Peloponnesian War are lacking, since it is impossible to admit with Kahrstedt that the appeal by Athens to Sparta in 490 is a case in question. At that time Athens appealed to Sparta and Sparta alone (not the League) sent aid.<sup>63</sup> This obviously is the period that is of most importance in determining the original character of the League, while it is generally admitted that after the Peloponnesian War, Sparta began to exercise a more domineering leadership over the allies. Furthermore, in the later period when appeals to Sparta are reported, it still is difficult to determine just what were the rights of the allies, for our sources seldom are interested in such technicalities but care only to report whether the aid requested was given or not. All the examples given by the authors already cited will not be discussed. Often the sources simply indicate that a member was involved in war and that Sparta came to its aid with her own and allied troops. In some cases it is implied that the motive for the Spartan action was self-interest.<sup>64</sup> A case in which the Spartan intervention clearly seems due to the need of supporting her allies is that of the expedition of Age-

<sup>60</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, 90.

<sup>62</sup> *CP*, XXVII, 140.

<sup>61</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 1333-34 and 1334, n. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Herod. vi. 105, 120.

<sup>64</sup> In 418 it was not only the distress of Epidaurus but the general situation that caused the Spartans to take the field. They feared that unless they acted the situation might grow worse (Thuc. v. 57. 1). Xenophon (*Hell.* iii. 5. 4 f.) represents the Phocians as definitely appealing to Sparta for aid against aggression, but represents the Spartans as acting primarily because they were glad to have an excuse for attacking Thebes. The modern historian, of course, may doubt that this motivation is correct, for it would be surprising if Sparta desired a major war in Greece when she already was involved in Asia. Thus the real reason for the Spartan action may have been the necessity of defending her allies.

silas against Acarnania in 389 undertaken in response to an appeal from the Achaeans.<sup>65</sup> Agesilaus took along a contingent of allies as well as Spartan troops. No meeting of the assembly of the League is reported and, though the absence of a report does not supply a certain proof, the general Spartan policy of the time was such that it is unlikely that a meeting was held.

The action of Sparta in 490, if it could be admitted that Athens was a member of the Peloponnesian League and that this action thus can be used as an illustration of the procedure in the League, would fit well into Kahrstedt's scheme. In answer to the appeal from Athens, Sparta acted but apparently used only her own troops. On the other hand, it would not prove that League members did not feel entitled to the support of the entire League. I fail to see how Kahrstedt<sup>66</sup> can consider the account in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* xiii of the incident of 395 as a proof that an attack on Phocis would mean war with Sparta but not with the League. Kahrstedt probably has in mind the hope of the Theban leaders that the Corinthians, Argives, and Athenians, who at the time were members of the Peloponnesian League, all would take part in the war on the Theban side. Surely this does not throw any light on their rights and duties in relation to the League, but merely proves that the three states were ready to secede from the League and take part in a war against Sparta.

The incidents discussed so far are not very helpful. The account in Thucydides of the proceedings in 432 which prepared the way for the Peloponnesian War is more illuminating. It is clear that the Corinthians complained that they suffered from Athenian aggression, and it appears further that they implied that it was not the first time that they had done so, but that hitherto Sparta had ignored the complaints.<sup>67</sup> The case is even more illuminating for the reason that the situation was such that the opponents of Corinth easily could argue that the charge was not true. This is seen clearly in the case of the Coreyraean incidents. When the Coreyraeans came to Athens to request an alliance, they are represented as complaining of the aggression of Corinth, while a large part of the speech of the Corinthians is given up to a proof that this charge was unfounded.<sup>68</sup> Yet it is

<sup>65</sup> Xen. *op. cit.*, iv. 6. 1-3.

<sup>66</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, 91.

<sup>67</sup> Thuc. i. 68.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* 34. 2; 35. 4 (τῶνδε . . . ἐχθρῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπιδόντων); 37-39.



clear that the support given by the Athenians to the Corcyraeans at Sybota must have been one of the causes of the complaint lodged against them by the Corinthians.<sup>69</sup> The Potidaean incident hardly changed the issue, though it rendered the entire situation more piquant, especially as Sparta had promised to invade Attica in case the Athenians attacked Potidaea.<sup>70</sup> No doubt the real issue before the Peloponnesian League was one of policy, whether the League desired to make war on Athens or not. Yet the aggression and injustice of the Athenians were kept to the front. It is reported that the majority of the Spartans were of the opinion that the Athenians were acting unjustly.<sup>71</sup> Later it is reported that they took a formal vote on the question whether the treaty (the Thirty Years' Peace) had been broken by the Athenians and then, after their own vote, summoned a meeting of the assembly of the League to consider the same question.<sup>72</sup> When this meeting took place, it seems that the question actually put before the assembly was whether war was to be declared,<sup>73</sup> but the aggression of Athens must have been the pretext for the decision reached.

Thus in the one case where we have the fullest report of the proceedings of an incident in which an alleged aggression by an outsider against a member of the League led to a general League war, there are three stages clearly discernible: (1) Corinth brings her complaint before the Spartans; (2) Sparta reaches her own decision; (3) the question is put before the assembly of the League. Nevertheless, the account does not solve all problems. It does not prove whether it was considered the duty of Sparta to submit such a question to the entire League, and the duty of all members to defend other members against aggression, or whether Sparta submitted the question to the League merely because she preferred to make the war a League undertaking rather than to support Corinth by herself. Probably legalistic analysis had little or nothing to do with the decision of Sparta. It is more likely that she merely took stock of the situation. Corinth and other allies were excited and wished war, and whether Sparta desired it or not, it may well have seemed that a conflict was inevitable. Under the circumstances, a meeting of the assembly of

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* 55. 2.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* 79. 2.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* 119, 120. 1; 125. 1.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 58. 1.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* 87.

the League would seem the best instrument for unifying the public opinion of the League under Spartan leadership.

Some help is derived from the negotiations of the Corcyraeans and Athens that already have been mentioned in another connection. The Athenians did not wish to make the alliance an offensive alliance, for if the Corcyraeans should involve them in an attack on Corinth, this would have been a violation of their treaty *with the Peloponnesians*.<sup>74</sup> The implication is that an attack on any member of the League was a breach of contract made with all members and thus constituted a just cause of war for the entire League. It might be argued that the clause in question was a part of the Thirty Years' Peace and not of the treaties embodying the constitution of the League. Nevertheless, it clearly shows that at the time the treaty was made, the Peloponnesian League was considered a unity in relation to outside powers so that an act of aggression against any one member of the League was looked upon as an act of aggression against the entire League.

This interpretation is confirmed by the truce of 423, in connection with which the League decidedly appears as a unity.<sup>75</sup> The most striking feature here is that *ξυμμαχία* is used to designate the entire organization, Sparta as well as her allies, or probably rather the territory of this organization.<sup>76</sup> This implies that all the territory of Sparta and her allies is a unity, and thus an act of aggression against any part of it would be an act of aggression against the entire organization. Somewhat similar to the use of language found in this expression is the language in which Thucydides reports the making of the Five Years' Truce in 451.<sup>77</sup> This truce is said to have been made between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. Here "the Peloponnesians" takes the place of the more common expression, "the Lacedaemonians and

<sup>74</sup> ἐλίουτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί (*ibid.* 44. 1).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* iv. 117-19.

<sup>76</sup> ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἑκατέρους ἔχοντας ἅπερ νῦν ἔχομεν, . . . τοὺς δὲ ἐν Κυθήροις μὴ ἐπιμισγομένους ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, μήτε ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς (*ibid.* 118, 4). The dualism of the two parties to the contract makes it impossible to refer *ξυμμαχίαν* to anything but the entire territory of the Peloponnesian organization. Kahrstedt (*op. cit.*, I, 3) thinks that the word refers exclusively to the territory of the allies in opposition to Spartan territory proper and so uses it as a proof that the coast opposite Cythera was *perioecic* territory in opposition to *Bürgergebiet*. To me it seems impossible that *perioecic* territory in this manner should be classed with allied territory.

<sup>77</sup> Thuc. i. 112. 1; cf. Diod. xi. 86. 1.

their Allies." In opposition to the latter term it emphasizes the unity of the organization rather than the duality.<sup>78</sup> If this passage stood alone, it could be explained as merely a careless expression used by Thucydides for the sake of brevity. When it is combined with the other evidence, it becomes reasonably certain that there was a tendency in the fifth century to apply the term *symmachy* to the entire combination of Sparta and her allies and likewise to lump all of them together as Peloponnesians. In spite of the Spartan draft for the treaty of 418 with Argos,<sup>79</sup> it is unlikely that the latter name ever became an official term. Yet the use of the word shows that the term "Peloponnesian League" probably is not so completely a modern invention as frequently is supposed.<sup>80</sup> More important for our purpose is the fact that the evidence submitted points to a surprisingly strong feeling of unity in the Peloponnesian League in the fifth century and makes it reasonably certain that any member of the League felt that, in case of attack, it had a right to the aid of the entire League.

It is now time to summarize some of our results. It has been seen that the treaties embodying the constitution of the League contained a clause indicating that the alliance was an offensive and defensive alliance. It is not known in how great detail this was stated, but it

<sup>78</sup> There is probably a somewhat similar use of "Peloponnesians" in the Spartan draft for the treaty of 418 with Argos (Thuc. v. 77).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. the preceding note. The treaty actually adopted (Thuc. v. 79) does not use "Peloponnesian" in this sense but merely has "Peloponnesus" as a geographical term.

<sup>80</sup> The name "the Peloponnesians" probably was used rather frequently for the members of the League. Thus, in connection with the meeting at which it was proposed to support the revolt of Samos the following expression is found: τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων (*ibid.* i. 40. 5). Since the word is frequently used in a geographical sense as applying to the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, it is often difficult to distinguish between the two meanings. Thus, when the Peloponnesian War is called τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων (*ibid.* i. 1. 1; cf. for similar expression *ibid.* ii. 1; Herod. vii. 137. 1; ix. 73. 3), it is difficult to say whether the historian thought of the chief opponents of Athens as members of the Peloponnesian League or as residents of the Peloponnesus. In either case the word is used in the same way as a modern historian speaks of the Germans or the French, and is applied to those Peloponnesians who took part in the war, i.e., were members of the League. Since it has frequently been observed that the Peloponnesian League is referred to as "the Lacedaemonians and their allies," it is important to notice that in connection with the Peloponnesian War the name "Peloponnesians" is often used by Thucydides almost in a nationalistic sense to describe the members of the League. Thus Archidamus, before his first invasion of Attica, addresses the officers of his army as Ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι (Thuc. ii. 11.1). Armies are described as Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι (*ibid.* iii. 1. 1, 89. 1; iv. 2. 1).

has been seen that the members of the League felt that it was the duty not only of Sparta but of the entire League to defend them against aggression. It has, however, also been seen that a mere announcement by a member that it was suffering from aggression was not enough to secure action by the League. Instead there might be prolonged consultation, as in the case of the complaints of Corinth in 432. No doubt there were also many cases in which Sparta refused both to act herself on a complaint and to call the allies to consider it. There may also have been cases in which Sparta called a meeting of the assembly of the League but the allies refused to act. Thus there may have been many cases in which some member felt that it failed to receive the support of the League to which it was entitled. It is possible that the constitution of the League made it clear that support of the League depended upon the action of the assembly. It is probably more likely, however, that one section of the treaties contained a clause indicating that the alliance was offensive and defensive while another section contained the statement that the decisions of the assembly were binding on all members. This would seem to imply a contradiction between the sections. One section promised that all members would be defended against aggression, while another section could be interpreted to mean that such help would not be rendered unless the assembly acted favorably. Such a seeming contradiction between sections would not be surprising. A Cretan treaty has already been cited above to show how misleading it may be to interpret the bearing of a treaty from a single clause.<sup>81</sup> Likewise, in the Epidaurian inscription connected with the Hellenic League of Antigonos Monophthalmus and Demetrius Poliorcetes, one section gives the impression that the entire leadership in foreign affairs is vested in the kings,<sup>82</sup> while the section dealing with the *synedrion* of the League implies that the decisions of this assembly are always final.<sup>83</sup> When there was a real or apparent inconsistency of this nature in the constitution of a league organized after a couple of centuries of experience with *sym-*

<sup>81</sup> *SGDI* 5041.

<sup>82</sup> *IG*, IV<sup>2</sup>, 1, 68. 8-10. Though this section of the inscription is badly mutilated, it is clear that it contained the formula *ὥστε καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοις*.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, line 73. On this point cf. *CP*, XX (1925), 322, and XXI, 54; Wilcken, *Berlin. Sitzungsberichte, phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1929, p. 309.

*machies*, it is almost certain that the constitution of the earliest *symmachy* known contained a similar inconsistency.

The phrase "real or apparent inconsistency" was used because it is possible that the relation of the two clauses to each other was understood by those who ratified the treaties in question. Though this is possible, it is likely that, at least in the case of the Peloponnesian League, the inconsistency was real and that the reconciliation of the two sections was left to usage. In the case of offensive wars, it must have been clear from the outset that they could only be declared after a decision of the assembly, but the status of defensive wars probably was not equally clear. The members must have felt that they always had a right to defense against aggression, but soon there must have arisen cases in which such defense was claimed and refused. The refusals could be defended by the statement that the assembly had not decided to act. Thus there developed the understanding that also in the case of defensive wars the intervention of the League depended upon the decisions of the assembly, and so the procedure seen in operation in 432 was developed. The actual decisions in such cases probably depended more on practical considerations than on any legalistic consideration of the rights of the member that appealed. If Sparta felt that failure to act would endanger her leadership and cause secession from the League, she would recommend intervention. If the sympathies of the members of the League were strongly on the side of the member that requested aid, they would vote in favor of action.

What has just been stated was true of the fifth century. In the fourth century all was changed. Examples have been given above of treaties of offensive and defensive alliance in which one of the parties to the treaty was subject to the leadership of the other party. Among the examples given were the treaty of 404 between Sparta and Athens<sup>84</sup> and the treaty of 479 between Sparta and the Olynthians.<sup>85</sup> In a speech supposed to have been delivered at Sparta in 371, Xenophon describes an Athenian representative as complaining of treaties of this kind.<sup>86</sup> He implies that they were numerous and that, as a result of these treaties, Sparta was calling upon her allies to support her in wars without first consulting them. The passage suggests that the old treaties embodying the constitution of the League had been replaced

<sup>84</sup> Xen. *op. cit.* ii. 2. 20.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* v. 3. 26.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 3. 7 f.

by new treaties in which allies, who formerly had been autonomous and still in theory were so, had been transformed into subject allies. Similarly, when the Achaeans in 389 appealed to Sparta for aid against the Acarnanians, they implied that they had been in the habit of giving unquestioning obedience to the Spartan leadership.<sup>87</sup> Evidence of this nature is of more value than the reports of cases in which allies appealed to Sparta and the latter called out the League forces to co-operate in sending aid in response to the appeal. The fact that in such cases no meeting of the assembly of the League is reported is no sure proof that a meeting was not held. The evidence given here, on the contrary, implies that Sparta in the fourth century frequently involved the League in war without consulting the assembly. It might at first seem to suggest that she had gone so far as to take over completely the entire leadership of the League in all questions of war and peace. This was not quite the case. She still found it advisable to consult the assembly at least on subjects of such vital importance that it was desirable to mobilize the public opinion of the League.<sup>88</sup> Yet, in the light of the evidence presented, Sparta, without doubt, desired the same kind of absolute leadership over her allies that Cleomenes had tried to assert in the latter part of the sixth century. The effort of Cleomenes, it seems, had helped to start a movement of opposition that led to the formation of the Peloponnesian League. Also the fourth-century attempt helped to start a movement of opposition, but this time it contributed to the dissolution of the League. Meanwhile, Sparta had deprived the assembly to a considerable extent of its share in determining the policies of the League. As far as defensive wars were concerned, this meant that when members that claimed to be suffering from aggression appealed to Sparta, the question was not submitted to the assembly, but the decision was made by Sparta alone.

3. *The method of amending the constitution.*—The next problem to be considered is whether the treaties embodying the constitution of the

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* iv. 6. 2.

<sup>88</sup> A meeting was held before Agesilaus' expedition to Asia in 396 (*ibid.* iii. 4. 2.), another meeting was responsible for the decision made in 382 to intervene against the Chalcidic League (*ibid.* v. 2. 11-23), and a third meeting was probably held in 376 (*ibid.* 4. 60). Kahrstedt (*op. cit.*, I, 269) does not consider the latter a regular meeting, but there is no reason why συλλεγόντων δὲ τῶν συμμάχων should not be used to designate a regular meeting. Such a meeting might well be called as a counterblast against the newly organized Second Athenian League.

League included a clause providing for the amendment of these treaties, i.e., of the constitution of the League, in certain eventualities. It is known that from time to time decrees equivalent to constitutional amendments were passed, but it is not entirely clear whether they were the result merely of the general power of the assembly to pass binding decrees or whether special provision for amendments had been made.

The attempt to answer this question will take as its starting-point the formulas found in a considerable number of treaties of alliance. The formula used varied somewhat, but a clause providing for change of the treaty after common consultation and agreement between the parties involved is found in a number of treaties, for instance, in the treaty of 423/2 between Athens and Perdiccas;<sup>89</sup> the treaty of alliance of 421 between Athens and Sparta;<sup>90</sup> the treaty of 420 between Athens and Argos, Mantinea, and Elis;<sup>91</sup> the treaty of 395 between Athens and the Locrians;<sup>92</sup> the treaty of 394/3 between Athens and Eretria;<sup>93</sup> and the treaty of 362/1 between Athens and the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Phleasians, and the Eleians.<sup>94</sup> Though they are farther removed from the Peloponnesian League in both time and space, it is interesting to note that formulas of the kind seem to have been common in Cretan treaties of Hellenistic times.<sup>95</sup> Another late example is the treaty of about 180 B.C. between Miletus and Heraclea.<sup>96</sup> The list of examples given above makes no claim to be exhaustive. Even so, the list is strikingly long, particularly when it is remembered that treaties preserved in inscriptions are usually mutilated so that it is a matter of chance whether a particular clause has or has not been preserved. Thus it is clear that formulas of the kind were very common. They were used also in leagues of the *symmarchy* type, as is shown by the constitution of the Hellenic League of Antigonos Monophthalmus and Demetrius Poliorcetes.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>89</sup> SEG, III, 14. 15 f.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* 47. 12.

<sup>93</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 123.

<sup>90</sup> Thuc. v. 23. 6.

<sup>92</sup> IG, II<sup>2</sup>, 15.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* 181. 35 ff.

<sup>95</sup> For examples see SGDI 5039. 8 ff.; 5040. 74 ff.; 5041. 6 f.; 5075. 45 f. Section B of the latter inscription supplies an example of a later amendment or rather addition of the kind provided for in the treaty. Cf. also the treaty of Rhodes and Hierapytna from about 200 (Syll.<sup>3</sup> 581. 85 f.).

<sup>96</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 633. 120 ff.

<sup>97</sup> IG, IV<sup>2</sup>, 1, 68. 131 ff. For an attempt to restore the formula see CP, XXVII, 395 ff.



Naturally no such formula has been preserved for the Peloponnesian League, but indirect evidence makes it reasonably certain that also its constitution provided for future changes, or at least that the members had a strong feeling that changes could be made as a result of mutual agreement and only as the result of such agreement. Though it was not a treaty of alliance, it is well to note that the Peace of Nicias contained a clause providing that the treaty could be amended by means of an agreement between the Athenians and Spartans.<sup>98</sup> It has already been noticed that the treaty of alliance of the same year between Athens and Sparta contained a similar formula.<sup>99</sup> In this case it seems perfectly natural that a proviso for change should require the agreement merely of the Spartans and the Athenians, the two parties to the treaty. It is more surprising that the formula of the treaty of peace makes no references to the allies of Sparta. This must have been objectionable to the members of the League, for it meant that Sparta might take upon herself to make arrangements affecting her allies without consulting them. From the same point of view the entire treaty of alliance must have been objectionable to many, and the clause providing for future amendments as much as any part of it, though, if the treaty once had been made, it was merely a logical consequence of the rest of the agreement. Thus it is not surprising to find that Thucydides states that discontent with this clause of the treaty (or treaties) with Athens contributed largely to the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnesus that came to a head soon afterward. It was felt that justice demanded that changes should be subject to the approval of all the allies.<sup>100</sup> If a technical complaint had been formulated, it certainly would have had to be based on the Peace of Nicias, and it is likely that this is the treaty to which Thucydides refers, though the feeling of discontent must have been aggravated by the later treaty of alliance. This may well have been regarded as an outgrowth of the offensive clause in the earlier treaty or at least as an example of the same spirit. It may be well to recall that another treaty containing a clause providing for possible future amendments was the treaty of 420 between Athens and Argos, Elis, and Mantinea.<sup>101</sup> The

<sup>98</sup> Thuc. v. 18. 11.      <sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* 23. 6.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* 29. 2-3. The phrase *ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις* can refer equally well to one treaty or both treaties.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* 47. 12.

latter treaty is of special interest because it supplies an example of the use of the clause in a treaty involving more than two states.

The treaties just discussed show that a clause providing for the amendment of treaties was common at the time of the Peloponnesian War in treaties involving Peloponnesian states. The discontent of her allies with Sparta for concluding a treaty which could be revised without consulting them shows that the clause received considerable attention in the political thought of the time, and that the members of the League felt that no treaty involving the League should be modified except with the consent of the allies. It also shows that they thought that such modifications of treaties were perfectly proper if the changes were approved by the allies. Now since the constitution of the Peloponnesian League was embodied in treaties of alliance, it is likely that also these treaties were subject to similar amendments. This is made all the more likely by the fact that the constitution of the League is known to have been amended at times.<sup>102</sup> It may be argued that the proviso for the amendment of treaties is not known for any earlier period, and that if the allies at the time of the Peloponnesian War felt that the constitution of the League could be amended, this was not because the constitution itself provided for this but merely because other treaties had accustomed them to changes of the kind. Of course, this is possible. It is also possible that the amendments grew out of the general power of the assembly. On the other hand, a clause providing for amendments may well have been included in the original treaties embodying the constitution of the League. So little has been preserved of older treaties that it is impossible to affirm that such clauses were not used in treaties in the latter part of the sixth century. At any rate, one sixth-century treaty provided for the common consultation of the parties making the treaty,<sup>103</sup> and out of such a proviso there may speedily have arisen the more specific clause concerning the amendment of treaties. Such a clause would be eminently appropriate in connection with the organization of a league which was intended to represent a permanent alignment of powers, nor must it be forgotten that evidence, though of a later date, has been adduced to show that it actually was used in leagues.

Though the evidence is not completely conclusive, it has been

<sup>102</sup> Two such amendments are discussed in Vol. XXVIII, p. 261.

<sup>103</sup> *Syll.* 29.

seen that in all likelihood the constitution of the Peloponnesian League contained a clause providing for future amendments. It now remains to be seen whether the manner in which the amendments were to be passed can be determined. Among the examples cited above, there are two instances of treaties involving several states. In both it is provided that amendments can be adopted only if all the states agree.<sup>104</sup> In a league the procedure probably would be different. In the case of the Peloponnesian League the two constitutional amendments known to us, which have been discussed above, are reported as decrees of the assembly. This makes it seem likely that also in such matters the assembly was competent to make the final decision on behalf of the members. This is in accordance with the rule that seems to have been adopted in the later Hellenic Leagues. In these, it appears, constitutional amendments could be adopted through the co-operation of the king or kings and the *synedrion*.<sup>105</sup> If the usage of these organizations is compared, it appears that the constitutions of *symmachies* could be amended very easily. All that was required was agreement between the power holding the hegemony and the assembly. Nor is there any indication that a unanimous vote or an unusually large majority was required. It is more likely that the normal procedure was followed and that in constitutional questions as in others it was felt that when the assembly had acted the League had acted.

4. *The admission of new members into the League.*—Closely related to the question of the amending of the constitution is the question of the admission of new members, for their admission might frequently involve radical changes in the obligations of the older members. Therefore, if changes in the constitution of the League were subject to the approval of the latter, this ought to be the case also with the admission of members. To begin with an example that does not belong directly to the Peloponnesian League, the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians were admitted into the alliance of the Greeks in 479 through the action of an assembly.<sup>106</sup> The body that made the decision probably consisted of the commanders of the various contingents of the Greek

<sup>104</sup> The treaty of 420 between Athens and Argos, Mantinea, and Elis (Thuc. v. 47. 12), and the treaty of 362/1 between Athens and the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleians, and the Phleisians (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 181. 35 f.).

<sup>105</sup> *CP*, XXVII, 395 ff. esp. pp. 398–99.

<sup>106</sup> Herod. ix. 106.

fleet, but this makes little difference. It would be perfectly natural that in time of war—particularly in such a case as the present when an immediate decision was required—the commanders of the armed forces should be allowed to act for their respective states also on questions of broader policy. The important point is that the decision was made by an assembly and not exclusively by the Spartan officers, who, by the way, were opposed to the policy adopted. This act supplies an illustration of the procedure followed in *symmachies* in the early fifth century. A clear case of action by the assembly of the Peloponnesian League itself is the admission of the Lesbians in 428 at a meeting held at Olympia.<sup>107</sup> Nor does there seem to be any example of admission of new allies in which it is completely certain that the members were not consulted.<sup>108</sup> Nor do the facts that parties desiring aid normally negotiated with Sparta, that Sparta apparently at times refused aid without consulting the assembly, and that she probably at times entered into secret agreements prove anything to the contrary.<sup>109</sup> Since the League had no executive aside from that of Sparta, the officials of the latter city naturally would have charge of all diplomatic negotiations involving the League. No new member could be admitted unless the Spartan government was willing to call a meeting of the assembly and submit the question. If it refused to do so and thus for all practi-

<sup>107</sup> Thuc. iii. 8, 15. 1. Kahrstedt (*op. cit.*, I, 288), who believes that both cases cited belong to the Peloponnesian League and that admission into the League was completely under the control of Sparta, thinks that the assembly was consulted in the two cases for the reason that the question at stake involved not merely the extension of the League but also an important decision concerning its future policy.

<sup>108</sup> Kahrstedt (*ibid.*) thinks he has found an illustration in Thuc. viii. 6. 4 where we read *οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . τοὺς τε Χίους καὶ τοὺς Ἐρυθραίους εἰθὺς ξυμμάχους ἐποίησαντο*. But it is absurd to suppose that this refers to a formal admission of the states in question into the League. Sparta cannot have done more than to reach a secret agreement with oligarchic conspirators who were acting without formal authority. Even the assembly at Corinth, which was held some time later, and which determined to dispatch aid (Thuc. viii. 8.2), cannot have voted on the formal admission of the states. Some time later, the Athenians demanded and received a contingent of ships from the Chians (*ibid.* 9.2). The island city did not revolt before the arrival of the first Spartan squadron, and apparently the revolt of the Erythraeans came slightly later than that of the Chians (*ibid.* 14).

<sup>109</sup> For illustrations and a different interpretation cf. Kahrstedt (*op. cit.*, I, 288, and p. 289, n. 1). It would indeed be important if Diod. xii. 73. 1 stated that the Delians had joined the League secretly. But this is not the case. Diodorus states that the Athenians blamed the Delians *ὅτι λάθρᾳ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους συντίθενται συμμαχίαν*. Surely this means that they were engaged in the negotiations at the time, and it is not even clear whether an admission into the League was contemplated.

cal purposes refused the admission of some state, it acted fully within its rights, but such action does not mean that members could be admitted without the approval of the allies. Nor would this be proved by the action of Spartan officials in giving a secret promise of aid to some party or other nor by the action of such Spartan officers as Brasidas in winning over new allies. It is still possible that such actions bound only Sparta herself and that no new allies had a real claim on the League as such or a right to be represented in the assembly of the League before they formally had been admitted into the League by that assembly. That such was the case is suggested by the general considerations given above and confirmed by those cases of action by assemblies that have been reported.

It might be objected that the assembly of the League did not meet frequently enough or regularly enough to have any control over the admission of new members. This objection is hardly valid. In between the meetings Sparta might well bring over new allies and pledge herself to support them, but the real rub would come when a meeting of the assembly took place. The allies had joined a league, had undertaken certain obligations to each other, and had promised to abide by the decisions of their assembly. When new members were admitted, this meant that the obligations of the old members were increased, and that states that had not had a part in the original organization were given a voice in shaping those decrees that were to be binding on all members. Is it thinkable that these members should not have a right to reject the admission of such new members? Nothing would be more natural than that each meeting should pass on the admission of any new applicant that had appeared since the last meeting. In most cases the action would probably be a mere matter of form, a ceremony quickly completed or a vote hurriedly taken before the chief business of the meeting was taken up for consideration, and it is natural that we hear only of the action on cases of unusual interest and importance—cases in which the question of admission constituted the chief business of the meeting. In the absence of more full information it is impossible to say precisely how things were done. It is even possible that in cases where there was no objection to allies that Sparta proposed for admission, no formal action was taken at all. It is further possible that in the fourth century Sparta ignored the rights of the allies also

in this matter. But there is every reason to believe that the constitution of the League was framed in such a manner that the assembly had a right to a voice on the question of the admission of new members.

### III. CONCLUSION

It is too much to hope that everything presented above will win general acceptance or that the present study will be considered a final solution of the problems involved. It is largely the outgrowth of ideas that have forced themselves upon my attention as the result of evidence observed while engaged on other studies. It is my hope that it may suggest ideas to others who, as a result, will be able to notice additional evidence that will help to clarify the issues involved.

It is likely that many will feel that far too much has been claimed for early Greek treaties in general and for the Peloponnesian League in particular. The following considerations should do much to remove skepticism on this point. In the first place, the forms and formulas of interstate treaties and agreements are notoriously tenacious. Sufficient proof that this was the case in Greek history is supplied by the treaties from various periods cited in the present study. It is known, furthermore, that though there were some important differences on certain points, the forms of Roman treaties were largely borrowed from the Greeks.<sup>110</sup> This longevity of forms in itself makes it extremely likely that they go back as far as to the period of the origin of the Peloponnesian League. The case becomes very much stronger when it is remembered that there is reason to believe that the forms of Greek treaties of alliance, including the clause providing for the perpetuity of treaties and the clause binding the parties to have the same friends and enemies, were derived from oriental prototypes and reached the Greeks through the Lydians.<sup>111</sup> If this is correct, the latter part of the sixth century is precisely the period during which it would be most natural to find these clauses beginning to appear in Greek treaties.

It is now time to attempt to summarize the results of the present investigation. The general picture of the constitution of the League

<sup>110</sup> Täubler, *Imperium Romanum*.

<sup>111</sup> Schwahn in Pauly-Wissowa, *Zweite Reihe*, IV, 1107 ff. The case for this theory seems very strong though no treaties between the Lydians and Greek states have been preserved in sufficiently full form to give examples of the clauses at this particular stage.

that emerges is one of apparent rigidity combined with great elasticity. There was an agreement binding for all time that arranged for co-operation in offensive and defensive wars, but almost the only part of the agreement that could not be modified by a single meeting of the assembly was the part which made the alliance a permanent organization of a group of states bound to be guided by the decisions of the assembly. Otherwise it was as easy to pass a constitutional amendment as any other decree. From the point of view of the members this meant that though they knew what were the principles of the constitution when they joined the League, they had no guaranties that these principles might not be changed even if they themselves objected to the amendments proposed. The one thing they were sure of was that the assembly was supreme in all problems that involved the League. Considering the general attitude of the Greeks toward law and constitutions, the ease with which the constitutions of the *symmachies* could be amended is truly remarkable. Probably, however, they did not consciously allow their ideas concerning law to affect greatly their ideas of *symmachies*, or vice versa. There is no indication that the principles and rules of the *symmachies* were ever classified as laws. This type of organization was based on a working agreement made, to be sure, for all time for the co-operation of the states involved in foreign affairs, and there was no reason why the parties that had made the agreement could not agree to alter its terms.

The ease with which the constitution could be changed does not mean that it actually was radically transformed at any time, unless we should say that it suffered such a transformation when Sparta began to treat her allies in a more high-handed manner, particularly in the fourth century. But this was not so much a change in the constitution of the League as a tendency on the part of Sparta to override that constitution. Of radical changes of another kind, changes in the jurisdiction of the assembly and the rights of the members over against the assembly, little is heard. The explanation, doubtless, is that the organization was regarded as an alliance concerned exclusively with foreign affairs. The public opinion of the League neither demanded nor would tolerate any real change of these fundamental principles. Hence the amendments passed could deal only with the details of the obligation of the allies to each other.



Just as the assembly was fully authorized to act on behalf of the members in questions involving the constitution of the League, so they also were authorized to act for them on other matters. From whatever angle the League is approached, the assembly is seen to have been its all-important organ. This is true even to the extent that it seems necessary to consider any clause in the constitution concerning the duties of the members as implying that these duties would be performed if the assembly so decreed. If the treaties stated that under certain circumstances the members would render aid to each other, this meant that the aid had to be rendered if the assembly so decided, but only then. This may not have been stated in so many words in the specific clause which indicated that the members should support one another. It is possible that this clause merely was interpreted in the light of the general principle of the supremacy of the assembly, the cardinal and central principle of the constitution of the League.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# MAXIMUS PLANUDES' TEXT OF THE SOMNIUM SCIPIONIS

BY WARREN E. BLAKE

IN THE latest edition of Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* by Ziegler (Leipsic, 1929) very little attention is paid to the thirteenth-century Greek translation of the text by Maximus Planudes. In fact, in only one place does Ziegler use it as the source of an emendation. Of the earlier editions, those to which I have had access, namely, that of Osann (Göttingen, 1847) and of Jan (Quedlinburg and Leipsic, 1848), while they record an occasional variation in Planudes' version, never attempt a constructive study to determine what evidence his divergences may present for variants and improvements of the Latin text. Such is the purpose of this paper. The text of Planudes on which this study is based is a transcript made in Florence by myself of Cod. Laur. Ashburnhamensis 1641, a paper manuscript in a small and graceful fifteenth-century hand, with few abbreviations and very few obvious errors of reading. I shall present first several noteworthy readings derived from Planudes' version and not supported by any one Latin manuscript.

125, 5: *nihil nisi de Africano loqueretur* = μηδὲν ὃ τι μὴ περὶ τοῦ Ἀφρικανοῦ τοῦ 'μοῦ πάππου δηλοῦντος. The probable correctness of Planudes' exemplar—i.e., *de Africano avo meo*—is established both by the ease with which *avo* could be lost after *Africano* and by the parallel passage in Cic. *Rep.* i. 27: *ut Africanum avum meum scribit Cato*.

125, 7: *me et de via (fessum add. Dresd. 151 et Arnst.) . . . artior . . . somnus complexus est* = ἐκ τε τῆς τροφῆς . . . βαθυτέρῳ . . . ἐλήφθη ὕπνῳ. The reading *de victu* here implied in place of *de via* has been noted and rejected by Osann. I may point out, however, that it receives ample support in Macrob. *Com.* i. 3, 4, where the causes of dreams include *si . . . distentus cibo . . .*, and in Cic. *Div.* i. 6: *nunc onusti cibo et vino perturbata et confusa (somnia) cernimus*.

125, 19: *ostendebat autem Karthaginem* = εἰδείκνυε δέ μοι τὴν Καρχη-

δόνα. The *mihi* implied in Planudes' version could easily be lost in the common mediaeval contraction *aut m̄*.

126, 8: *sed eius temporis ancipitem video quasi fatorum viam* = ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ὀξύτατην ὁρῶ ὡσαυεὶ μοιρῶν ὁδόν. Here evidently ὀξύτατα should be read for ὀξύτάτην. The palaeographical connection between *ancipitem* and the original of ὀξύτατα becomes evident if we assume the usual abbreviations *ācipitē* (for *ancipitem*) and *pacute* (for *peracute*). Moreover, Planudes' reading seems greatly preferable, since the "way of Fate" is by no means "dubious" (*ancipitem*), whereas the preciseness of the elder Africanus' prophecy shows that his vision was "very keen" (*peracute*).

126, 21: *ne . . . excitetis et parum rebus audite cetera* = μή . . . διανίστητε ἀλλ' εἰρήνη ἦτω τοῖς πράγμασι ὡς ἀκοῦσαι τὰ λοιπὰ. Much effort has been expended in attempts to restore the Latin text, and many emendations proposed, of which the most popular is *parumper* for *parum rebus*, proposed by Bouhier. The true reading lies concealed in the Greek version. Planudes obviously had before him *sed pax esto rebus audire cetera*. This, however, is awkward and unsatisfactory. But if we go one step farther and reconcile this with the reading of the Latin tradition, we get the true answer of the problem. The original reading of both traditions must have been *ne . . . excitetis set par ē vob̄ audire cetera*. That is, Planudes' *pax* was corrupted from the *par*, which remained in disguised form in the Latin tradition, while the *ē vob̄* (*est vobis*) in its contracted form closely resembled *ēo reb̄* (*esto rebus*), which appeared in Planudes' exemplar, but was left hopelessly corrupted in the other tradition, except for an attempt partially to restore the sense by changing *audire* to *audite*. The passage is now restored to its pristine clarity: *ne me e somno excitetis, sed par est vobis audire cetera*.

128, 21: *iam ipsa terra (iam vero ipsa, C F)* = καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ γῆ. This presupposes *nam ipsa terra*—a very possible reading in this context.

129, 18: *infra autem iam (eam, Macrobian.) nihil est nisi mortale et caducum* = ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γῆς οὐδὲν ἔστι ὃ τι μὴ (μοι, errore Codex) θνητὸν καὶ ἐπίκνηρον. Planudes, then, saw *in terra autem*, a natural error in his manuscript, since the earth or inmost circle of the universe is now the subject of discussion. The origin of this reading is to be seen by a comparison with the *infra* of our manuscript tradition. It is very probable

that *in terra* was a misreading for *intra*. The familiar abbreviation *i tra* for *in terra* would make the error extremely easy. Furthermore, *intra* would seem a superior reading to *infra*, since it is in more accord with the Platonic-Ciceronian conception of the structure of the universe in concentric circles or spheres. So on the next page (130, 9) earth is described as *complexa medium mundi locum*. Cf. also Cic. *Rep.* i. 64: *tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras*.

129, 24: *quid hic inquam* = τί τοῦτο ἔφην. Here alone Ziegler adopts the obvious suggestion of Planudes and reads *quid hoc* in his text.

130, 11: *in quibus eadem est vis duorum* = ὡν δυνὼν ἡ αὐτὴ πρόσεστι δύναμις. Here, though the implied original of Planudes, *quorum duobus eadem est vis*, is very attractive, I cannot equate it with the reading of the manuscript tradition.

130, 21: *hic vero tantus est totius mundi incitatissima conversione sonitus* = οὕτως δὲ τοσοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος τοῦ παντός ἤχου καὶ οὕτως ὀξυράτης ῥύμης. Planudes must have read in his copy: *hic (οὗτος) vero tantus est mundus totius sonitus et tam incitatissima conversione*. Correcting the obvious errors (*mundus* for *mundi*, due to the two following words which end in *-us*, and *et tam* for *e tam* by simple dittography), we arrive at the original reading: *hic vero tantus est mundi totius sonitus e tam incitatissima conversione*. In support of the changed position of *sonitus*, we may cite the reading of the *editio princeps* (Venice, 1472): *tantus est mundi sonitus*. The loss of *e tam* may be explained by its being misread as *etiam*, which so readily drops out. For this use of *tam* and the superlative in Cicero, cf. *Phil.* xii. 11: *nondum erat vestris tam gravissimis tamque multis iudiciis ignominiisque concisus*. The passage thus becomes definitely improved if we may now read: "Indeed so great is this sound of the whole universe from its so very rapid revolution. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

130, 29: *haec caelestia semper spectato* = παντὶ τὰ οὐράνια διὰ παντός ἔλπιζε. From this it would appear that Planudes had before him either *exspectato* or *sperato*. Whether either of these readings is superior to the *spectato* of the manuscript tradition is not certain. However, *ex-*

<sup>1</sup> There is no significance in Planudes' translation of *incitatissima* by ὀξυράτης. ὀξὺς in late Greek may mean "sharp," "shrill," or "swift." Planudes uses it indiscriminately for *incitatus*, *excitatus*, and *acutus*.

*spectato* does form a little better antithesis to the *illa humana contemnit* which follows. See also below on 133, 8.

132, 21: *deficere sol hominibus (omnibus, B M R W) exstinguique visus est* = ἐκλιπεῖν ὁ ἥλιος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔδοξε καὶ σβεσθῆναι. The confusion in manuscripts between *omnibus* and *hominibus* is well known. Planudes' version shows that both were present in his model. Cf. Cic. *ND* ii, 164: *omnibus hominibus . . . deos consulere*.

133, 8: *igitur alte spectare si voles atque hanc sedem et aeternam domum contueri (eligere, G)* = τοιγαροῦν (εἰ) εἰς τὸ ὕψος ἀφορᾶν ἐθελήσεις καὶ ταυτησί τῆς λήξεως καὶ αἰδίου κατοικίας ἐπιλαβέσθαι. Here Planudes follows the reading of G as his ἐπιλαβέσθαι shows. His version ταυτησί τῆς λήξεως points to an original *hanc sortem*. The sense of this reading is most appropriate to the logic of the passage. "Looking on high" is merely symbolic of the decision to choose the heavenly lot. *Igitur alte spectare si voles atque hanc sortem et aeternam domum eligere, . . . nec in praemiis humanis spem posueris rerum tuarum*. The parallelism to the Planudean tradition of 130, 29, cited above, is obvious. Cf. Cic. *Ad fam.* ii. 19. 1 for this use of *sors* as the equivalent of *fatum*. See below on 135, 6.

133, 13: *sermo autem omnis ille* = πᾶς γὰρ ὁ ἐκείνων λόγος. The reading *sermo autem omnis illorum*, which is here presupposed, affords a neater connection than the traditional *ille* with the preceding sentence. *Quid de te alii loquantur, ipsi videant, sed loquentur tamen. Sermo autem omnis illorum et angustiis cingitur. . . .*

135, 6: *in hanc sedem et domum suam pervolabit* = εἰς τήνδε τήν λήξιν καὶ τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἀναπήσεται οἶκον. As above in 133, 8, λήξιν here represents *sortem* in Planudes' text. However, in this place it is impossible to accept the reading, and we must retain *sedem*. In 130, 27; *sentio, inquit, te sedem etiam nunc hominum ac domum contemplari*, is rendered correctly by Planudes: αἰσθάνομαι σου φησί τήν ἔδραν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ οἰκίαν (αἰρίαν, errore Codex) καταμανθάνοντος. Palaeographically the change from *sedem* to *sortem* and vice versa was very easy. Thus the fact that in the present passage *sortem* wrongly appears in one tradition for *sedem* is an argument for, rather than against, the probability of an erroneous substitution of *sedem* for *sortem* in the other tradition in 133, 8.

135, 7: *idque ocius faciet, si . . . eminebit . . . et abstrahet* (*extrahet*, ed. pr.) = καὶ τοῦτο δ' ἂν κούφως ποιήσειεν εἴπερ . . . προκύπτει . . . καὶ ἐξέλκοι. In the first place, Planudes is very careful in translating the Latin moods to reproduce them by the exact Greek equivalents. Thus a future indicative in Latin is always rendered by a future indicative in Greek, and a conditional present subjunctive always appears as an εἰ with the optative, followed by the optative with ἂν. Consequently we may be sure that here his text had the forms *faciat*, *emineat*, and *abstrahat* or *extrahat*. Second, *κούφως* is not *ocius*, but rather *otiose* or *otiose*. We may thus reconstruct Planudes' exemplar as follows: *Idque otiose faciat, si . . . emineat foras, et . . . quam maxime se e corpore extrahat*. Both variants are highly commendable. The *ocius* of the manuscript tradition is displeasingly repetitious after the *velocius* which immediately precedes it. So too, after the patriotic exhortation of the previous sentence expressed in the vivid future form, the tone needs to be lowered somewhat to the less vivid form in the practical suggestions which follow.

135, 15: *nec hunc in locum nisi multis exagitati saeculis* (*nisi multis saeculis exactis*, Codex Par. Macrob.) *revertuntur* = καὶ οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν πρὸς τουτονὶ τὸν χώρον ὅ τι μὴ πολλοῖς αἰῶσι δίκας εἰσπραχθεῖσαι ἐπανακάμπτουσι. In the Paris manuscript of Macrobius we see the neat solution of the apparently great divergence between the manuscript tradition and the version of Planudes. The Greek implies as its Latin original: *nisi multis saeculis multis exactis*. At some point between the time of writing of Planudes' exemplar and that of the Parisian codex of Macrobius some copyist failed to recognize the noun *multa* in the second *multis*, and so omitted it as a dittography. Of the correctness of the *multis exactis* there can be no doubt. Cf. Plato *Phaed.* 81 D: ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς (τροφῆς T). The *multis saeculis* however, which was very awkward in construction even when *exagitati* was read, now becomes almost a solecism. Yet the idea of the lapse of a long period of time must be retained, as Plato shows us once more (*Rep.* 615. A: εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη). This would best appear in the sentence in the form *multis post saeculis*. Cf. Cic., fragment viii (*De gloria*), 9: *tumulum multis etiam post saeculis*

*praetereuntes*. The restored passage will accordingly now read: *nec hunc in locum nisi multis post saeculis, multis exactis, revertuntur*.

From the readings cited above we may reasonably conclude that the Latin original of Planudes' translation represents a tradition that is older than, or at least distinct from, that of the existing Latin manuscripts. It will consequently be of interest to note in the second section of this paper those passages in which Planudes lends significant support to the readings of one or more of the Latin codices against others. In this list I have purposely omitted numerous variants of ambiguous value. So, for example, *vobis* = ἡμῖν and *nobis* = ὑμῖν are errors so easy to commit on either the Greek or the Latin side that no conclusions of significance may be drawn from them. Also very limited attention has been paid to divergences of word order, since the exigencies of translation produce inevitable dislocations of the original. In the few cases where Planudes has obviously omitted a word or phrase of the Latin, I have preferred in general not to note these omissions. The *argumentum ex silentio* is dangerous enough under any circumstances, but doubly so when one is dealing with translations. Naturally, when the divergent sense of the translation can be explained readily by a corruption in the Greek text itself, as happens very rarely, no record thereof has been included. Likewise, when in two or three places Planudes substitutes a pronoun for its noun or vice versa for the sake of clarity or smoothness, again nothing can be concluded of value to the history of the text. In general, however, it should be stated that the translation is one of extreme skill and fidelity, with a sustained effort, in so far as the natural differences of the two idioms permit, to reproduce the exact phraseology and even the word order of the original.

124, 21: *Cuius ego nomine recreor ipso (ipse recreor, BC<sup>1</sup> GUW alii Hauler) = οὐπερ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ ὀνόματι ζωπυροῦμαι*. Planudes here follows what is probably the inferior reading.

126, 9: *nam cum aetas tua . . . converterit, duoque ii numeri . . . summam tibi fatalem confecerint, in te se . . . convertet* = καὶ γὰρ τῆς ἡλικίας σοι . . . ἀμειψάσης, δύο οὗτοί γε ἀριθμοὶ . . . τὸ πεπωμένον



σοι τέλος συμπράξουσι, καὶ πρὸς σέ . . . ἐαυτὴν ἐπιστρέψει. Osann's Dresd. 1, not used by Ziegler, reads *conficient* for *confecerint*. Unfortunately the distribution of the connectives in the Dresden manuscript is not indicated by Osann. The reading of the Planudes exemplar, supported in part at least by Dresd. 1, will have been: *nam cum . . . converterit, duo ii quidem numeri . . . summam tibi fatalem conficient, et in te se . . . convertet*—a slightly more vigorous form of prophetic expression.

126, 16: *ac, ne multa, dictator rem publicam constituas oportebit* = καὶ ἵνα μὴ πολλὰ λέγω, σέ μόνον ἄρξαντα τὴν πολιτείαν καταστήσαι δεήσει. The implied original of Planudes—i.e., *ne multa dicam*—is supported by Osann's Dresd. 1. Moreover, the loss of *dicam* before *dictatorem* in the other manuscripts is palaeographically very easy. The *oportebit*, adopted by Ziegler into his text from the 1555 edition in preference to the *oportet* of all the manuscripts, is here supported by Planudes' δεήσει.

126, 25: *certum esse in caelo definitum locum* = ἀποδεδειγμένον τυγχάνειν ἐν οὐρανῷ τόπον καὶ ὠρισμένον. The reading *et definitum* here implied is both in accordance with good Ciceronian style and is supported by Dresd. 1 as well as by the *editio princeps* and other early editions. Other manuscripts according to Osann read *ac definitum*. Cf. Cic. *De or.* ii. 14: *unum de certa definitaque causa*.

126, 26: *ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruuntur* = ἐνθάπερ οἱ μακάριοι ἀτέλευτῆτον αἰῶνος καταπολαύουσιν. As stated above, Planudes is very careful to reproduce the moods of his Latin original. His model, then, had *fruuntur*, a reading found also in Osann's Arnstadtensis and in the first hand of his Darmstadtensis (Ziegler's D). The indicative form gives a sense that is quite satisfactory, making a simple descriptive clause of the construction.

127, 8: *et alii quos nos extinctos esse arbitramur* = καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἷς ἡμᾶς ἀπεσβηκότας εἶναι οἴομεθα. The curious inversion of meaning in the first part of Planudes' translation would seem to be a rendering of *et alii quibus nos extinctos esse*, but it is almost certainly a corruption in the Ashburnham Codex for οὓς ἡμεῖς κτλ. The reading οἴομεθα, however, seems genuine and is supported on the Latin side by *arbitramur* in the first hand of E and by G. Again the present indicative gives a

satisfactory sense, making the relative clause parenthetical to the indirect question.

127, 11: *quin tu aspicias* (*aspicies*, V; *aspicias*, cett.) = τί γὰρ μὴ βλέπεις. The reading *aspicias*, which is a conjecture of Heinrich adopted into his text by Ziegler, thus receives support from Planudes.

127, 12: *ad te venientem Paulum patrem* = ἐρχόμενον πρὸς σέ (πρὸς σέ supra lin.) Παῦλον τὸν πατέρα σουτοῦ. The strong form *σουτοῦ* used here by Planudes shows that his text must have read *patrem tuum*. This is found also in Osann's Rehdigeranus (= Ziegler's W), Uffenbachiensis, Confluentianus, Dresdensis 2, and Herbipolitanus.

127, 20: *cuius hoc templum est omne* = οὗ νεὼς ἐστὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν. The reading *cuius templum est hoc omne* is also found in Osann's Dresd. 2.

129, 26: *intervallis disiunctus* (*disiunctus*, Macrobi. et Favonius; *coniunctus*, codd.) *imparibus* = διαστήμασι περιττοῖς συνημμένος. Planudes thus follows the *Somnium* tradition against Macrobius.

129, 26: *pro rata parte ratione* = τῇ συμφώνῳ τῶν μερῶν ἀναλογία. The Greek supports the readings of E and F—i.e., *pro rata partium ratione*—against the other manuscripts.

130, 1: *motu ipsorum orbium* = κινήσεως τῶνδε τῶν σφαιρῶν. The reading *eorum orbium* of the Latin original reappears in Favonius' quotation of this passage: *eorum ordinum* (*sic*).

130, 9: *una* (*ima*, W et plur. codd. Macrobiani) *sede semper haeret* = ἐν ἑδρᾷ μιᾷ δι' αἰῶνος ἐστήρικται. That is, Planudes here opposes W and Macrobius. While of course the Greek construction necessitates the addition of *ἐν* whether or not *in* appeared in the Latin, still there is evidence that *in una sede* was the original reading. Cf. Cic. *Rep.* ii. 7: *qui incolunt eas urbes non haerent in suis sedibus*. The loss of the preposition before *una* (or its palaeographical equivalent *ima*) would of course be very simple.

131, 26: *quis* (*vis*, P; *vix*, B G T; *vel quis*, W) *in reliquis* = ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλοίποις τίς. Planudes here evidently follows W's *vel quis*, a reading which likewise explains the variants of P B G T.

131, 27: *tuum nomen audiet* (*audiat*, P) = τὸ σὸν ἂν ἀκούσειεν ὄνομα. Planudes here agrees with P in what seems the preferable reading. The tone of the passage is better suited by the slightly contemptuous force of the subjunctive construction.

132, 11: *qui ante (ante te, P) nati sunt* = τῶν σοῦ προγενεστέρων. Planudes' agreement with P seems correct. The *te* is readily lost by haplography, and I can find no other Ciceronian example of the adverbial use of *ante* with *natus*.

132, 16: *re ipsa autem cum* (Macrob.; *cum autem*, codd.) = ἀλλ' ἦν καὶ αὖν.

133, 1: *ad idem principium (idem, Macrob.; om. codd.)* = πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν.

133, 2: *cuius quidem anni (Macrob. et E; huius quippe anni, F; huius anni, rell.)* = τοῦτου γε μὴν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ. That is, Planudes follows F. From these last three passages and others it appears that Planudes' text follows neither the Macrobius nor the *Somnium* tradition consistently.

135, 12: *impulsuque libidinum voluptatibus oboedientium deorum et hominum iura violaverunt* = καὶ τῇ τῶν θεῶν (errore; cf. Plato *Legg.* 841 A: ἡδονῶν ῥώμῃ) ῥώμῃ ταῖς ἡδοναθείαις ὑπέκυψαν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δίκαια κατεπάτησαν. Osann here quotes the Uffenbachiensis as reading *oboedierunt*. This is of course Planudes' original. I believe that it is also the correct reading. The phrase *libidines voluptatibus oboedientes*, even if it be good Latin, is quite inappropriate. It should at least be *voluptates libidinibus oboedientes*. If, however, we read *impulsuque libidinum voluptatibus oboedierunt et deorum et hominum iura violaverunt*, then the logic of the whole passage is improved, "for the souls of those who have surrendered themselves to the pleasures [*voluptatibus*] of the body, and have offered themselves to be, as it were, their slaves, and have, at the instigation of their lusts, become obedient to pleasures [*voluptatibus*], and have violated the laws of gods and men. . . ."

135, 17: *ego somno (somno statim, Vind. 2 (in marg. et ed. pr. et alii) solutus sum* = ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ ὕπνου εἰθὺς ἀπελύθην.

As may be seen from the passages just cited, the text of Planudes falls into no classification. Indeed, classification of the Latin manuscripts themselves of the *Somnium* is impossible, as Ziegler confesses. Nor does Planudes favor consistently the readings of any one manuscript, or even in every case the consensus of all the manuscripts against the Macrobius tradition or the *testimonia* of Favonius, but

follows now one manuscript or tradition and now another. Any conclusions, therefore, as to the place of the Planudean text in the tradition as a whole must necessarily be chiefly negative. It is interesting to note that in three or four places the Dresden manuscripts, highly esteemed by Osann, but neglected by Ziegler, are supported by Planudes.

On the other hand, the independent value of the version is shown plainly not only by its impartiality, but by the numerous new and convincing readings such as have been elicited in the first section of this paper. Also the very nature of the errors in certain of its implied readings (see especially 126, 21, and 130, 21) gives evidence of an older and less corrupted text than appears in any of the extant manuscripts. It is clear, therefore, that no future editor of the *Somnium* can afford to neglect this valuable source of information.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

## THE COUCH AS A UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

BY EUGENE S. MCCARTNEY

TODAY we have standard methods of measuring distances, areas, spaces, weight, time, and other things, but the original units of measurement were more or less makeshift devices. As Vitruvius<sup>1</sup> tells us, the fundamental ideas of measures of length were derived from parts of the body, as the finger, the palm, the forearm (*cubitus*), and the foot. Seeds, grains, and pebbles of a somewhat uniform size were employed in weighing. Most of our standard measures have had similar humble but logical beginnings from things in the world of nature.<sup>2</sup>

Among the Greeks the word κλίνη, "couch," finally became a unit of area and in one instance, as quoted later, a compound containing this word was used figuratively to indicate a large head. The transition in meaning was quite natural.

It is our custom to indicate the size of a large dining-room or banquet hall by stating the number of persons it will seat, but the Greeks preferred to give the number of couches it contained or could contain. Pollux is explicit on this point: Λέγεται δὲ καὶ οἶκος τρίκλινος, πεντάκλινος καὶ δεκάκλινος καὶ ἀπλῶς, πρὸς τὸ μέτρον τοῦ μεγέθους ὃ τῶν κλινῶν ἀριθμός.<sup>3</sup>

We are told that Cleombrotus usually dined in a small room which contained only three couches, but which could accommodate two more when he was entertaining ambassadors.<sup>4</sup> He might, perhaps, have had a slightly larger room without running much risk of being charged with extravagance by his parsimonious subjects. Even "among the

<sup>1</sup> iii. 1. 5.

<sup>2</sup> See the interesting volumes by E. Nicholson, *Men and Measures: A History of Weights and Measures, Ancient and Modern* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1912), and M. P. Nilsson, *Primitive Time-Reckoning* (Acta Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis, 1920). I have made a small collection of somewhat similar material in a paper called "Popular Methods of Measuring," *Class. Jour.*, XXII (1927), 325-44.

<sup>3</sup> i. 79.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Cleom.* xiii. 3.

ancients," according to Athenaeus,<sup>5</sup> there were dining-rooms with three, four, seven, and nine couches, and some had a still larger number. In the time of Plutarch, however, a "thirty-couched" dining-room was regarded as an insolent display of wealth.<sup>6</sup>

During the nine-day festivities which marked Alexander's return to Macedonia after the destruction of Thebes, he entertained friends, the commanders of his army, and ambassadors in a "hundred-couched" tent or pavilion.<sup>7</sup> On another occasion, soon after the capture of Darius, Alexander used a "hundred-couched" room for the celebration of the marriage feast of himself and his companions.<sup>8</sup> Other examples of large rooms were the bedchambers in the palace at Jerusalem. Josephus<sup>9</sup> describes them as large enough for a hundred beds.

An excellent opportunity to study the couch as a unit of measurement for rooms is to be found in two descriptions of luxurious ships recorded by Athenaeus.<sup>10</sup> King Ptolemy Philopator constructed for use on the Nile a barge of state which contained two rooms characterized as "five-couched," one as "seven-couched," and two as "nine-couched."<sup>11</sup> In view of the use to which the boat was put, these expressions doubtless signify that the rooms actually contained the number of couches indicated rather than that they were large enough to contain such a number. Perhaps capacity rather than actual number is signified by the description of the largest cabin as *εἴκοσι κλινὰς ἐπιδεχόμενος*.<sup>12</sup> A chamber devoted to Dionysus is called "thirteen-couched,"<sup>13</sup> which doubtless means "large enough for thirteen couches," as it is rendered by the Loeb translator.

In another richly furnished boat, built by Hieron of Syracuse, there were "four-couched" cabins for the crew.<sup>14</sup> "The officers' cabin could

<sup>5</sup> 47 E-F. Quotations from Phrynichus and Eubulus are given in this reference. See also Xen. *Symp.* ii. 18; Timotheus, as quoted by Athenaeus 243 D; Pollux i. 79, vi. 7; Themist. *Orat.* xix. 223a.

<sup>6</sup> *Mor.* 679 B.

<sup>7</sup> Diod. Sic. xvii. 16. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Chares, as quoted by Athenaeus 538 C.

<sup>9</sup> *Bell. Iud.* v. 4. 4. For a σκηνή . . . τετράκλινος ἢ πεντάκλινος see *Papiri greci e latini*, V, 116, No. 533 ("Publicazioni della Società Italiana per la Ricerca dei Papiri Greci e Latini in Egitto"). A note explains the Greek quoted by "una cabina a quattro o cinque posti."

<sup>10</sup> 204 D—209 E.

<sup>11</sup> 205 C-D, 206 A.

<sup>12</sup> 205 B.

<sup>13</sup> 205 E.

<sup>14</sup> 207 C.

hold fifteen couches and contained three apartments of the size of three couches. . . ."<sup>15</sup> There were also a "three-couched" shrine of Aphrodite, a "five-couched" library, and a "three-couched" bath-room.<sup>16</sup> It seems that in the last three expressions the couch is used simply as a unit of measurement, although some of these rooms doubtless had couches.

A still more interesting use of the word "couch" in connection with a boat is to be found in Xenophon.<sup>17</sup> He tells how on a certain Phoenician ship an immense amount of goods and gear was packed away so neatly that it took but little more space than a well-proportioned ten-couched room.<sup>18</sup> The context makes it clear that this is a measure of area rather than of capacity, since objects were arranged with regard to convenience in finding and removing them. There is one passage, however, which does seem to imply cubic measure, but I leave this for the reader to decide for himself. It runs as follows: "Misisti tu quidem lembum mobilem, solidum, lecti capacem, iamque cum piscibus."<sup>19</sup>

The area of underground chambers might likewise be indicated in terms of couches. In ridiculing a dinner given on the occasion of Iphierates' marriage to the daughter of a Thracian king, the comic poet Anaxandrides said in the *Protesilaus*<sup>20</sup> that the kettles were of bronze and larger than cisterns or reservoirs big enough for twelve couches. At first glance this may seem like a purely humorous method of measuring, but the dungeon into which the Romans threw Perseus is described as "nine-couched" in size (τὸ μὲν μέγεθος ἔχον οἶκον μάλιστα πῶς ἐννεακλίνου).<sup>21</sup>

Examples of even greater freedom in secondary uses of the word "couch" are to be found in Aristotle. He describes a spring of the

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* The translation is that of C. B. Gulick in the "Loeb Classical Library."

<sup>16</sup> 207 E-F. <sup>17</sup> *Oec.* viii. 12-13; see also Pollux i. 80.

<sup>18</sup> In his edition of *The "Oeconomicus" of Xenophon*, H. A. Holden suggests "measuring ten κλῖναι."

<sup>19</sup> Sidonius Apollinaris ii. 9 (12).

<sup>20</sup> As quoted by Athenaeus 131 B. For this reference and the one from the *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon, I am indebted to Professor Robert J. Bonner of the University of Chicago.

<sup>21</sup> Diod. Sic. xxxi. 9. 2.



Palici in Sicily as "ten-couched."<sup>22</sup> In another passage<sup>23</sup> he tells us that "in Apollonia" there was a place not far from a deposit of asphalt and pitch where fire was burning all the time. "The area ablaze is not large, it seems, but about five-couched." He also says that the skin of the wild ox of Paeonia (*βόλινθος* or *βόνασος*) when stretched out would cover an "eight-couched area."<sup>24</sup>

During the investment of the city of Rhodes, Demetrius Poliorcetes constructed some enormous siege engines.<sup>25</sup> The largest is described as one hundred cubits high and as having nine stories. The lowest story was big enough for forty-three couches; the highest, for nine. In view of the many kinds of rooms and chambers whose areas or floors are measured by couches, it is certainly natural enough to indicate the sizes of these stories in this way, but the editor of the 1906 Teubner edition, C. H. Fischer, substitutes *ἀκαιῶν* for *κλινῶν*, in defiance of the manuscript readings. Is not the *difficilior lectus* the easier one?

Since the Greeks frequently employed the couch as a unit of area, they doubtless had in mind a more or less standard size, which would naturally vary from place to place and from century to century. An analogy may be found in the varying length of the *schoinos* which bewildered ancient Greek travelers upon the Nile as they passed from city to city.<sup>26</sup> One writer, however, does give some indication of the width of the couch. He is Philo of Byzantium, whose exact date is not known. He was a pupil of Ctesibius, who flourished in the reign of King Euergetes.<sup>27</sup>

Philo<sup>28</sup> records a few measurements of parts of city walls like those at Rhodes. He says that some walls had passageways on top which

<sup>22</sup> *De mirab. ausc.* 127.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* 57.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* 1. In *De animalibus historia* 630 a 23-24, however, Aristotle gives "seven-couched" as the measurement of the skin.

<sup>25</sup> *Diod. Sic.* xx. 91. 1-4.

<sup>26</sup> *Strabo* xi. 11. 5; xvii. 1. 24. Cf. *Pliny Nat. hist.* vi. 124; "Inconstantiam mensurae diversitas auctorum facit cum Persae quoque schoenos et parasangas alii alia mensura determinent."

<sup>27</sup> I am accepting the conclusions of E. J. A. Kenny, "The Date of Ctesibius," *Class. Quart.*, XXVI (1932), 190-92.

<sup>28</sup> 80. 48 in the Thévenot edition. In the revision of Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, by Henry Stuart Jones, the word *ἐπτάκλινος* as used by Philo is regarded as a measure of area.

were 7 cubits broad and that beneath them there were "seven-couched" watch-houses or guard posts (*φυλακτήρια ἐπτάκλινα*) with front walls 10 cubits long and 10 cubits thick. In a translation of this passage two German scholars<sup>29</sup> give 4.436 meters as the equivalent of 10 cubits and comment as follows in a note: "In den Wachthäusern lassen sich auf 4.436 m bequem 7 Pritschen zu 60 cm Breite aufstellen. . . ."

Nearly half a century ago a French writer<sup>30</sup> understood the words of Philo to mean that the watch-houses measured 7 by 10 cubits, which gives a floor measurement of 70 square cubits. He then estimates by the following argument the area occupied by a couch:

On remarquera que, la coudée étant sensiblement égale à un demi-mètre, un lit ordinaire de deux personnes mesure environ 4 coudées de longueur sur 2 coudées et demie de largeur, ce qui fait justement 10 coudées carrées. Ainsi il y aurait lieu, à notre sens, d'admettre que la κλίνη était pour les Grecs une unité de surface de la valeur qu'on vient de dire.

Personally I much prefer the German conclusions. The French estimate leaves not even a square inch unused, and the theoretical couches would have to be cut up in order to fit into such an area. I do not believe that the couch ever became so precise a unit of measurement. Had it done so there would be more references to it. It was doubtless a unit of measurement which could be applied without the aid of exact measuring devices. Under most circumstances doubtless a *coup d'œil* sufficed.

These examples of the freedom with which the word "couch" was used as a unit of area make clearer and more significant, I believe, a comic poet's ridicule of Pericles as it is preserved by Plutarch: "And Telecleides speaks of him as sitting on the acropolis in the greatest perplexity, 'now heavy of head, and now alone, from the eleven-couched chamber of his head, causing vast uproar to arise.'" <sup>31</sup>

The interpretation of "eleven-couched" in this passage has caused

<sup>29</sup> H. Diels und E. Schramm, "Exzerpte aus Philons Mechanik B. VII und VIII," *Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: Phil.-hist. Klasse*, No. 12 (1919), p. 22.

<sup>30</sup> Ch. Graux, *Revue critique d'histoire et de littérature*, IV (1877), 6-8.

<sup>31</sup> *Per.* iii. 4. The translation is that of B. Perrin in the "Loeb Classical Library."

some trouble,<sup>32</sup> but obviously it is merely a vivid way of saying "roomy" or "capacious."

It may not be amiss to note in conclusion that our word "gallon" is used rather freely in giving sizes of hats. We have "two-gallon" and "ten-gallon" hats. In E. Eggleton's *The Hoosier Schoolmaster* one reads of "Forty-Gallon Baptists,"<sup>33</sup> a usage which is perhaps somewhat akin to an "eleven-couched" head.<sup>34</sup>

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

<sup>32</sup> Three interpretations by previous scholars are listed, with disapproval, by H. A. Holden in his *Life of Pericles*, p. 85: "a head as long as eleven couches"; "tête longue comme onze lits ou plutôt d'une longueur telle qu'il eût fallu onze lits pour la porter"; "tam grandis ut undecim stratis indigeat (Pericles), in quibus accumbat." I wish to acknowledge indebtedness to Holden's note.

<sup>33</sup> Described in chap. xii as a sect that existed "in all the old Western and South-western States."

<sup>34</sup> I wish to thank Mr. Herbert C. Youtie, of the University of Michigan, for criticism which led to the improvement of this paper.

## THE INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTERS BY NAME IN THE *METAMORPHOSES* OF APULEIUS

BY BLANCHE BROTHERTON

IN HIS recent book, *Der Stil des Apuleius von Madaura*,<sup>1</sup> Bernhard notes that Apuleius often fails to inform his readers of the names of important characters until late in the story or episode.<sup>2</sup> The reason for such postponement he explains as the desire to arouse suspense; so Psyche, for example, is named only after fifty-four lines of the tale have been related. Meroe, Byrrhena, Thelyphron, Haemus, Philebus, Thiasus, and Isis are all introduced in some way other than by direct appellation; their *nomina propria* are indicated later.

The lack of vital similarity which the characters in Bernhard's list exhibit and of any real suspense will concern us later; his interest is in stylistic features of language rather than in the technique of narrative. His hint, however, is suggestive, and it may not be amiss to consider by what means Apuleius effects the introduction of the scores of characters who meet us in the pages of his romance.

### I

The introduction of characters by name is but one phase of the larger task of introduction; only a very small percentage of the *personae* of the *Metamorphoses* are equipped with proper names. Further, a mere name does not necessarily carry with it all the information necessary to place a given person in the story. Other details of equal or even greater importance must be explained. If the artistic demands made of the author of a novel in the introduction of his characters by name are less strict than they are in the case of a playwright,<sup>3</sup> in one

<sup>1</sup> *Ein Beitrag zur Stilistik des Spätlateins* (Stuttgart, 1927).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93, n. 45.

<sup>3</sup> Except in so far as the exposition assists, the identity of an actor must be revealed in conversation which is realistic. The author of a novel may at any time in his own person or that of the narrator give the information necessary to introduce a character. Only in those parts of the narrative related by conversation (and even here he may interrupt at any point) does his problem approach that of the dramatist. For a discussion of introduction in drama see D. M. Key, *The Introduction of Characters by Name in Greek and Roman Comedy* (University of Chicago diss., 1923); A. B. Bellinger treats the same theme for Lucian in *Lucian's Dramatic Technique* ("Yale Classical Studies," I [1928], 3 ff.).

respect the novelist is at a disadvantage. His reader cannot see his figures face to face. Their characterization, relationship to other persons, the part they play, must be told largely in word pictures without the aid of costume, age, beauty, or ugliness to suggest rôle or function.

The *Metamorphoses* by its very nature contains a great number of characters. A framework consisting of the experiences of a person traveling from place to place, in association with constantly changing groups, and relating not only his personal adventures but those of anyone else of interest, places no limit to the number of participants in the various *fabulae*. It is obvious at the outset that many names can be dispensed with because the majority of the characters are not permanent but temporary.

The means by which an author introduces his characters, the proportion of the named and the unnamed, and the substitutions for proper names are worth consideration only if the results show some rhyme or reason underlying the practice. Is personal contact a decisive factor? Are the characters in a given type of tale regularly named or regularly unnamed? Does class differentiation afford any clue? Is Bernhard's thesis of suspense valid? Will Apuleian technique in the introduction of characters by name substantiate or disprove existing theories on the "contamination" of tales or the distinction between *fabula* and *historia*?

The number of nameless rôles in the *Metamorphoses* far exceeds the named. The latter group, comprising in addition to the men and gods of the Psyche tale<sup>4</sup> fifty-four characters marked with distinctive names, is further reduced by the omission of incidental people who do not enter into the action of the story. So, for example, Plutarch and Sextus (i. 2), ancestors of Lucius, and Theron (vii. 5), father of the pretended Haemus, serve merely as passport credentials. Other individuals, such as servants who perform some trifling act at a master's command, fill minor rôles and are not strictly essential to the action. Seventeen such characters<sup>5</sup> may be called incidental; their function is

<sup>4</sup> With Cupid as lover, the other rôles are determined immediately as an Antigone fixes those of a tragedy.

<sup>5</sup> Demeas (i. 21), Nicanor (iv. 16), and Salvia (ii. 2) serve as credentials; Clytius (i. 24), Lupus (i. 5), Arignotus (ii. 14), and Caesar (iii. 29, vii. 7) are mentioned but play no rôle; Myrrhine (ii. 24) and Philodespotus (ii. 26) each perform a single act; Babulus (iv. 14) is credited with the invention of the masquerade; Myrtilus, Hefaestio, Hypataeus, and Apollonius (ix. 2) are victims of rabies and suggest that Lucius may suffer from the same disease.

to lend credence to a given situation or add circumstantial detail valuable in itself or occasionally leading to action.

With the elimination of these incidental rôles, the remaining *nomina* are divided as follows: Book i includes Lucius, the hero (24), and the household in which he visits, composed of Milo, his host (21), Pamphile,<sup>6</sup> Milo's wife, and Fotis their maid (23). A fellow-traveler, Aristomenes (6), relates a tale of witchcraft involving his friend Socrates, Meroe, the witch (7), and her assistant, Panthia (12). The episode of the wasted fishes adds Pythias, a school friend of Lucius (24). Book ii introduces Byrrhena (3), another inhabitant of Hypata, at whose house Lucius, the son of her best friend, is a welcome visitor. At a dinner at her home Thelyphron (20) relates the most "cutting" experience of his life, a second tale of witchcraft. Here the characters are nameless with the exception of two servants<sup>7</sup> and an Egyptian priest, Zatchlas (28). A previous after-dinner chat at Milo's had revealed Diophanes, a Chaldaean prophet (13), as a faker; he was tricked in turn by Cerdo, a successful merchant (13). In Book iv are related the exploits of three robber heroes, Lamachus (8), Alcimus (12), and Thrasyleon (15), pitted against Chryseros (9), an *anus* (12), and Demochares (13). Charite<sup>8</sup> is captured, and the Cupid and Psyche tale interrupts the main narrative. In Book vii Haemus (5) tells of the heroism of Plotina (6) and his real identity as Tlepolemus, Charite's lover (12), is disclosed. His villainous rival, Thrasyllus (1), meets his end in Book viii and Lucius is passed on to his third owner, the Syrian priest Philebus (25). Stories of three faithless wives appear in Book ix; we know the names of the characters of only one. The wife of Lucius' fourth master at the advice of her nurse takes Philesitherus (16) as her lover; he had been the lover of her neighbor Arete, who had outwitted her husband Barbarus (nicknamed Scorpio) with the help of Myrmex (17). Thiasus (x. 18) is a wealthy Corinthian, the eighth and final owner of the ass. In Book xi Isis (5) and Osiris (27) and their priests, Mithras (22) and Asinius Marcellus (27), are prominent.

The paucity of characters with names is most apparent when set

<sup>6</sup> Named in ii. 5.      <sup>7</sup> Cf. n. 5. It is natural to address by name in a command.

<sup>8</sup> Nameless until vii. 12.

over against the unnamed. Without listing the incidental rôles,<sup>9</sup> of which there is a goodly number, Book i contains four nameless individuals, the fellow-traveler and companion of Aristomenes (2), the janitor (15) of the inn where he and Socrates lodged, the *anus caupona* (21) who directs Lucius to Milo's house, and the *piscator* (24). In Book ii the *senex* (2), with Byrrhena, Diophanes' friend who caused his lapse (13), and the majority of the individuals in Thelyphron's tale—the *praeco* (21), the wife (23), the *adulter* (27), the husband (24), the witch who appears as *mustela* (25), and the uncle (27)—are unnamed. The dignitaries and ministers of the courtroom (iii. 2 ff.), the accuser (3), and the relatives of the deceased are present at Lucius' trial *sine nominibus propriis*. Fotis' explanation of the strange assailants adds a Boeotian youth (16) and a shearer of goatskins (17). The robbers who constitute a group are not named. En route to their fasthold, in the fourth book a gardener and his wife (3) mistreat the ass. An *anus* (7) cares for the robbers; another *anus* (12) was the intended victim of Alcimus. The slave who discovered the bear at large (19), the man who finally stabbed him, and the butcher who despoiled him (21) are designated only by their actions. The narrator (8) of the three unsuccessful attempts at robbery is only *unus*.

This analysis of the first four books will serve to illustrate the substitutes which Apuleius employs in lieu of names. Occupations, out of which often develop proper names, quite naturally serve as labels. They are more helpful than a colorless proper name would be, for as a rule the occupation has bearing on the story.<sup>10</sup> So it is more to the point that Lucius' accuser is captain of the night guard than that he is "so and so." Janitors, lictors, magistrates and judges, barbers, robbers, gardeners, cooks, governors, grooms, bakers, and witches usually act in their proper capacity. Confusion due to repetition of the same profession is avoided by the fact that few rôles and few tales are long continued.

Akin to the group named from a profession is that in which a temporary act or occupation distinguishes the character. There is

<sup>9</sup> E.g., the juggler (i. 4). The number mounts well up into the sixties.

<sup>10</sup> Sometimes the relation is slight; so an *anus caupona* answers a question, but it is the publicity of an inn which makes her a natural choice; the fuller's trade is utilized in the press where the lover lies hidden (ix. 24), the baker's in the bin (ix. 23), etc.



likely to be little interest in the identity of the people of this group; the action or function alone is important.<sup>11</sup>

Characters are designated by terms of relationship as often as by occupation; of family most frequently, sometimes of friendship or community. In any stories which deal with human beings, relationship is obviously important. So the *uxor*, *filius*, *nepos*, *amicus*, and the like are adequate terms for placing a character. Slaves and servants swell the group considerably.

Sometimes age is significant; poverty, wealth, or mental equipment are distinguishing features. But they must be attached to speech or action to have real bearing.<sup>12</sup>

It may well be observed that certain nameless characters have no need of names. So any individual who merely "passes" in the narrative has no occasion to disclose his identity.<sup>13</sup> Again, it is easy and natural for the narrator<sup>14</sup> not to mention his own name. But, granting these exceptions, there still remains a large residue of nameless people.

Personal contact<sup>15</sup> does not altogether make the demarcation between the named and the unnamed. Lucius has first-hand contacts with nine<sup>16</sup> named individuals before his metamorphosis, six during his assdom, and four after regaining human form. Of the unnamed, he is more or less associated with seven acquaintances<sup>17</sup> as Lucius and with some thirty-five as the ass. Secondhand knowledge (the characters form the subjects of tales) introduces him to four other people in the first two books and ten while he is a beast of burden; in the same two periods Lucius meets eleven nameless individuals, the ass meets thirty-five. The period of metamorphosis—the greater part of the story—

<sup>11</sup> These rôles are not permanent; travelers, messengers, etc., fall into this class. Later reference to one of these actors causes awkward fulness, e.g., *sed ille qui commodum falsam de me notoriam pertulerat* (vii. 4).

<sup>12</sup> So youth and strength inspire action (iv. 21); age gives experience and good council (x. 4).

<sup>13</sup> E.g., the shepherd (viii. 19).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. the robber (iv. 8) and the reporter of Charite's death (viii. 1); also the postponement of Lucius' name.

<sup>15</sup> This accounts in part for the named; in spite of contact, some characters are unnamed.

<sup>16</sup> Incidental characters are not included.

<sup>17</sup> Various reasons might account for lack of names here.

offers the largest contrast: the ass knows six named characters as over against thirty-five who are unnamed. But in general more of the characters closely attached to the hero are named, especially in the first two books, in which Lucius is at the center of the action and the narrated tales are fewer.

The nature of the named and the unnamed seems also to determine the assignment of proper name. The majority of the tales of the *Metamorphoses* deal with two themes, witchcraft and illicit love. The *personae* of these stories are nameless for the most part. The exceptions serve to support rather than damage the thesis. The love affair of Arete (ix. 17 ff.), in which the rôles are named, is included within the framework of another tale; it would be distinctly awkward to refer to these absent characters in any other way than by name. The further desire to quote authority for action also leads to the use of definite name. Again, the fact that the actors in Aristomenes' tale are named is no real contradiction to the general rule that creatures in magic tales are nameless. Socrates' fate is related by a personal friend who witnessed his death. More to the point is the fact that Lucius' introduction to witchcraft should carry conviction. Names lend credence. The mention of Zatchlas by name in Thelyphron's tale is probably part of the realistic detail in the description of the foreigner's linen garb, tonsure, and awesome ritual.

Over against these tales stand the episodes of the three robbers and the Psyche and Charite stories in which the characters have proper names. It is worth noting that the sympathies of the reader are on the side of these individuals as they are not in most of the other tales. These characters represent a higher stratum of society;<sup>18</sup> even the robbers with their martial organization are worthy ancestors of Robin Hood. Psyche, Charite, and Lamachus might well fill the mold of comedy or tragedy.

The relation between the named and the unnamed may well be stated in another form: the characters attached to the main thread of the narrative are named; the characters in the tales attached to the

<sup>18</sup> The *piscator* and *adulescentulus* are clearly subordinate to Lucius and Pythias (i. 24), Cerdo and Diophanes (ii. 13). A reason for Zatchlas' name has just been suggested. The *anus* who dispatches Lamachus is an exception, but old age is often a substitute for a name. Philesitherus' name (cf. p. 38) is not mentioned in the actual tale of the baker's wife. Plotina (vii. 6) is named to impress the robbers (cf. p. 35).

narrative, with certain exceptions (principally those who arouse sympathy), are unnamed.

One more generalization may be added: Usually all or none of the principal characters in a given tale are denoted with proper names.<sup>19</sup>

## II

Bernhard suggests that for reasons of suspense Apuleius sometimes withholds the identity, that is, the names, of his characters. His list of cases is not complete nor is the suspense involved parallel in amount or kind. The difficulty with Bernhard's thesis is due largely to his failure to take into account other factors than the mere time element; in other words, apparent suspense is not always real suspense. Artistic requirement, artistic limitations, and features of style lead often to the postponement of a name where it is impossible to detect any element of suspense in the postponement. Moreover, postponement of name is not necessarily postponement of identity.

So any author, in presenting a character to a reader, is prone to preface a certain amount of description for the sake of vividness.<sup>20</sup> The important *matrona* (ii. 2), attended by a large retinue and handsomely garbed, reveals her identity as Byrrhena twenty-five lines after she is first presented. Thelyphron (ii. 20) is addressed by name only six lines after he is referred to as *nescioqui*. Thrasyllus (vii. 1) is named five lines after his parentage and morals have been described. Meroe (i. 13) is named twenty-three lines after her entrance, but her first words were sufficient for the reader to identify her, as they were for Aristomenes. It is the supernatural setting rather than the postponement of name which creates suspense. Twelve lines intervene between the mention of the seer and the statement of his name in the case of Zatchlas (ii. 13), but Lucius' answer following immediately on Milo's question leaves little time for suspense. The prophecy regarding the hero is more important than the prophet. Thus far the withholding of Byrrhena's name alone suggests conscious postponement.

<sup>19</sup> Exceptions to this are the slaves who are named. Fotis and Myrmex have significant rôles; Myrrhine and Philodespotus are addressed in commands (cf. n. 7); for Myrtilus see n. 5. Seers and priests form a sort of aristocracy of their own; robbers look with pride on their profession.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. the long description of Chariclea (Heliod. *Aeth.* i. 2). Contrast the immediate naming of people not present and usually not important in the same work.

In addition to the desire to arouse interest there is a negative cause for postponement which is imposed by artistic considerations:<sup>21</sup> the author must introduce the name naturally. Although Aristomenes might have given his name along with the details of his trade (i. 5), as might Lucius (i. 1) in answer to *quis ille?*<sup>22</sup> the names are withheld until realistically used in address by respective friends (i. 6, 25). Fotis is addressed in a command by her master (i. 23);<sup>23</sup> there was no reason for the *anus* (i. 21) to know her name or for her to volunteer it on answering the door (i. 22). *Uxor* (i. 21) suffices to denote Pamphile until she is named by a third person (ii. 5). It is difficult to feel any suspense in these cases in spite of the interval between the introduction and disclosure of the name.

The rhetorical style of an author sometimes accounts for delay in the naming of characters. Isis is not named for several pages after Lucius' prayer to her (xi. 5), but the description of her person and powers have long before revealed her.<sup>24</sup>

Apparent carelessness in the disclosure of names is due in part to the casual quality of oral narrative.<sup>25</sup> So Apuleius apologizes for not naming Thiasus sooner (x. 18), although he has been previously mentioned as the rich owner of the baker and cook who bought the ass from the soldier (13). He enters the story actively in chapter 16 and his name is given along with the information as to his business in Thessaly. Although there are not many occasions to use his name in these early chapters, the postponement might argue little interest in the name as such<sup>26</sup> and little interest in the character. Apuleius' own apology marks the delay as unintentional and devoid of conscious suspense. Somewhat more value attaches to the postponement of

<sup>21</sup> This limitation applies to the cases just quoted in so far as they involve artistic postponement.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Chariclea's account of herself (*Aeth.* iv. 26-27).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Panthia, named three lines after entrance.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Ceres (vi. 2) and Juno (vi. 4); their attributes have identified them and their talk with Venus prepared us for these meetings.

<sup>25</sup> So von Arnim, *Wien. Stud.*, XXII (1910), 167, where he refers the postponement of Menekles' name to *mündliche Erzählung*.

<sup>26</sup> This finds additional confirmation in the fact that Apuleius does not name the wife of the *gregarius* (vii. 15), though she has a name in the extant Greek version. Cf. also Mithras, mentioned first in xi. 6, named in 22, and called by name only once more (25).

Asinius Marcellus' name because of the relation between it and the experiences of Lucius.<sup>27</sup> But again the postponement creates little interest in the character or suspense.

Philebus' name (viii. 25) seems to be withheld for a number of reasons. The parenthetical style (cf. Thiasus) suggests casualness. Apuleius' love for a rhetorical flight accounts for some delay. This worst of priests is also an interesting creature.

In three cases we can agree with Bernhard that the desire to arouse suspense accounts for the postponement of name. Psyche, Tlepolemus (Haemus to some extent), and Charite are outstanding examples in which the postponement of name is both large in amount and indicative of conscious intent. Psyche is named fifty-five lines after she is first mentioned (iv. 28-30). Some delay is due to the description of Venus' anger, but the desire of the reader to learn more of this charming mortal is thereby increased. Tlepolemus is named five pages after he appears (vi. 1-12). His masquerade accounts for part of the delay, but two pages intervene after Charite sees him before her actions reveal him to the ass, though her smile at sight of him may have prepared the reader. As Haemus (vii. 5) the disclosure of the assumed name is more immediate; here, too, the robber's description of the new convert and his own appearance create interest in him. He introduces himself when the rhetoric of his speech permits. Charite's name is postponed from iv. 23 to vii. 12; Psyche's tale intervenes. To be sure, there is no reason for anyone's addressing her until her lover comes, but the appearance of the grief-stricken maiden and the cause of her woe rouse the reader's sympathy to the highest pitch.

On the whole, then, such postponement as exists in the naming of characters seems to be due to definite artistic principles, to casual oral narrative, and to a small degree to the desire to arouse suspense. In amount the postponement does not exceed natural limits.<sup>28</sup> Exceptions to these generalizations are found in the cases of Tlepolemus, Charite, and Psyche.

<sup>27</sup> Named fourteen lines after appearing in a dream.

<sup>28</sup> To what extent the postponement of name may be used for arousing suspense and interest in character may be seen from an examination of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*. The majority of the leading rôles are not named on entrance, often not for many pages. When they enter the action a second time the same device may occur again (cf. p. 51).

## III

The specific method by which the names of characters are disclosed depends upon the form of the story in which they occur.<sup>29</sup> The hero and narrator may represent the individual as present or absent in his own experience or he may retell a tale from hearsay with the same two possibilities. In either case he may use dramatic dialogue or describe events in the third person or combine the two forms. Address in conversation or in direct command or self-introduction are natural and artistic devices of introduction. A character may be mentioned in the third person when he is represented as present or absent during the narration of his tale. In the last case added naturalness is attained by introduction of the name in conversation.

The formulaic type of introduction, *hoc enim nomine censebatur*, as Bernhard notes,<sup>30</sup> is part of the tendency to employ parentheses common to Apuleius and certain other Latin authors. It is an easy extension of a simpler form, for example, *erat iuvenis . . . Thrasyllus nomine*. One may suspect that the formula used for this particular purpose is not Apuleian; its Greek equivalent<sup>31</sup> is a fairly common feature in Greek romance.<sup>32</sup> But even more pertinent is its use in the Lucianic and Apuleian versions in the introduction of Philebus. With the omission of the jesting of the auctioneer and the answer of Philebus' which do not appear in Λούκιος ἢ Ὀνος, the details regarding the priest are the same.<sup>33</sup> Then occur the phrases, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤκομεν ἔνθα ᾤκει Φίληβος—τοῦτο γὰρ ὄνομα ὃ ὠνησάμενός με (36) and *et ilico me tumicula spartea deligatum tradidit Philebo: hoc enim nomine censebatur iam meus dominus* (viii. 25).

In all cases where comparison is possible<sup>34</sup> the similarity in manner

<sup>29</sup> For means of varying the style of narrative cf. Bernhard, *op. cit.*, pp. 270 ff.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 91 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Parentheses introduced by γάρ (cf. *nam* and *enim*) are characteristic also of Greek romance.

<sup>32</sup> E.g., Heliod. *op. cit.* i. 18, δ Θάμης (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὄνομα τῷ ληστήρχῳ); Longus *Pastor.*, ἡ μὲν δὲ Νάπη (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο) and *passim*.

<sup>33</sup> Age, lewdness, and service of the Syrian goddess for purposes of beggary.

<sup>34</sup> Eight characters in Lucian are named; the wife of the groom who corresponds to Megapole is unnamed in Apuleius. Pamphile is unnamed in the Greek.

of introduction by name in the Lucianic and Apuleian versions of the tale is striking. Hipparchus (1) is named in the same way in which Milo is named; a traveler asks a citizen of Hypata if he knows the person in question. The mention of letters from Decrianus (2) is used to gain entrance into the house of the miser (cf. Demeas i. 22). Palaestra (2) is first named as is Fotis (i. 23) in a command to care for baggage, room, and a bath for the guest.<sup>35</sup> Abroia (4) meets Lucius walking on the same errand as that on which he is bound when Byrrhena meets him (ii. 1 ff.) and both ladies introduce themselves. Lucius' last master, Menekles (49), is mentioned first without name as the owner of two cooks (cf. Thiasus); in both cases the name is given later to account for the presence of the men in Thessaly.

Similarity in introduction may be only a further instance of close adherence to the lost original on the part of the two versions, but one or two points are suggestive. Lucius' own name is first used in dramatic dialogue in both versions; in the Greek it is his host who names him, in Apuleius it is Pythias. The scene of meeting between Lucius and his host is very similar in both narratives, but the episode with Pythias is missing in the Greek. It can perhaps be only a matter of conjecture as to where the name was mentioned in the original. If the meeting with Pythias is an inset<sup>36</sup> added by Apuleius, obviously the name must have been stated elsewhere in the original. But it is somewhat surprising to have it postponed until almost the end of the book<sup>37</sup> in the Latin; it occurs in Lucian where we should expect it. Since there seems to be no obvious reason for omitting it in the corresponding passage in Apuleius, the more difficult position may well have been the original. When the Lucianic version was made and the Pythias episode omitted, Lucius' name was introduced in the easiest and most logical position. The close agreement both in manner and in time of introduction in all the other cases lends plausibility to this suggestion. The Pythias episode probably stood in the original.

<sup>35</sup> She is mentioned once and appears once previously in both versions.

<sup>36</sup> It is usually so considered; cf. Goldbacher, *Zeitschr. f.d. Österreich. Gym.*, XXIII (1872), 329; Bürger (*De Lucio Patrensi* [1887], p. 31) condemns it as unreasonable to suppose that Lucius would need to buy food while visiting; but cf. "Ὀνος (1) φιλαργυρώτατος δεινός. Cf. also Perry, *TAPA*, LVII, 249, n. 24.

<sup>37</sup> The *ego* narrative explains the postponement in some degree.



## IV

That the Thelyphron story (ii. 21-30) is a unit and not a piece of patchwork drawn from several sources is indicated by certain features in the technique of the introduction of characters by name. A recent article claims<sup>38</sup> that it is "a somewhat awkward compound" of three entirely different stories: (1) a witch story in which the guardian is

<sup>38</sup> B. E. Perry, *CP*, XXIV (1929), 231 ff. A number of the objections brought against the unity of the story do not seem altogether convincing. Perry maintains (1) that after chap. 26 the expected dénouement is abandoned. But surprise and suspense merely postpone it; the tale would not be worth telling if it were only the fulfilment of the compact. Perry believes (2) that the grief of the woman is not plausible. She would not pay a thousand sesterces to guard the corpse nor would she show grief in private if guilty. But what else would a clever murderess do to avoid suspicion? Moreover, she is not alone but expecting these very callers. The indications of her grief are the conventional ones (cf. x. 27 ff.). Perry maintains (3) that the verbal accident is an anticlimax. But it allows for the delightful irony of Thelyphron's remark, "laceratus atque discerptus domo proturbor" (26). He is mutilated but as yet ignorant to what extent. Perry asks (4) why did not the witches help themselves when they were in the room and had access to the corpse? If it is proper to subject the details of witchcraft to logical analysis, the situation is as follows: The witches could get into the room only through a small hole and they would naturally have obtained the spoils then ("perpetem noctem eximie vigilandum est exertis et inconivis oculis semper in cadaver intentis nec acies usquam devertenda, immo ne obliquanda quidem, quippe cum deterrimae versipelles in quodvis animal ore converso latenter arrepant, ut ipsos etiam oculos Solis et Iustitiae facile frustrentur; nam et aves et rursum canes et mures, immo etiam muscas induunt" [22]). But because of the stubbornness of the guard who kept strenuous watch (*cum . . . exertam teneret vigiliam* [30]), they were unsuccessful (*industriam sedulam eius fallere nequivissent* [30]). They therefore employed their powers in putting the guard to sleep, a practice indicated in 22 (*tunc diris cantaminibus somno custodes obruunt*), and repeated as what happened in 30 (*iniecta somni nebula*). With the guard asleep the witches have two alternatives: (1) to return and help themselves, (2) to summon the corpse to them. The latter course is chosen and leads to disastrous results: the man, dead with sleep, in contrast with the corpse, really dead, tries to pass through a chink (possibly the cutting results when force meets force like the camel and the needle's eye). Perry says (5) that the features are replaced; why did Thelyphron not keep the substitutes which the witches gave him? Why did they not fall off during the mauling? One may answer, "He lost them; in the second place, being wax and magic, they would not stand the strain of human wear like the *linteolum*." If it is proper, again, to insist that all details be strictly logical, Thelyphron distinctly says that the servants mauled *malas, scapulas, latera, capillos, vestem*. Perry contends (6) that the testimony of the dead man to prove the guilt of the wife has no relation to the superfluous information about Thelyphron. Granted that the testimony of the corpse might be sufficient indictment of the guilt of the wife without added proof of the accuser's veracity. But the corpse is the only one who can explain what happened to Thelyphron (cf. p. 48); other cases of the testimony of a dead man on more than the point at issue occur (cf. Heliod. *Aeth.* vi. 14-15). Here the Egyptian mother tries twice, as does Zatchlas, to make her son speak. When he does reply, in addition to answering questions as to the return of her other son, he volunteers further information in which the mother has no interest, but which does concern Calasiris and Chariclea who overhear it.

compelled by law to pay the forfeit for his failure to guard the corpse, (2) a second witch story where a fatal identity of name results in the loss of the guardian's features, (3) the miracle of Zatchlas, the purpose of which is to prove the guilt of the murderess. It is essential to this thesis that the corpse as well as the guardian be named Thelyphron. If it can be shown that the name of the corpse is not Thelyphron, but that he is only *cadaver*, *mortuus*,<sup>39</sup> then the "three parts" of the story are bound together. For if the watcher answers to the name of *mortuus*<sup>40</sup> and in so doing suffers mutilation, there is need of some agency to disclose the facts and to explain what happened to him. If watcher and corpse had both been named Thelyphron, explicit information would have been unnecessary. The identity of name alone would have sufficed. Now the only possible characters cognizant of the truth are the witch and the corpse. Obviously the witch will not give evidence; only the corpse with the fuller knowledge of the dead remains.<sup>41</sup>

Certain general methods in the introduction of characters by name have been shown to obtain in the *Metamorphoses*. So, in this tale, it is natural that Thelyphron, the narrator, a personal friend of Byrrhena, should be named in contrast with the characters of the story he tells. Again, as a rule all or none of the characters of equal importance in a given tale are named;<sup>42</sup> with the exception of Zatchlas no individual in Thelyphron's narrative is called by name. It is likely that the corpse, like the other characters, is not designated by specific name. Moreover, this story belongs to the realm of witchcraft in which names are regularly omitted.<sup>43</sup> Lastly, postponement of the name to the end of the tale—without any explicit statement of it even there—would be unique and at variance with the technique of Apuleius.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Note the repeated emphasis on this and similar epithets: *cadaver* (25 and 26), *corpori* (26), *mortuus* (27), *corporis* (28), *corpus* (29), *cadaver* (29), *cadaveris* (30), *corporis* (30), and the contrast between *vivus* and *mortuus* (30).

<sup>40</sup> The Latin alone should carry conviction that the witches called out *mortue*: "*cum me somnus profundus in imum barathrum repente demergit, ut ne deus quidem Delphicus ipse facile discerneret duobus nobis iacentibus, quis esset magis mortuus*" (25); "*iniecta somni nebula eoque in profundam quietem sepulto*" (30); "*hic utpote vivus quidem sed tantum sopore mortuus quod eodem mecum vocabulo nuncupatur, ad suum nomen exsurgit et in exanimis umbrae modum ultroneus gradiens. . .*" (30).

<sup>41</sup> Thus the "third" source is bound to the first and second.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. p. 42.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. p. 41.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. pp. 42 ff.

Another feature in Apuleius' employment of proper names serves to confirm the belief that the corpse is not named Thelyphron—the fact that *redende Namen* are used almost entirely.<sup>45</sup> They are assigned on two main principles:<sup>46</sup> (1) they have reference to some quality of the character and have direct bearing on the story,<sup>47</sup> (2) they are an absurd contradiction to the nature of the character or event and are used by way of irony.<sup>48</sup> In either case there may be an element of satire.

It is not necessary to try to determine whether Apuleius is responsible for all or some of the names<sup>49</sup> or whether they come from the Greek original.<sup>50</sup> His principles are self-evident. Nor is it necessary to explain scientifically the etymology of individual names.

The Greek *Θηλύφρων* is not extant in literature or inscription as a proper name. As an adjective *θηλύφρων* occurs twice<sup>51</sup> with a somewhat derogatory force, "feminine" (i.e., weak), and "feminine witted." Another similar compound in a proper name<sup>52</sup> probably supports the interpretation of "weak." Thelyphron, then, should be a man with weak wits. The fact that the word does not occur elsewhere as a proper name makes it likely that it is a *Spotname*.

The herald had emphasized the need of wits,<sup>53</sup> and Thelyphron himself had fondly boasted, "vides hominem ferreum et insomnem,

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Apul. *Flor.* (Helm), *Praef.*, p. xxxvii. The names would bear more investigation than Helm gives them, but for the present purpose his treatment is adequate.

<sup>46</sup> Certain exceptions occur; so Lucius, Milo, etc.

<sup>47</sup> Meroe, Fotis (with no reference to *lucerna* [so Helm] but like Phaniscus, Pinacium), Pamphile, Byrrhena, Lamachus, Alcimus, Thrasyleon, Chryseros, Babulus, Charite, Psyche, Haemus (good Thracian name), Plotina (name of respected matron?), Myrtilus, Hefaeistio, Apollonius, Hypatarius (with reference to *cubicularius*?), Barbarus, Scorpio, Philesitherus, Myrmex(?), Thiasus, Mithras, Asinius Marcellus.

<sup>48</sup> Aristomenes, Socrates, Panthia, Diophanes, Arignotus, Thelyphron, Tlepolemus, Thrasyllus, Daphne, Philebus, Arete.

<sup>49</sup> The metaphor drawn from wrestling is significant only when we find that Palaestra was the servant's name in the Greek original.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Perry, *TAPA*, LIV, 199; von Arnim's suggestion (*op. cit.*, pp. 171 ff.) as to substitution of names in the summary is bound up with the problem of authorship and polemical purpose presented in chap. 55.

<sup>51</sup> Arist. *Eccl.* 110 (= *Tr. Ades.* 51); Vett. Val. 104. 21.

<sup>52</sup> *Θηλυμίθρης* (IGSI, No. 1658) cf. *Θηλυμίθρης* (C.I.G., No. 3346); Fick (*Die Griechischen Personennamen*, p. 37) equates it with *Φρύξ*; cf. J. C. Austin, *The Significant Name in Terence* ("University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature," Vol. VII), p. 63.

<sup>53</sup> Chap. 22.

certe perspicaciorem ipso Lynceo vel Argo et oculo totum" (23). How feeble his wits were the tragedy proved. Without speculating idly as to whether the husband too was weak-witted in not avoiding his foes, it is clear that such an explanation would have little pertinence.

The practices previously noted all favor the namelessness of the corpse and thus establish the unity of the Thelyphron tale. Since it is a unit, it may well have stood in the Greek original.<sup>54</sup> Its position, which makes it the entertainment after a banquet, is natural; its nature and subject matter agree with the probable nature and subject matter of the Greek *Μεταμορφώσεις*.<sup>55</sup> There is little to be gained by surmising that not this story but another like it held this position in the original.<sup>56</sup>

## VI

A number of more or less clearly defined practices have been discernible in the analysis of the introduction and naming of characters in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*. The characters closely attached to the hero are more likely to be named than those in narrated tales. Namelessness appears regularly in stories of magic and illicit love; these two classes include the majority of *fabulae*.<sup>57</sup> The substitutions for proper names, largely terms of occupation and relationship, are usually applied to incidental characters and to the people in narrated tales. There is little conscious attempt to withhold the names of the characters except in two tales. Formulaic types of introduction and comparison between the Apuleian and Lucianic versions confirm the close relationship between the two. People of higher rank are more likely to have names than those of low degree. Most of the *fabulae* deal with the latter class.

<sup>54</sup> It is usually considered an interpolation; cf. Bürger (*op. cit.*, p. 37), who assigns it to the same source as the Socrates tale because of similar subject matter; Perry, *TAPA*, LVI, 249, n. 24; Bernhard, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 and 259.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Goldbacher, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

<sup>56</sup> Perry, *CP*, XVIII (1923), 235, n. 2.

<sup>57</sup> Bernhard (*op. cit.*, p. 260) divides the "inlays" into six groups: tales of magic, robbers, murder, unfaithful wives, and love. He lists three magic tales; he might well have assigned his story, n. 11, to the same group. n. 17 is primarily a murder tale, though the omens savor of the supernatural. n. 18, though ending in murder, involves a faithless wife.

The situation as it appears in Apuleius is in marked contrast with the technique of the Greek romances. So in the *Aethiopica* of Heliodorus there are only two unnamed characters<sup>58</sup> as against forty-one denoted by name. Difference in the structure of the two types of novel accounts for the need of names in the romance; characters of what are apparently interpolated adventures are ultimately connected with the main narrative and their fortunes prove to be strands of the whole. Since they persist in the narrative and their number is great, names are a means of convenience and identification.

In further contrast with the situation in Apuleius, almost all of the characters of the Greek romance are intended to appeal to the sympathies of the reader. They are usually drawn from the higher ranks of society and there is a personal interest in a Chariclea which is wholly lacking in a nameless *quidam*. The majority of rôles in Apuleius are not lovable; it is rather the tale which is the thing.

Lastly, in the romance the names of important characters are regularly postponed.<sup>59</sup> Sometimes the desire to arouse interest in the character is the cause; more often that and added emotional suspense are attained. The contrast with Apuleius, with whom postponement is rare, is striking.

With the situation as it has been described, with the cleavage between the romance and Apuleius clearly manifest, is there any explanation which will reasonably fit all the conditions? I believe that many of the features, particularly the large amount of namelessness in Apuleius, are due to the fact that many *fabulae*—oral tales or *Märchen*—have been strung together. In tales orally transmitted as distinguished from those cultivated in formal literature, names are often lacking. So the hero and his friends, being the subject of written narrative, are named; tales of witchcraft and illicit love, on the other hand, belong to the realm of folk lore and fairy tale in which the rôles are often nameless. A formal element such as artistic suspense, gained by intentional postponement of name, is characteristic, not of the simple *fabula*, but of the more formal romance. The people of the

<sup>58</sup> The Tyrian merchant (iv. 16) and the Egyptian woman; neither rôle is permanent although the merchant does not disappear from the action until v. 24.

<sup>59</sup> The hero and the heroine, introduced in chap. 1, are not named until chap. 8. Even the identity of groups is deferred; cf. the robber band (i. 1), not identified until i. 32.

*fabulae* of the *Metamorphoses* belong to the lower classes in keeping with the piquant or miraculous subject matter of the type; those of the erotic romance are gallant heroes and beautiful heroines.

In two stories in Apuleius the characters are not only named, but their names are postponed with obvious intent; these are the Cupid and Psyche tale and the story of Charite and Tlepolemus. The nature of the former makes of it somewhat a thing by itself.<sup>60</sup> In the tale of Charite it is significant that the *personae* are well born, that they are treated sympathetically, and, as just stated, that they are denoted by names which are consciously postponed.

The distinction between *fabula* and *historia* has been set forth by Reitzenstein;<sup>61</sup> the former is an oral tale or imitation of an oral tale, the purpose of which is to entertain; the latter is a cultivated literary product, serious, pathetic, intended to arouse emotion and capable of treatment as a tragedy. As Reitzenstein has further pointed out, Apuleius himself marks the story of Charite as *historia*. The analysis of the two types of romance bears out this interpretation; the situation in Charite's tale confirms the general conclusions as regards the naming of characters in the *Metamorphoses*. The oral and literary tales denoted by *fabulae* and *historiae* account for the names and lack of names; Apuleius' *varias fabulas conseram* accounts for the extent of the namelessness.

MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE

<sup>60</sup> The nature and origin of the tale is the subject of Reitzenstein's *Das Märchen von Amor und Psyche bei Apuleius*.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 68 ff.

## THE GREEK SOURCE OF RINUCCIO'S *AESOP*

By B. E. PERRY

THE Latin translation of the *Life* and *Fables* of Aesop made by Rinuccio da Castiglione of Arezzo (Remicius Aretinus) dates from the year 1448, and is of interest more for the sake of the popularity it enjoyed among the early editors of Aesop than for its intrinsic literary merits.<sup>1</sup>

The source of this translation was obviously some Greek manuscript belonging to the recension designated by Chambry as Class C, and by Hausrath as the "Vindobonensis";<sup>2</sup> but even within the limits of this recension, the Greek manuscripts differ considerably from each other in respect to the inclusion of the *Life* and the number and order of the fables; hence the exact source of Rinuccio's translation is yet to seek. Concerning the *Vita*, P. Marc<sup>3</sup> asserts that it is "von der HS W bis in die größten Verderbnisse hinein abhängig"; and in speaking of the *Fables*, T. O. Achelis<sup>4</sup> says (p. 79) that Cod. Vind. Gr. 130 "steht

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed account of Rinuccio's activity as a translator, and for the *Fortleben* of his *Aesop*, see the able monograph by D. P. Lockwood, *De Rinucio Aretino Graecarum litterarum interprete*, "Harvard Studies in Classical Philology," XXIV (1913), 51-109.

<sup>2</sup> So named after Cod. Vind. Hist. Gr. 130, which typifies the recension so far as the *Fables* are concerned.

<sup>3</sup> "Die Überlieferung des Äsopromans," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XIX (1910), 390, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> "Die hundert äsopischen Fabeln des Rinucci da Castiglione," *Philologus*, LXXXIII (1928), 55-88. Achelis' study is painstaking and detailed, but his knowledge of the Greek manuscripts is deficient and seems to be derived in the main from Hausrath (*Jahrbücher f. class. Philologie*, Supplementband XXI [1894], 247-312) and Fedde (*Über eine noch nicht edirte Sammlung äsopischer Fabeln, nach einer Wiener Handschrift* [Breslau, 1877]). He might have discussed this question more intelligently had he been familiar with the valuable edition of the Greek fables by Chambry (*Aesopi fabulae* [Paris, 1925]), where he would have found clearly delineated more useful information about the Greek manuscripts than is available anywhere else in printed form. By giving us the actual texts of virtually all the anonymous fables in all the five classes of manuscripts, together with a full report upon the readings of forty-seven of these manuscripts, Chambry has done a great deal to facilitate investigation in this field; and the valuable service that he has thus rendered to Aesopic scholarship is not seriously impaired by the fact that he does not understand the relationship between Classes I, II, and III (P, C, L) and that he fails to realize the compounded and interpolated nature of many of the fables in W. I take this occasion to comment upon Chambry's edition



von allen bisher bekannten Handschriften der Übersetzung des Rimi-cius am nächsten." Neither of these statements is true; Rinuccio's text is in no wise dependent upon W (= Laur. Conv. Soppr. 627); and Achelis, though his data and method are all right so far as they go, is unfortunately not familiar with all the *bisher bekannten Handschriften*.

In what follows I propose to show that Cod. Palat. Gr. 269 stands closer to Rinuccio's text than any other of the known Greek manuscripts both in the *Life* and in the *Fables*, and that the manuscript from which Rinuccio translated came directly from the same immediate source as Pal. 269.

The Greek *Life of Aesop* is extant in three principal recensions, of which the oldest and the most complete, contained in the long-lost Cryptoferratensis A 33,<sup>5</sup> has never been published. The version published by Westermann (Brunswig, 1845) is an abbreviated Byzantine redaction of the old *Life*, and the vulgate version ascribed to Planudes is still further syncopated and re-written, and depends almost entirely upon a relatively late manuscript of the Westermann version which was one of the immediate ancestors to what I (after Marc) call B.<sup>6</sup> Having completely collated all known manuscripts of the Westermann version, including several that were unknown to Marc, and having mapped out their interrelationships and crossings in detail, I am in a position to control what is probably the entire Greek tradition of the *Vita* in so far as it is extant in the public libraries of today.<sup>7</sup>

because it has been unjustly condemned by Hausrath (*Philologische Wochenschrift*, 1927, cols. 1537 ff.), and because the latter's sentiments have been echoed and even exaggerated by Wilhelm Port in his recent *Bericht* (Bursian, *Jahresbericht*, CCXL, 74).

<sup>5</sup> This manuscript, which disappeared from Grottaferrata near the end of the eighteenth century, has recently come to light in America. A full description of it, together with studies on its unique texts, by Mrs. J. H. Huxseltman and the present writer, may be expected shortly. Likewise, a first edition of the old *Vita* along with a critical text of the Westermann version, by the writer, is now in course of preparation.

<sup>6</sup> See below, n. 7.

<sup>7</sup> The manuscripts of the Greek *Vita* are herein designated by the symbols which will be used in my forthcoming edition, and these are, with some exceptions not important here, the following:

S    Moscoviensis 436, 14th-15th c. (in Vladimir's catalogue of the MSS in the old Synod Library)


B    Brit. Mus. Add. 17015, 15th c.

[Footnote continued on following page]

Lockwood (pp. 62-64) describes or mentions thirteen manuscripts of Rinuccio which contain the *Vita* and which are antecedent to, or independent of, the printed editions. I happen to know of four others, though they are less complete and doubtless later than some of those mentioned by Lockwood: (1) MS Misc. Lat. e. 35 in the Bodleian Library at Oxford;<sup>8</sup> (2) No. 155 in the Bibiothèque de Genève, which

- P Vat. Pal. Gr. 269, 14th-15th c.  
 W Laur. Conv. Soppr. 627, 13th c. (=Ca in Chambry)  
 L Leidensis Vule. 93, 15th c.  
 F Laur. 57.30, 16th c.  
 V Vat. Gr. 695, 15th c.  
 λ Lost archetype of LFV  
 M Mon. Gr. 525, 14th c.  
 O Baroccianus 194, 15th c.  
 R Vat. Gr. 1192, 14th c. (fragmentary, but supplements O)  
 Lo. Lollinianus 26 = 26, at Belluno, 14th c. (Latin)

The stemma is essentially as follows:



The purest text is found in M. SBP is slightly re-written and in some place abbreviated. W is compounded of the two principal branches, SBP and MO, and has been influenced also by λ. P and its immediate ancestors have crossed to the λ family here and there and λ, like W, is compounded and re-written on the basis of SBP and MO. Westermann's text depends entirely, though not directly, upon W and reproduces that manuscript on the whole quite accurately.

<sup>8</sup> The following description is copied more or less verbatim from the *Accessions Catalogue* for 1890-1915: "In Latin, on parchment, written in the 15th cent. in Italy, 7½ × 5 in., 1 + 28 leaves. At end, *Finis vite Esopi*. Wanting ten (?) leaves at the beginning. Begins *rem imperabo: accitoque Esopo* (cf. Westermann, p. 28, l. 17); ends *qui mortem Esopi auctores fuerunt*. A second short life (begins *Esopus fabulator*) follows at fol. 25v. On fol. 27v is a hymn to the Virgin (16th cent.). The name Jos Paulus (17th cent.) is on fol. 27v. Bought by Mr. Westell, a London bookseller, at the Joseph Sams sale, June 11, 1857, and by W. H. Black from Westell. Presented as no. 33391" (accession of 1904).

is catalogued under Aegidius but contains the *Vita* by Rinuccio on folios 149r-159r; (3) No. 41 in Mazzatinti's catalogue of the manuscripts at Pesaro in the Biblioteca Oliveriana, which contains both the *Vita* and the *Fabulae* (see Mazzatinti, *Inventario* xxix, p. 19); and (4) No. 26 in the Library of the University of Illinois, Urbana.<sup>9</sup> The last mentioned, dated 1467, contains only the *Vita*—the dedicatory epistles and other introductory texts (Lockwood, pp. 70-71) and the fables being absent. My citations of Rinuccio are from this manuscript, since none other is accessible to me at present; but the variants that it doubtless contains can scarcely affect the issue of the present inquiry, since the comparison with the Greek manuscripts usually involves the substance of the text over relatively large areas, rather than single words or phrases.

In addition to the longer *Vita*, Rinuccio also translated and prefixed to the *Fables*, with the title *Vitae Aesopi commentarium* (Lockwood, p. 71), the short Preface published by Eberhard as *Vita III*.<sup>10</sup> These two texts are found together only in PLF;<sup>11</sup> but neither L nor F could possibly have served as Rinuccio's source for both texts, since F was written in the sixteenth century and L, in the longer *Vita*, has none of the numerous and conspicuous errors (especially of omission and of arrangement; cf. *infra*) that are common to P and the Latin translation. If Rinuccio found both texts in his Greek source, as is natural to suppose, then that source must have been either P or some unknown manuscript very closely akin to it.

Lockwood notices only one lacuna in Rinuccio's translation, probably because Rinuccio himself was aware of only one. As a matter of fact, there are several very conspicuous lacunae—at least in the Urbana manuscript—and since all of these agree exactly with P, I infer that they were in the original translation; otherwise the coincidence would be quite miraculous. The lacuna that Lockwood mentions corresponds to Westermann, page 53: 1.20—54.10, and includes the major part of the well-known story of the widow. Lockwood be-

<sup>9</sup> This is a small octavo volume on paper, and was purchased in 1929 from my friend Mr. W. H. Allen, the well-known bookseller of Philadelphia. It was once the property of Henry Alan, whose bookplate appears on the cover.

<sup>10</sup> *Fabulae Romanenses Graece conscriptae* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1872), pp. 309-10.

<sup>11</sup> The scribe of W, like P interpolating from λ, started to add this Preface, but broke off at the end of the first sentence.

lieves that Rinuccio found this gap in his Greek source, since the earliest and best manuscripts of the Latin translation have a note in the margin opposite the lacuna as follows: "Hic quia deficit ut opinor carta una, ideo fabulam incohatam et quae sequuntur scribere supersedi, alias scripturus si reperire quibo."<sup>12</sup> P has exactly the same lacuna except for the beginning of the story and the *quae sequuntur* (consisting of four short lines) which Rinuccio intentionally omits, whereas all the other Greek manuscripts have the story complete. From the manner in which Rinuccio speaks in this note, it is clear that he had only one text before him, otherwise he would, and could easily, have supplied the deficiency. After this lacuna Rinuccio continues with the words *Ecce Delphi*, which translate the *ἰδοῦ καὶ οἱ Δέλφοι* (Δελφοὶ B) peculiar to BP.

It is interesting and probably significant that Rinuccio supposed a lost leaf to have been responsible for the lacuna at this point; for, if he was mindful of what he was saying, we must conclude that in the Greek manuscript before him the story of the widow broke off at the bottom of a page, whereas in P the lacuna begins, not at the bottom of 255v, but in the third line of 256r. This would indicate that Rinuccio was not translating from P itself, but from some closely related manuscript wherein the lacuna happened to come at the bottom of a page. I say "happened to come" because I do not think that the lacuna is due to the loss of an entire leaf; the amount of missing text is somewhat less than half of what would be normally contained on a folio leaf of P, which itself is of small format, allowing on the average about one hundred and fifty words to the page. It is possible, but not very likely, that the archetype of P was illustrated, or otherwise interrupted, in such a way that one of the leaves contained only the small amount of text (*ca.* one hundred and thirty-five words), that has actually been lost in P.

In the original text of the Westermann version, as represented by MRLF Aesop's appearance before Nectenabus (cf. Westermann, pp. 48-49) comprises three scenes: (1) that in which the king in his glory is likened to the moon, and his followers to the stars; (2) that in which the king is likened to the sun in springtime shining upon the fruits of

<sup>12</sup> Lockwood, p. 61. This note is not in the Urbana manuscript, but the lacuna is indicated by a blank space of somewhat more than half a page.

the earth; and (3) that in which the king is compared to the sun, and his followers to the sun's rays. Of these three scenes, only Nos. 2 and 3 appear in WSB, while P and Rinuccio are alone in preserving only No. 3. The lacuna in both cases includes Westermann, 48.27, ἀκούσας . . . 49.12, ἐνδυσάμενος; but the transition is so abrupt in P, and the general context so easily supplied, that Rinuccio has attempted to bridge the gap by adding the following sentences, for which there is no equivalent in any Greek manuscript: "Itaque Esopus in regiam profectus ad regis genua procidit. At rex in maiestate existens eum benigne recepit. Deinde inquit ('cui me ac meos assimulas, Esope?' etc.)."

Another very conspicuous omission, peculiar to P and Rinuccio, is the fable of "Zeus and the Beetle" contained in Westermann, 54.32 (Δελφοί.) λαγῶς ποτε . . . 56.2, Δελφοί. This lacuna appears to have originated in a confusion of the two Δελφοί. The text runs thus in P (256v): ἀπαγόμενος δὲ ὁ Αἰσωπος ἔφη, "ἀκούσατέ μου, ἀδελφοί, (lacuna) καὶ μὴ ἀτιμάσατε τὸν θεὸν τοῦτον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἱερὸν μικρόν; and this is translated as follows by Rinuccio: "At Esopus ignominiose cum se duci videret, ait ad illos 'Intendite Delphi, deum hunc licet aedes eius parva sit inhonorare nolitis, etc.'"

Another, but shorter passage, missing only in P and Rinuccio, consists of Westermann, 17. 9-10, ἐμοῦ . . . δεῖ σοί. In the passage corresponding to Westermann, 29.9, Rinuccio has P's unique φιλόσοφον (i.e., *philosophum*) where all the other manuscripts read φίλον; and again at 54.13, P is the only Greek manuscript that has τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα corresponding to Rinuccio's *animalia bruta*. Doubtless other examples of this sort could be cited, but I have not thought it necessary to hunt for them.

It often happens that Rinuccio's text stands alone with P and one or two other manuscripts. Thus *Dea hospitalis* translates Φιλοξενία (Westermann, 9.19), found only in PWO; the other manuscripts, have Τύχη. The story of the stupid girl is out of place in W, as Marc observed; it should come at 54.6 after πατρίδι, as in MRλ and in the older *Vita*, but instead it comes at 56.20. The fact that this story is similarly misplaced in Rinuccio may have been what misled Marc into thinking that the latter was dependent upon W; but the same displacement is found also in PS; and although B has omitted the whole epi-

sode, the omission was evidently made from the same context, since it includes one line of the preceding story of the farmer and his asses. Incidentally, the relative position of these two stories in the various texts affords further proof that Rinuccio was not using W; for the story of the farmer and his asses *follow* that of the stupid girl in PS and Rinuccio, whereas in W it precedes.

With PB, Rinuccio shares the following omissions not found elsewhere: 25.2-3, *καὶ τίς . . . ὄψει*; 51.1-2, *ἐτάζειν . . . τρόπον*; 51.7-8, *διὰ τὸ περιέχειν ἅπαντα*; 51.12-13, *τὸν καθημέρινόν . . . ζήτημα*; 52.20-29, *ὦδε ἄξιον . . . ἐγένετο*. Demas instead of Δημέας (53.15) is also confined to Rinuccio and PB.

Still more numerous are the peculiarities, mostly of omission, which are found only in Rinuccio and PBS,<sup>13</sup> but here one illustration will suffice. In the original Greek text as represented by MOW (cf. Westermann, 29.7-32.9), Aesop makes two attempts to find a man who can mind his own business. In PBS and Rinuccio,<sup>14</sup> however, these two episodes are deliberately telescoped into one in such a way that the first disappears entirely, and the second is shortened by about twenty-two lines.<sup>15</sup>

In examining the lacuna at 53.20 (*supra*, p. 57), we found some rather plain indications that Rinuccio was not using P itself, but a closely related manuscript in which the lacuna began at the end of a folio leaf. Certain other facts point in the same direction. The witty reply of Aesop to the philosophical question put to him by Xanthus (Westermann, 33.12-18) is completely spoiled in P by the accidental omission of the words *ἀπ' ἐκείνου οὖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι φοβούμενοι, μὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰς*

<sup>13</sup> Omissions of the following passages are in point: Westermann, 17. 13-15, *Ξάνθος . . . ἐξουθενεῖς*; *ibid.*, 19-22, *τὸ δραπετεύειν . . . πρὸς σέ*; 33.31-34.1, *μὴν πάντα . . . ἔφη* (the passage is omitted also by LFV); 35.10-14, *ἐξήρει . . . Ξάνθου*; 42.28-43.4, *ὁμοία . . . εὐρίσκονται*; 47.22-24, *πάντα γὰρ . . . ἀφαιρείται*.

<sup>14</sup> Also in Cod. Atheniensis 1205 (seventeenth century, modern Greek), but this version depends mainly upon S.

<sup>15</sup> In P the syncopated text runs as follows (note the deliberate patching): *ἐπεὶ περίεργον εἶπες τὸν φιλόσοφον, δεῖξόν μοι ἀπερίεργον ἄνθρωπον εὐρεῖν* (cf. Westermann, 29.10), *πολλοὺς οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν θεωροῦντος* (*sic.*; cf. 30.11), *εἶδεν ἄνθρωπον ἐν ἐνὶ τόπῳ καθεζόμενον* (cf. 29.17!) *καὶ φησὶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ δεσπότης μου καλεῖται ἵνα μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀριστήσῃς* (cf. 30.33). Rinuccio translates: "ex quo philosophum appellas curiosum, i atque adducto hominem non curiosum. Esopus domo egressus hominem incurium si reperire posset circumspicit. Et cum in via per plures conspicaretur rusticum quendam secus sedentem intuens ait illi 'herus meus te vocat ad prandium,' etc."

ιδίας χέσωσι φρένας, πυκνῶς, τὰ ἴδια ἀφοδεύματα βλέπουσιν. ἀλλὰ σύ, δέσποτα, μηδὲν ἀγωνιάσης· οὐ γὰρ ἔχεις φρένας. P is the only Greek manuscript that has this particular omission, although SB omit the words ἀπ' ἐκείνου . . . βλέπουσιν. Rinuccio, however, has the whole passage intact;<sup>16</sup> and since it is quite unlikely that he emended P by conjecture so felicitously as to arrive at the exact sense given by the other Greek manuscripts, I conclude that he was not dependent upon P, but upon one of P's near relatives. Here, then, we have an instance in which Rinuccio's translation is the only text that preserves the sense of the original reading of the SBP family. It cannot, therefore, be entirely neglected in the recension of the Greek text, though its contribution is likely to be of small consequence. Westermann, 17.2-3, reads κἄν τε ἐν ἀνωγέῳ κἄν τε ἐν κατωγέῳ, ἢ ἐν τρικλίνῳ, which is a compound of the original reading πότερον ἐν κοιτῶνι ἢ ἐν τρικλίνῳ found in MO<sup>17</sup> and κἄν τε ἐν ἀνωγαίῳ κἄν τε ἐν κατωγαίῳ which must have originated in λ whence it was taken over, along with numerous other readings, into SB and into W. P omits the phrase altogether, but Rinuccio has *utrum in atrio an in cenaculo*. I do not know what Greek word, if any has been translated by *atrio*; but *cenaculo* points definitely to τρικλίνῳ, and from this I should infer that the manuscript used by Rinuccio had the genuine old reading πότερον ἐν κοιτῶνι ἢ ἐν τρικλίνῳ, and that this was originally the reading of the SBP archetype, as well as of MO. Here again it is plain that Rinuccio must have translated from one of P's immediate kindred rather than from P itself. In examining the *Fables* we shall find further evidence pointing to the same conclusion.

Not having a copy of Rinuccio's Latin fables before me, I can make no study of textual details, but must confine my observations in the main to the statistics furnished by Achelis and Chambry. The former (pp. 78-79) draws up a comparative table of contents of the fables contained in Vind. 130, Par. suppl. Gr. 105, and Rinuccio, which is intended to show that Vind. 130 is closer to Rinuccio in respect to the number, identity, and order of the fables than any of the other Greek manuscripts, the Parisian manuscript being the nearest competitor.

<sup>16</sup> "Ex illo tempore homines huiusmodi casum formidantes, cum egerint suas semper insipientiunt feces. Tu vero, id formidare desinas, nam quod non habes id perdere non potes."

<sup>17</sup> O, however, has added ἢ ἐν κατωγαίῳ thereunto from the SB group, or possibly from LFV (λ).



Since Achelis failed to take account of P, his result is not final. The accompanying table will show that P (=Cb in Chambry) is much closer to Rinuccio than is Vind. 130 (=Ch) or, for that matter, any of the other manuscripts known to Chambry.<sup>18</sup>

It appears that Rinuccio has one fable (No. 77 =Chambry, No. 269) that is not found in P; but since this is extant in nearly all the other manuscripts of Class C (Ch, Ca, Cg, Ce, Cf), it is a natural inference, in the light of what we have learned above concerning the *Vita*, that Rinuccio found this fable in a manuscript derived from the same immediate source as P. Scarcely any two manuscripts of Aesop contain exactly the same number and choice of fables.

But a more conspicuous point of divergence between the two texts consists in the absence in Rinuccio of nine fables which are present in P, namely, Nos. 27-30 (in Chambry, Nos. 68, 70, 293, 74, respectively) and 100-104 (Chambry, Nos. 296, 328, 345, 354, 352). It occurred to me at first that Rinuccio might have somehow overlooked these two groups of fables in P, perhaps as the result of certain leaves having become glued together; but, on further reflection, I find this supposition unlikely for two reasons: in the first place, the amount of Greek text that Rinuccio has omitted is not even approximately the same in both lacunae, and does not in either case correspond to the amount of text

<sup>18</sup> Cod. Leidensis Vulc. 93, not seen by Chambry, contains 105 mixed fables, of which 78 belong to Class C, 25 to Class L (Accursiana), 1 to Class B (Bodleian paraphrase), and 1 (=Chambry, No. 24) to C and L indifferently. This manuscript, in the *Fables* as well as in the *Life*, is from the same source as Laur. 57.30, which Chambry calls "Mc." Its contents bear no resemblance to Rinuccio. A report on the fables contained in S (Moscovensis 436, also belonging to Class C) is given by Urban Ursing, *Studien zur griechischen Fabel* (Lund, 1930), p. 110; from which it appears that the order of fables in that manuscript differs considerably from the order in P and all the other manuscripts of Class C.

Rin.	P	Vind. 130
1-26.....	1-26	1-17 +25-33
27-77.....	31-80 (Rinuccio's No. 77 is not in P)	38-64 +66 +68-69 +71 +73-76 + 78 +80-81 +83-87 +89 +91-92 +94-96 +98-99
78-96.....	81-99	101-13 +115 +117-19 +121-122
97-100.....	105-8 (last fable in P)	128-30 (No. 100 in Rin. missing)

normally contained on two pages of P;<sup>19</sup> and, second, it is quite unlikely that Rinuccio was careless in turning the leaves of his Greek manuscript, since he tells us in his Introduction that he translated all the fables he could find, and that he knew that the number of these was not complete, owing to the obvious scarcity of fables beginning with B, Y, Φ, and X.<sup>20</sup> This implies that he examined his manuscript with some care, since he remarks upon the absence of the fables in question<sup>21</sup> without suggesting any definite explanation thereof, as he had done in connection with the lacuna in the *Vita*. We must, therefore, conclude that in the manuscript from which Rinuccio was translating, the nine fables corresponding to Nos. 27-30 and 100-104 in P were not present. If they had been present, he would surely have found them and translated them, inasmuch as he was not making a *choix de fables* in the manner of the Greek copyists, but intended to translate all the fables he could find.

The fact that these nine fables were absent in Rinuccio's source, but are found in P, precludes the otherwise natural inference that Rinuccio translated from P's immediate ancestor in the direct line. The relationship is, therefore, in all probability a three-cornered one as follows:



#### UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

<sup>19</sup> The first omission totals 254 words in Chambry's text, and the second 406. The average page of P contains ca. 150 words.

<sup>20</sup> "Habes vitam pariter et fabulas Aesopi . . . non tamen omnes, sed quotquot ad manus meas pervenerunt. Quamquam arbitror praeter has si quae reperiuntur esse perpaucas. Quod vero longe plures Aesopus confecerit, hinc vel maxime coniectari licet, nam in describendo fabulas cum sequatur ordinem alphabeti, in his hae deficiunt litterae B Y Φ X atque in aliis plerisque litteris perspicue apparet plenum fabularum numerum non esse. Quae sive negligentia scriptorum sive varietate temporum sive ipsa vetustate oblitteratae sint, ad saecula nostra non pervenerunt" (*Totius operis Anacephaleosis*, ed. Lockwood, pp. 71-72).

<sup>21</sup> Of the nine fables missing in Rinuccio but found in P and most of the other manuscripts, the first four begin with B, the next two with Y, the next one with Φ, and the last two with X.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

### FRAGMENTS OF THE *GEOGRAPHY* OF STRABO IN THE COMMENTARIES OF EUSTATHIUS

In Book vii of the *Geography* of Strabo, in the description of Macedonia and Thrace, there is an extensive lacuna, caused by the loss of a quaternion from the manuscript. Through the labors of a number of scholars, a large part of the lacuna has been supplied. At the suggestion of his former teacher, Professor Horace L. Jones of Cornell University, the present writer has investigated the subject, and has been able to add a number of fragments. Professor Jones has accepted the findings of the writer and incorporated the new fragments in Volume III of his edition and translation of Strabo for the Loeb Classical Library (pp. 322, 332, 336, 338, 350, 366, 370, 384, 386).

Eustathius Bishop of Thessalonica (fl. 1175 A.D.) wrote commentaries on Homer, on Pindar, and on Dionysius Periegetes; that on Pindar has survived only in part, but the other two are practically complete. In his works Eustathius makes numerous citations from, and references to, an author whom he designates simply as *ὁ γεωγράφος*. Bernhardt,<sup>1</sup> in his edition, tacitly assumes *ὁ γεωγράφος* to be Strabo; in his *Index auctorum ab Eustathio scholiisque laudatorum*, he cites Strabo as the source of many of the passages ascribed to the "geographer." This more than a century ago. No editor of Strabo prior to Jones has, however, seen fit to incorporate in his text any citations of Eustathius' commentaries as fragments of the lost portion of Book vii, except Meineke, who inserted one fragment from Eustathius (23a, note on *Iliad* ii. 850).

Nearly thirty years ago, R. Kunze,<sup>2</sup> assuming that Strabo is the "geographer" so frequently placed under contribution by Eustathius,<sup>3</sup> produced from the commentaries 32 passages as possible fragments of Strabo. Of Kunze's 32 passages, 15 Eustathius in his usual way refers to *ὁ γεωγράφος*; 13 are credited to no particular person: *διὰ τοὺς παλαιούς; ὡς καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ φασιν; οἴονται δὲ τινες; φασί;* and 4 are cross-references made by Strabo himself to the lost part of Book vii. Kunze's valuable study was based, however, upon an assumption which, though plausible and acceptable as an assumption, fell short of the certainty which is a necessary prerequisite to the extensive use of

<sup>1</sup> *Dionysius Periegetes, Graece et Latine, cum vetustis commentariis et interpretationibus ex recensione et cum annotatione Godofredi Bernhardt* (2 vols; Lipsiae, 1828).

<sup>2</sup> *Rheinisches Museum*, LVII (1902), 437 ff.; *ibid.*, LVIII (1903), 126 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Dindorf's note under "Strabo" in Stephanus: "A grammaticis Strabo κατ' ἐξοχὴν dicitur *ὁ γεωγράφος* saepissime ab Eustathio."

the passages from the "geographer." The present writer, by seeking to locate in the *Geography* of Strabo each citation of the "geographer" in the works of Eustathius, undertook to settle beyond question whether Strabo and ὁ γεωγράφος are identical. If all, or nearly all, the citations are to be found in Strabo, the assumption becomes an assured fact.<sup>4</sup>

In the three commentaries written by Eustathius there are 409 references to ὁ γεωγράφος or its equivalent, eg., ἡ τοῦ γεωγράφου ἱστορία; ἡ δὲ γεωγραφία. Of these, 111 occur in the commentary on Dionysius Periegetes and the remaining 298 in the Homeric commentaries. Of these 409 references or citations, the writer succeeded in locating 392 in the *Geography* of Strabo. Of the 17 remaining passages, 1 was obviously not a reference to, or citation from, any particular passage; 3, which the writer failed to locate, had nothing to do with the locality discussed in the lost pages; and the remaining 13 passages did refer to places in Thrace or Macedonia, the regions which Strabo described in the lost quaternion.

If, then, 392 (about 96 per cent) of the 409 references made by Eustathius to ὁ γεωγράφος are shown to have been derived from Strabo, the presumption that Strabo is ὁ γεωγράφος becomes practically a certainty; and it is reasonable to assume that these 13 passages, concerned with the subject matter of the lacuna, which cannot be located in existing texts of Strabo belong to the part that has been lost. There are, moreover, additional facts to make the case even stronger.

It has been shown<sup>5</sup> that Eustathius wrote, and probably published, the commentary on Dionysius Periegetes prior to those on the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. In this commentary Eustathius refers to more than fifty authorities by name; but, although he is seeking geographical information for the most part, he never mentions Strabo. If Strabo is not ὁ γεωγράφος, Eustathius slights in surprising fashion one of the best sources of the very knowledge which he desires. Eustathius does indicate, however, albeit casually, who the "geographer" is. In this same commentary on Dionysius the first two references to the "geographer" describe him as ὁ Ἀμασεὺς γεωγράφος.<sup>6</sup> Amasea was Strabo's birthplace. Furthermore, the comment on verse 7 ascribes to this Amasean geographer the same plan of procedure which Strabo employs in describing the world: ὁ τοίνυν Ἀμασεὺς γεωγράφος οὐχ οὕτω προσπαθῶς ἔχων ἄλλως μετεχειρίσατο τὴν περιήγησιν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἀρχάμενος εἰς τὴν Λιβύην κατέληξεν. In the later and longer commentaries on the *Iliad* and the

<sup>4</sup> For the Homeric commentaries, I had the use of lists of references to the "geographer" compiled by Dr. H. F. Rebert, formerly fellow in Greek and Latin at Cornell, now of Amherst College.

<sup>5</sup> F. Kühn, "Quo ordine et quibus temporibus Eustathius commentarios suos composuerit," *Comm. in honor. Gulielm. Studemund*, pp. 247 ff. Cf. H. Usener, "Ἐρώτημα ὑπὲρ Eustathius," *Rhein. Mus.*, xx (1865), 135 f.; Cohn in Pauly-Wissowa under "Eustathius," p. 1454.

<sup>6</sup> "Ep. Ded. to John Doukas," p. 77 (Bernhardy), and commentary on vs. 7.

*Odyssey*, Eustathius does occasionally mention Strabo. For the most part, however, he clings to the epithet  $\delta$  γεωγράφος in his references to Strabo.

If Strabo is not the "geographer," who is? Eustathius mentions in his commentaries the geographers Eratosthenes, Hipparchus, Pausanias, Poseidonius, and Ptolemaeus. The three books of the Γεωγραφικά of Eratosthenes had largely to do with the mathematical side of geography, and with political or historical geography; the work could hardly have contained the wealth of descriptive material afforded by  $\delta$  γεωγράφος. Besides, the name of geographer is too narrow a designation to describe the varied talents of Eratosthenes. Hipparchus was primarily a mathematician, whose interest in geography was largely the result of his mathematical bent; the term "geographer" does not fit him at all. Pausanias treated merely of Greece, and could not be the source of information concerning the rest of the world. Poseidonius was an astronomer, only incidentally concerned with geography. The dry lists of names offered by Ptolemaeus could never have been the source of the varied information contributed by  $\delta$  γεωγράφος. Of these men, Ptolemaeus would have the strongest claim to the title from the scope and value of his work; but all, for the reasons given above, must be ruled out.

Finally, it might be objected that Eustathius, if he had been quoting Strabo as the "geographer," would have expressly said so, whereas in the commentary on Dionysius Periegetes he does not once so much as mention Strabo. One might reply, as previously stated, that the first mention of  $\delta$  γεωγράφος qualifies him as Ἀμασεύς. Eustathius, is however, somewhat prone to refer to his sources by descriptive epithets rather than by name. Stephanus Byzantinus, though cited twelve times in the commentary on Dionysius, is referred to simply as  $\delta$  τὰ ἔθνικα γράψας, never by name. Aristophanes, though never named, is eight times cited as  $\delta$  κωμικός. Athenaeus is once mentioned as  $\delta$  δειπνοσοφιστής and twice under his proper name. Homer is  $\delta$  ποιητής as often as he or his poems are named. It is not peculiar, then, that Strabo, though so often cited by Eustathius, is so seldom named.

To sum up the evidence: 96 per cent of the references to  $\delta$  γεωγράφος are to passages located in Strabo; 13 of the remaining 17 are from their subjects related to the subject of the lost quaternion of Book vii; no other ancient geographer mentioned by Eustathius, or at all prominent, can have been the source of these citations; the first two references to the "geographer" identify him with Strabo; Eustathius is not unaccustomed to the use of a source designated by a descriptive epithet rather than by name. In view of all this evidence, it seems certain that Strabo is  $\delta$  γεωγράφος.

The fragments in the commentaries of Eustathius may be found in the Loeb Strabo, edited by Jones, III, 320-87. With the exception of 15a, which bears the name of Strabo, all are assigned to  $\delta$  γεωγράφος.

J. P. PRITCHARD

WASHINGTON AND JEFFERSON COLLEGE  
WASHINGTON, PA.

## DIO CHRYSOSTOM AND JUVENTIUS CELSUS

Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* xlv. 1) mentions the hardships which he suffered in exile and tells how he endured an enemy (Domitian) "who was called 'master and god' by all Greeks and barbarians, but who was really an evil daemon." He adds, moreover, that he himself "did not flatter Domitian *in this way* [*καὶ ταῦτα οὐ θωπεύων αὐτόν*] or try to avert his hostility by entreaty."

These statements indicate that Dio is contrasting his own conduct with that of others, and apparently he did not follow the course of some other person or persons who actually did escape punishment by flattering the Emperor, specifically by calling him *dominus et deus*. If Dio referred in general terms to the *adulatio* of others, he surely must have known of at least one particular case, and in fact he seems to have had in mind Juventius Celsus.

Dio Cassius, the historian, a relative and perhaps, as Cary has suggested,<sup>1</sup> the grandson of the orator, gives the following information concerning Juventius Celsus, the distinguished jurist,<sup>2</sup> who, when accused of taking a leading part in a conspiracy against Domitian, saved himself in a remarkable way:

When he was about to be condemned, he asked leave to say something in private to the Emperor, and then made proskynesis before him and frequently addressed him as "master and god," names by which he was already being called by others. He said, "I have done nothing of the kind [i.e., taken part in a conspiracy], but, if I secure a respite, I shall inquire closely into all matters and accuse and convict many persons." On this condition he was let off, but he did not report anyone, and he kept putting forward now one excuse and now another until Domitian died.<sup>3</sup>

The conduct of Juventius Celsus corresponds precisely with the *adulatio* of which Dio Chrysostom, in the passage cited above, so thoroughly disapproves and with which he contrasts his own courageous outspokenness. It is more than likely that he had Juventius in mind when he wrote, especially since it is quite understandable why he did not mention the great jurist by name: In general he is very restrained in his writing, even when he refers to Domitian, who had banished him.<sup>4</sup> It would, moreover, have been an unnecessary courting of trouble to name in such connection a personage who after the death of Domitian became *praetor*, *legatus* of Thrace, *consul*, both *suffectus* and *ordinarius*, and member of Hadrian's *consilium*.<sup>5</sup> Still, he evidently could not refrain from making a guarded reference to the past actions of Juventius in the time "when it seemed necessary to all to speak falsehood on account of fear" and when he, Dio, "alone dared to speak the truth."<sup>6</sup>

KENNETH SCOTT

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

<sup>1</sup> Loeb ed. of Dio's *Roman History*, I, viii.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Diehl, "Juventius," No. 13 in P.-W., *Halbbd.*, XX (1919), 1364-65.

<sup>3</sup> *Epit.* of lxvii. 19. 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> On Dio Chrysostom and his attitude toward Domitian cf. O. Weinreich, *Studien zu Martial* (1928), pp. 125-32.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Dessau, *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, II (1897), 255, No. 590.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, iii. 12-13.

## NOTE ON PLATO LAWS 917 B

πάντως μὲν δὴ καλὸν ἐπιτήδευμα θεῶν ὀνόματα μὴ χραίνειν ῥαδίως, ἔχοντα ὡς ἔχουσιν ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πλείστοι καθαρότητος τε καὶ ἀγνείας τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς.

This passage correctly paraphrased in *What Plato Said*, page 399, is strangely misunderstood by all interpreters whom I have been able to consult. They fail to appreciate the curious unction of Plato's turn of phrase. The meaning is, "It surely is good practice not lightly to pollute the names of the gods in view of the condition in which most of us find ourselves in respect of purity and holiness." Plato reinforces the principle that we are not to take the names of the gods in vain by the implication that the impurity and unholiness of the majority of mankind makes it unfit that their lips should sully the divine name. That not only expresses the real Platonic feeling, but it is, I think, the only possible construction of the Greek. *ἔχοντα* must be construed with the implied subject of *χραίνειν*. It cannot, with the insertion of an "and" or "but," be interpreted as a loose exegesis or antithesis of the whole clause, which is in effect the construing of most translators, however much they may vary in detail. Jowett renders, "Certainly, it is an excellent rule not lightly to defile the names of the Gods, after the fashion of men in general, who care little about piety and purity in their religious actions"; Apelt, "Es ist doch gewiss ein lobwürdiges Bestreben die Namen der Götter nicht so leicht hin zu beflecken wie die meisten von uns gegebenen Falles es sich in vieler Beziehung gegen die Götter auf Kosten der Gewissensreinheit und Lauterkeit erlauben"; Bury (Loeb), "Certainly it is a good practice to refrain from sullyingly lightly divine names and to behave with such purity and holiness as most of us generally exhibit in matters of religion"; England, whom Bury apparently is following, rejects Jowett's version and quotes Ficinus, who, he says, is no guide here: "Aequum profecto est nomina deorum non facile inquinare nec ea huc atque illuc devolvere, sed omnia quae ad deos pertinent pure casteque servare."

England himself renders, "And to behave as the generality of us behave more or less in the matter of purity and guiltlessness towards heaven." Hieronymos Müller translates, "In jeder Hinsicht ist es gewiss eine schöne Anordnung, nicht leichtsinnig den Namen der Götter mit so geringer Beachtung der ihnen schuldigen Unbescholtenheit und Reinheit zu entweihen, wie gewöhnlich die meisten von uns zu beweisen pflegen." Ast translates, "Omnino vero praeclare institutum est ut ne deorum nomina temere polluamus eandem in his usurpandis sanctitatem et castitatem observantes quam plerique in plurimis rebus ad deos spectantibus observant." Bekker's note, too long to transcribe, seems to hint at the truth, but his translation is wrong: "Tantam castitatem (in deorum nominibus) observantes, quantam plerique in plurimis ad deos spectantibus rebus . . . observare solent"; Stallbaum, "Sicuti plurimi nostrum sanctitatis et castitatis habita ratione fere in rebus plurimis ad deos pertinentibus sese habent."

Anyone who examines these translations will find them amusing illustra-



tions of the diversities of meaning that great scholars can extract from the same Greek. The point may seem a trifle, but it is a good example of how the meaning of Plato's Greek may be missed by not understanding his style and his feeling.

PAUL SHOREY

### HXERES

That the word HXERES, which is to be found in Latin only in a Pompeian wall inscription,<sup>1</sup> has proved difficult for the editors may be observed from the fact that Sogliano omits it entirely,<sup>2</sup> Mau says "quid sibi velit, nescio,"<sup>3</sup> and Diehl's only comment is "unverständlich."<sup>4</sup>

Inasmuch as the cursive H of the graffiti is, in some instances, quite like the cursive K, it seems not unreasonable to assume that this word should be read KXERES. The problem then becomes somewhat easier. We know that in popular Latin the sound *s* was often written *x*, especially finally. Not only inscriptions but the *Appendix probi* furnish instances of this confusion in writing. In the *Satiricon* of Petronius<sup>5</sup> there is evidence for a similar pronunciation of *x* when used initially. In part, the force of the pun "serisapia et contumelia": xerophagiae e sapa datae sunt et contus cum malo" rests upon the fact that the popular pronunciation of *x* and *s* was almost identical. It would seem, then, that the writer of this bit of Latin wrote KX in an attempt to reproduce the proper sound of *x*. Indeed, we find the proper sound of *x* more accurately expressed in an inscription,<sup>6</sup> which has VICISIT for VIXIT.

KXERES seems to be a borrowing from the Greek ξηρός and in this context may quite properly mean "dried food," as fruits or nuts.

Although we would normally expect a second-declension noun, perhaps its declension was changed because of its unfamiliarity. It is without question an accusative plural of the third declension as it stands. There are in Latin several parallels in this confusing of the declension in borrowed words.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, note that xerophagia, which occurs in Latin only in Petronius<sup>8</sup> and Tertullian,<sup>9</sup> is borrowed from the Greek and means the "eating of dry food."

F. W. CLEAVES

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

<sup>1</sup> CIL, IV, Suppl. Pars II, No. 5380.

<sup>2</sup> Not.d.sc., 1880, p. 396.

<sup>3</sup> CIL, IV, Suppl. Pars II, No. 5380.

<sup>4</sup> Pompeianische Wandinschriften und Verwandtes, 2. Vermehrte Auflage (1930), p. 24, No. 390.

<sup>5</sup> lvi. 8.

<sup>6</sup> CIL, VII, No. 5723.

<sup>7</sup> E.g., gausapa, ae; gausapē, es (f.); gausapē, is (n.): gausapum, i; from the Greek γαυσάπης according to Varro, LL xi, frag. 15, but see also Strabo v. 1. 12, and the recent discussion in KZ, LVIII (1930), 26.

<sup>8</sup> l.c.

<sup>9</sup> De Ieiunio Adversus Psychichos, Cap. I.

## THE DATE OF NONNOS OF PANOPOLIS

In dealing here with the debated chronology of Nonnos, an attempt is made to organize in brief space our information on the subject to date, and to bring together in one place certain data which are scattered in journals and elsewhere. The opportunity for a conclusion on the basis of the facts presented is perhaps made possible by this discussion.

There are two different lines of reasoning at present as to the date of Nonnos: (1) one which places his *floruit* at the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth century A.D. and (2) another which attempts to assign him to the period 450-90. The writers of his time, the fifth century, and certain of those of the eleventh and twelfth centuries say little or nothing of Nonnos; only Agathias Myrrhinos (570 A.D.) and the empress Eudocia (ca. 1060 A.D.) mention him by name; Eustathios (1160 A.D.) in his commentary to the *Iliad*, and the author of the *Etymologicum magnum*, mention the author of the *Dionysiaca*, but not by name. The scribe who gave us our chief manuscript of the *Dionysiaca* [Laurentianus XXXII 16 (L)] neglected to append the name of his author, and it is only from the papyrus codex of Books xiv and xv, incomplete (Berolinensis P. 10567), written perhaps in the seventh century and edited by Wilamowitz ("Berliner Klassikertexte," V [1907] 1), that we receive visible assurance as to Nonnos' authorship.<sup>1</sup>

Ludwich (*praefatio* to his edition of the *Dionysiaca* v-x) cites the relevant passages from the writers mentioned above, together with one from Eunapios' *Lives of the Sophists*, on the Egyptian love for poetry, which need by no means be taken as a *terminus ante quem* for Nonnos.<sup>2</sup> Ludwich believes that Nonnos drew upon Gregory of Nazianzos for his *Dionysiaca*, and places Nonnos between the dates when the works of Gregory and of Eunapios appeared, i.e., 390-405. He considers Kyros of Panopolis, whose epigram (*AP*, ix, 136), written about 441-42 according to Friedländer,<sup>3</sup> resembles *Dionysiaca* xvi. 321 and xx. 372, an imitator, not a predecessor, of Nonnos. Various other scholars seem to agree with Ludwich as to this approximate date.<sup>4</sup> The epigram and passages in question follow:

<sup>1</sup> For a description of L see A. Chiari in *Raccolta di scritti in onore di Fel. Ramorino* (Milano, 1927), pp. 568-74. L was written in 1280 A.D.

<sup>2</sup> Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.*, VII, II, 2, p. 966, n. 5.

<sup>3</sup> P. Friedländer, "Die Chronologie des N. von Panopolis," *Hermes*, XLVII (1912), 43-59; p. 44. This epigram is discussed (pp. 44-45) with passages from the *Dionysiaca* analyzed metrically (pp. 48-49).

<sup>4</sup> Lubker, *Reallexikon* (8th ed.), p. 715: "N. am Ende des 4. Jahrh. lebend"; *ibid.*, p. 338: "Im Nonnos (400 n. Chr.)"; K. Krumbacher, "Die griech. Lit. des Mittelalters," *Kultur d. Gegenwart*, I, 8, p. 266: "Nonnos (um 400)"; Christ-Schmid-Stählin (*op. cit.*, pp. 965-71) present the evidence of Ludwich and Friedländer but make no definite decision of their own.

Αἶθε πατήρ μ' ἐδίδαξε δασύτριχα μῆλα νομεῖν,  
 ὥς κεν ὑπὸ πτελέῃσι καθήμενος ἢ ὑπὸ πέτρῃς  
 συρίσδων καλάμοισιν ἐμὰς τέρπεσκον ἀνίας.  
 Πιερίδες, φεύγωμεν εὐκτιμένην πόλιν· ἄλλην  
 πατρίδα μαστεύσμεν· ἀπαγγελέω δ' ἄρα πᾶσιν,  
 ὥς ὅλοοι κηφῆνες ἐδηλήσαντο μελίσσας [AP, IX, 136].

αἶθε πατήρ με δίδαξε τελεσιγύμον δόλον οἶνον [Dion xvi. 321].

αἶθε πατήρ με δίδαξε μετὰ κλόνων ἔργα θαλάσσης [ibid. xx. 372].

Among those who hold the second view on the period of Nonnos, the name of Wilamowitz<sup>5</sup> has much weight, although he gives no reasons for the date he assigns to him. The most important single attempt, on historical and literary evidence alone, to place Nonnos after 450 is that of P. Friedländer.<sup>6</sup> His arguments may be summarized as follows: (1) No writer of the Nonnian school (except Pamprepios and possibly Tryphiodorus)<sup>7</sup> lived before Anastasios I (491-518).<sup>8</sup> (2) An exhaustive study of the epigram of Kyros and the similar passages in the *Dionysiaca* shows him to be the source for, and not the imitator of, Nonnos, contrary to Ludwig's assertion. (3) The passage cited by Ludwig and others from Eunapios refers not to Nonnos but to Egyptian poetry before him.<sup>9</sup> Bury<sup>10</sup> tends toward Friedländer's view; and, as Keydell<sup>11</sup> points out, Ludwig, in his reply to Friedländer,<sup>12</sup> does not answer these arguments effectively. He belabors the point involved in the diagram, (Kyros) Nonnos or Nonnos (Kyros, and dismisses Friedländer's conclusions on the following grounds: (1) that Friedländer presents slight evidence for his contention (chiefly AP, IX, 136) that Nonnos copied Kyros; (2) that meter is no sure index of plagiarism. Johannes Kyriotes Geometres (tenth century) and Maximos Planudes (thirteenth century) copy Nonnos also, but without giving the slightest notice to his curious rules of prosody. Kyros' imitation must have been of this nature.

However, Ludwig does not make out a clear case for an earlier *floruit*. Friedländer's somewhat subjective arguments are corroborated on other grounds by P. Maas.<sup>13</sup> The latter shows that Planudes, in his private copy of Nonnos' *Paraphrase of the Gospel of John* (Cod. Marc. 481), originally attached to the *Planudea*, or epigram collection, names as its author either an

<sup>5</sup> *Die griech. Lit. des Altertums* (3d ed.), p. 288 ("um 450").

<sup>6</sup> See n. 3.

<sup>7</sup> W. Weinberger, *Tryphiodori et Colluthi Carmina* (Teubner), p. iii.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 52, n. 3.

<sup>10</sup> J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (1923) II, 431.

<sup>11</sup> R. Keydell, *Bursian* 230 (1931), p. 110.

<sup>12</sup> *Musaïos Hero und Leander*, herausgeg. von A. Ludwig (1912), p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> *Byz. Zeitschr.*, IV (1923), 265-69.

Alexandrian philosopher called Ammonios (second half of the fifth century) or Nonnos; he is not certain which. The passage in question runs as follows:

καὶ παρ τισι μὲν λέγεται εἶναι ἡ μεταβολὴ Ἀμμωνίου,  
Ἀλεξανδρέως φιλοσόφου, παρ' ἄλλοις δὲ Νόνου ποιητοῦ τοῦ Πανοπολίτου.

There seems thus to be a connection, though slight, between the two men; perhaps Nonnos, who worked at Alexandria, dedicated the *Paraphrase* to Ammonios, his contemporary. Maas traces next the history of the MS Laurentianus XXXII 16, refers to Planudes' imitation of the *Dionysiaca*, already noticed by Holzinger, and concludes that Planudes once owned our chief manuscript of the *Dionysiaca*.

Since 1925 investigation of the chronology of Nonnos has taken a new turn; fresh arguments have been presented and lines of research along which this problem may possibly be solved have been laid down. Golega,<sup>14</sup> trying a different tack, has brought to the attention of Nonnos-scholars the implications significant for purposes of chronology in the religious controversy which became acute in the fifth century, known as the Nestorian heresy or Nestorianism. According to A. J. Maclean, the word *θεοτόκος* was the watchword of the Nestorian controversy "... which divided Christ into two Persons, closely and inseparably joined together, and yet distinct."<sup>15</sup> The churchmen Kyrillos and Theodoretos were prominent antagonists on the point of theology inherent in the use of this word; Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople, A.D. 428-31, has given his name to the dispute which arose over it and which was finally settled at the Synod of Ephesus, 431. Nonnos uses the word in both *Dionysiaca* and the *Paraphrase*; Golega believes he belonged to that group of religionists who regarded the Holy Ghost as proceeding from the Son; he places the *Paraphrase* in the second half of the fifth century and thus checks with Friedländer's results. Further, he concludes that Nonnos was a Christian when he wrote the *Dionysiaca*, and tends to discredit the commonly accepted view of two separate periods, pagan and Christian, in the life of Nonnos. Apparently following Geffcken,<sup>16</sup> he declares, with good reason, that Nonnos

<sup>14</sup> Jos. Golega, *Studien über die Evangeliendichtung des Nonnos v. Panopolis* (Kathol. Theol. Diss.; Breslau, 1925); printed in 1930 in "Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie," Band XV.

<sup>15</sup> Hastings, *Encycl. of Religion and Ethics*, IX, 323-32. Meursius (*Glossarium Graeco-barbarum* [1614], p. 185) has the following to say of the word *θεοτόκος*: "inditum hoc nomen est matri Domini ac Servatoris nostri Iesu Christi a Synodo v. Constantinopolitana tempore Justiniani." Lidell-Scott-Jones (9th ed.), p. 792, cite Cod. Just. I. I. 5. 1; Just. Nov. 3. 1; SIG 912 B (vi A.D.). Stephanus, *Thes. ling. Graec.*, sub voc.: "quae Deum peperit, Dei genetrix, Mariae virginis epith." and cites Greg., *Nyss.*, III, 660, who objects to the use of the word; also Greg., *Naz. Or.*, LI, 738. E. A. Sophocles, *A Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (1870), p. 578, sub voc., cites fourteen Christian writers, dating from Origen (253) to Modestius (614), who use the word.

<sup>16</sup> J. Geffcken, *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums* (1920), 176-77 and 191.

shows a mixture of both pagan and Christian elements in his poetry, similar to writers such as Claudian, Dracontius, Ausonius, Apollinaris, Sidonius, Synesios, and others.

Stegemann,<sup>17</sup> using the same method of reasoning as Golega, comes to a slightly different conclusion. After discussing the religious strife between the Antiochenes, headed by Nestorius, and the Alexandrians, led by Kyrillos, he concludes that the *Paraphrase* was written about nine years after the Synod of Ephesus, i.e., A.D. 440. Thus Ludwig's dating of the *Dionysiaca* is strengthened, since Stegemann considers the poems of Gregory of Nazianzos (ca. 385 A.D.) an indisputable *terminus post quem* for Nonnos, an assertion Keydell,<sup>18</sup> for one, does not accept. This argument presupposes that the *Dionysiaca* was written before the *Paraphrase*, a contention likewise not without opponents.<sup>19</sup>

Thus far the investigation of this problem has been conducted with a good deal of subjective theorizing on grounds of literary and historical evidence, together with great emphasis on the matter of contemporary influences and plagiarism. An additional source of information is at hand in the papyri. Körte, in his review of recently discovered literary papyri,<sup>20</sup> discusses with perspicacity one of especial importance for the chronology of Nonnos: an *encomion* written in praise of Patrikios Theagenes who flourished at Athens, 470-90, by a fellow-townsmen of Nonnos named Pamprepios. He is the earliest dated member of the Nonnian school,<sup>21</sup> living at Athens from 465 to 475,<sup>22</sup> and his *encomion* shows the influence of Nonnos. Though this papyrus, if we may definitely attribute it to Pamprepios,<sup>23</sup> gives us an earlier example of Nonnian poetry than Friedländer had judged possible, yet his arguments are not thus invalidated.<sup>24</sup> P. Maas agrees with Gerstinger, the editor of the papyrus, as to its authorship.<sup>25</sup>

In résumé, we have, then, these sources of evidence: (1) references to Nonnos in authors from the fifth to the twelfth centuries, direct and indirect; (2) literary influences and metrical similarities (Friedländer); (3) Planudes' copy

<sup>17</sup> V. Stegemann, *Astrologie und Universalgeschichte* (1930), p. 208.

<sup>18</sup> Bursian 230, p. 110.

<sup>19</sup> Geffcken, *op. cit.*; K. Kuiper, "De Nonno evangelii Johanei interprete," *Mnemosyne*, XIV (1918), 227 ff.

<sup>20</sup> A. Körte, "Literarische Texte mit Ausschluss der christlichen," *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, X, 1-2, 18-70; Pap. Vindob 297888 A-C ("um 500 n. Chr."), ed. H. Gerstinger, *Sitz.-Ber. d. Wien. Akad. Philol.-hist. Kl.* (3. Abh. mit Tafel), Band CCVIII.

<sup>21</sup> Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.*, p. 961; also Keydell, Bursian 230, pp. 122-23.

<sup>22</sup> Asmus, *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXII (1913), 323 ff.

<sup>23</sup> See, for an objection, O. Schissel, *Phil. Woch.*, XLIX (1929), 1073-80; the assignation to Pamprepios is doubtful.

<sup>24</sup> Körte, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>25</sup> *Gnomon*, V (1928), 250-52.

of the *Paraphrase*, with its superscription; (4) the records of religious disputes in the fifth century; and (5) the papyri. If we accept Ludwig's *terminus post quem* as 381-90, when Gregory of Nazianzos wrote his poems, and as *terminus ante quem* the destruction (529) by earthquake of Berytos, a Phoenician city described at length by Nonnos in *Dionysiaca* xli, we have more than a century of interval, in the second half of which Friedländer, Golega, and Mass endeavor to place Nonnos. Further, I see no reason why imitation of Gregory Nazianzen should cause Ludwig to regard Nonnos as an actual contemporary of that poet. The evidence of the papyri, though not incontestable, seems to make a later date for Nonnos more than plausible; and the Pamprepios papyrus, in particular, if definitely proved to be by Pamprepios, will tend to narrow the date of the composition of the *Dionysiaca*, and therefore the maturity of Nonnos, to the space from 450 to 490 A.D. In regard to the imitators of Nonnos, Friedländer's observation that they do not (with the exceptions mentioned) come before the reign of Anastasios I seems incontrovertible and probably his strongest argument. Until we find, therefore, actual proof to the contrary, his results must be regarded as the most careful conclusions yet made on the subject.

L. ROBERT LIND

WABASH COLLEGE

## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Miniatures of the Manuscripts of Terence prior to the Thirteenth Century: The Text.* Edited by LESLIE WEBBER JONES and C. R. MOREY. Published by the Department of Art and Archaeology of Princeton University, 1932. Pp. xi+241. \$12.

This study is based on a collection of all the illustrations in the pre-Gothic MSS of Terence, which was made by the Frick Art Reference Library of New York, under the supervision of Professor Jones. In a previous volume the editors published a collection of plates, arranged to facilitate a comparative study of the miniatures. The present volume contains the results of this study. The editors justly claim that the two volumes contain the first complete corpus of the mediaeval illustrations of an ancient text and embody the first comprehensive attempt to use both miniatures and text in tracing an ancient author's tradition through the Middle Ages.

A preliminary chapter, "Genealogy of the Manuscripts," gives an excellent history of the textual criticism of Terence and sketches the contribution of successive scholars to the solution of the manuscript problem. It concludes with a stemma that represents the final stage in this slow evolution. This stemma serves as a point of departure for the present investigation.

The body of the book is devoted to a discussion of the MSS, thirteen in number. In each case a careful description of the MS and its palaeographical features is followed by a discussion of its miniatures. The style of the artists who collaborated on the MS is examined with the greatest detail, with an analysis of the various formulas, and the illustrations are compared with those found in other Terence MSS. Comparison is also made with the illustrations of Bible MSS, of the Latin Physiologus, of Prudentius, etc., as well as with the motifs found in frescoes, mosaics, and in ivory, stone, and metal monuments. The enormous amount of minutiae is rather bewildering to the philologist, who will have to take a great deal on faith; but faith in Professor Morey's knowledge of his subject comes easily. There is no reason, however, for the apologetic attitude of the editors (p. v) in regard to such minutiae. On matters so highly controversial we need all the evidence that can be found.

But those who are not interested in detail will find the most important evidence summed up in the final chapter ("Conclusions"). The editors make out a good case for the assumption that C and its copy B were written at Corbie rather than at Korvey. The importance of the miniatures in determining manuscript relationship is well illustrated by the evidence given to show that O is a direct copy of P, and not a gemellus, as has been generally assumed. Similarly, artistic features caused the editors, in agreement with Traube, to



assign F to the district of Orleans. This MS they regard as a direct copy of  $\gamma^1$  and not a member of the "mixed" class, though it has readings of the  $\delta$  class. The result of these two discoveries is to simplify the stemma considerably. There is no longer need of a separate archetype ( $\gamma^2$ ) for PO, nor of  $\omega$  as parent of O; P is descended from the same exemplar as CJ( $\gamma^2$ ). The new position of F as a descendent of  $\gamma^1$  makes unnecessary the assumption of a separate archetype ( $\mu$ ) for the "mixed" class.

The editors assign the Calliopian recension, as well as its immediate descendants  $\gamma$ ,  $\gamma^1$ ,  $\gamma^2$ , and  $\delta$ , to the fifth century, though it is of course possible that ninth-century copies may have intervened between them and the surviving MSS. In the illustrations they see the influence of Graeco-Asiatic style which began in Italy in the fifth century. This style is best represented in C, though for the iconography F approaches nearest to the archetype. They argue against the view of Leo and others that the ornamentation goes back to the first century or earlier and assert that Quintilian's exposition of the meaning of gestures has little, if any, bearing on the gestures found in the Terence illustrations. The chapter concludes with a survey of the evidence for the provenience of the MSS.

A list of the previous reproductions of the miniatures of Terence, a partial list of later illustrated MSS of Terence, and a select bibliography of works on the Terence miniatures are appended.

One or two points for comment. On page 6 Lindenbrog is said to cite a MS with the expression *ita ms. quomodo*; it should be *ita ms.; quomodo* goes with what follows, *quomodo et Plautus*, introducing a parallel passage. The argument on page 51 that the archetype of C must have left Corbie before B was copied (from C), since if it were still at Corbie the scribe of B would have chosen it, instead of C, as his exemplar, is not sound. The Middle Ages had no respect for age as far as MSS were concerned. When an old codex was copied the copy displaced the original. Further copies would be made from the new MS; the latest would naturally be regarded as the best; it had the advantage too of being written in a familiar script. This does not really affect the main issue, but the fact that B was copied from C should not be taken as proof that the old codex was no longer at Corbie. The monks of Corbie may well have sent the MS to Rheims since they had no further use for it after C was copied.

The printing, plates, and paper are excellent. The publishers have given an appropriate dress to this splendid achievement of American scholarship.

CHARLES H. BEESON

---

*The Script of Cologne from Hildebald to Hermann.* By LESLIE WEBBER JONES. Mediaeval Academy of America, 1932. Pp. 98 with 100 pls. \$20.00

This sumptuous volume contains a survey of the script of Cologne from the time of Archbishop Hildebald (785-819) to the régime of Archbishop Her-

mann (890-923). Twenty-eight manuscripts are treated, one of which falls within the period of Hermann. The earliest manuscripts are not included since it is not clear that they were written at Cologne. Only those are discussed for which the author thinks he has found evidence (bookmarks, script, etc.) that makes the assumption of a Cologne provenience certain or at least probable.

The two pages (in Part A) covering an account of the libraries of Cologne show how meager our information is about the scriptoria of this important ecclesiastical center.

A chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of the make-up of the manuscripts; leaves, dimensions, ruling, gathering, signatures, abbreviations, punctuation, etc., are discussed at great length. In the development of the script the author distinguishes seven periods, the early, middle, and late Hildebaldian, and the régimes of Hadebald, Gunther, Willebert, and Hermann. The attempt to differentiate so many styles, based on twenty-eight codices covering a period of a hundred years, is not so bold as it might appear. Very few manuscripts are the work of a single scribe. The resources of the scriptorium are indicated by the fact that seventeen scribes took part in transcribing 83<sup>rd</sup> and twelve collaborated on 164; ten nuns wrote 63, 65, and 67, containing Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos*. In some cases the quires were parceled out for simultaneous copying. In addition to the main copyists, "relieving hands" took part in the work, though some wrote only a few lines; e.g., 39 was written by nine main scribes with the assistance of four relieving hands. The three Hildebaldian periods (785-819) are represented by five, nine, and four manuscripts, respectively; the number of scribes is about 130; any conclusion about the third period with its two scribes (not counting the nuns) or the period of Hadebald (819-41), which is represented by only a single manuscript, must be regarded as tentative. There is a little more material in the five manuscripts of the régime of Gunther (850-63) with some twenty-eight scribes, but for Willibert (870-89) it becomes more scanty, three manuscripts with a dozen scribes. Only one who has attempted the task can appreciate the labor involved in trying to differentiate the various hands engaged in copying a manuscript. It is significant of the interests of this cultural center that the only surviving text which could be called classical is that of a technical writer, Vitruvius. The solitary manuscript listed for Hermann is a Priscian.

More than half of the study (Part B) consists of an elaborate description of the manuscripts with comments on all sorts of palaeographical minutiae. Obviously little has escaped the keen eye of the author. The work concludes with five indexes, an index of manuscripts, of plates, of authors and works reproduced in the plates, of authors and works treated in the text, and a general index.

The plates are excellent. They are a hundred in number; two-thirds reproduce complete pages, including twenty-one of two pages each; the rest, with four exceptions, contain two half-pages each—making a total of more than a

hundred and fifty specimens of script. No other mediaeval scriptorium has received such generous treatment in the way of manuscript reproductions.

The author has done justice to the Irish influence at Cologne to which he calls constant attention. His comments on the use of *t'* for *tur* and *tus* show that these symbols are not as trustworthy for dating manuscripts as has been supposed. The statement in regard to the apex (p. 16) might well have been supplemented by citing the occurrence in the individual manuscripts; this has been done once or twice but a number of cases have been overlooked; the usage is characteristic of Insular scribes, though not confined to them; the apex is also used to indicate accent, e.g., *circūmdedit* (Pl. LXIII). We should like further details about the practice of Cologne scribes in regard to reference marks to indicate where an omitted passage, added on the margin, is to be inserted. The author calls attention to one such use (of *d* and *h*) in Plate XXXV; there is one also on Plate I; other reference marks occur, e.g., three dots on Plate L and a sign resembling the symbol for *enim* on Plate XCII. Such details are the more necessary since in some of the plates the margins have been left out of the picture. In view of the Insular influence which is found in all the manuscripts except two, attention might have been called to such spellings as *misus* for *missus* (Pl. XIII, 1), *pascassini* (Pl. XXX), and *quadragissima* (Pl. LXXV); similarly to the use of *Finit* for *Explicit* (Pl. XCII).

One would like to know the grounds for the positive statement (p. 19) that "one hand is obviously written, in pointed [i.e., Insular] style, by an Irish scribe trained in an English scriptorium"; *rū* for *runt* (p. 31) must be an error; probably *ṛ* for *runt* is intended. The text of Plate XXI, 2, which the author failed to identify, is found in Migne, *PL*, Volume XXV, column 408. The text of Plate XXII, 2 (fol. 14 of the manuscript), is not Isidore's *Chronicon* (p. 39). The Isidore text is found on folios 5-12 of the manuscript; it, of course, has frequently been published—the best edition is in Mommsen's *Chronica minora* (M.G.H., A.A., XI), II, 424-81. The statement (p. 39) that the tract *De XIII divisionibus temporum* is unpublished is incorrect; it is to be found among the spurious works of Bede in Migne, *op. cit.*, Volume XC, column 653. Instead of citing Giles's antiquated edition of the *Aratus* of Germanicus, references should have been given to Maas, *Commentariolum in Aratum reliquiae* (Berlin, 1898), pages 102, 155, 192, 265; the last three references are to the interpolated recension. The term *i-longa* should not be correlated with *r* in such a comment as "many ligatures, particularly with *i-longa* and with *r*" (p. 50); the author apparently is thinking of the cursive or subscript *i* in ligature with the preceding letters. On the same page attention might have been called to the rare symbol for the syllable *ben*, *b* with a stroke through the shaft (Pl. LX); Lindsay cites this abbreviation from only three manuscripts (Irish); in the Cologne codex it was undoubtedly transcribed from the archetype.

Modelled on Rand's *Script of Tours*, the volume reflects credit on the author and on the Mediaeval Academy which sponsored the work.

CHARLES H. BEESON

*Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten und die romanhafte Literatur der Antike.* By ROSA SÖDER. ("Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft," Heft 3.) Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1932. RM. 12.

This carefully and painstakingly compiled dissertation treats in scholarly fashion a section of Greek literature that is frequently disregarded by scholars, but which has its own interest for the student of literature.

The term "Greek Romances" is generally used to designate the stories of love and adventure that flourished in the late Hellenistic and Roman period, the best known probably being Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*, Longus' tale of Daphnis and Chloe, and Achilles Tatius' story of the loves of Cleitophon and Leucippe; but in a broader sense, as it is taken in this treatise, the term also includes the historical romances, as, e.g., the romance of Alexander and even Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*; the philosophical romance as exemplified in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* and Philostratus' life of Apollonius of Tyana; and also such tales of travel and adventure as we find parodied in Lucian's *Vera historia*. Dr. Söder attempts to show that what she calls the five chief elements of this genre also occur in the various apocryphal Acts of the Apostles. These five elements are the element of travel or wandering, the aretalogical element, the teratological element, the tendentious element, and the erotic element.

Dr. Söder begins with a brief summary of earlier opinions on the question. These range from Dobschütz' view that the apocryphal Acts directly imitated the Greek romances to Reitzenstein's opinion that they are rather related to the "aretalogies" of prophets and philosophers. In a minute examination of the various "Acts"—acts of Paul (with the Thekla story), acts of Peter, John, Matthew and Andrew, Philip, and Thomas, and other minor fragments, the author discovers the presence there of all five "elements," as well as a number of lesser details, such as storm, shipwreck, slave market, persecution, the multitude, rescue at the point of despair, dreams, and oracles. And she finds that the relation between the apocryphal Acts and the Greek romances in the narrower sense, the love stories, is particularly close. Now it is true that the erotic—or rather anti-erotic—element plays a considerable part in some of these Acts, but if one reads them without *parti pris*, it is not—except perhaps in the Acts of Thomas—as salient a feature as Dr. Söder would have us think, but is really a part of the "tendentious" element, for most of the apocryphal Acts are "heretical documents" glorifying celibacy.<sup>1</sup>

As regards the other four elements there is undeniably some similarity: both apocryphal Acts and Greek romances tell of travel and adventure, dangers and escapes; both are embellished with miraculous or quasi-miraculous events and sometimes with monsters and daemons. But it would be difficult to tell an interesting story without some of these, and not every Greek romance

<sup>1</sup> Cf., however, O. S. v. Fleschenberg, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des griechischen Romanes im Altertum*, pp. 95 f.

includes all of them. Moreover, there is a fact which Dr. Söder does not mention, and that is the similarity of these "Acts" with biblical literature, especially some of the older legends of the prophets and with Old Testament Apocrypha. She brings out the difference between the moderation and general rationality of the canonical Acts and the exaggeration and melodramatic character of the apocryphal Acts—which is quite proper—but it is not quite fair to say nothing of other books. For example, the stories of Elijah and Elisha in II Kings have a number of the elements of the apocryphal Acts, such as the returning to life of a corpse that touched the prophet's bones, as well as other miraculous healings and raising of the dead, etc., a detailed examination of which would occupy more space than is here at our disposal. But the Book of Jonah certainly possesses all the "elements" except the erotic, and this is strong in the *Story of Susannah* and also occurs in the Book of Tobit, which even has the motif of an amorous daemon, found in several of the apocryphal Acts. The contest in the Acts of Peter between Peter and Simon the magician recalls the contest between Moses and Aaron and the Egyptian sorcerers in Exod. 7. 10 ff. The speaking animals may find their ancestor in Balaam's ass. Dr. Söder says (p. 102) that the acclamation of the multitude after a miracle so frequent in the apocryphal Acts is not found in the New Testament. But certainly there is a clear case of it in Luke 7. 16. Moreover, large sections of the apocryphal Acts are tissues of tags from the Old and New Testaments.

There is no doubt of the fact that the apocryphal Acts wallow in the miraculous as no canonical books do, and that herein they are similar to the tales ridiculed by Lucian. This was the literary taste of the period, especially among the masses, who reveled in prodigies, daemons, metamorphoses, and hysterical manifestations of religion. The apocryphal Acts were probably a development and exaggeration, in accordance with the tendencies of the age, of elements used more sparingly in the earlier biblical books, as the Greek romances were a development and combination of elements some of which are found as early as the *Odyssey*,<sup>2</sup> and others in Xenophon, Plato, Euripides, the New Comedy, and the Alexandrian writers. And Dr. Söder herself reasonably concludes that the resemblances do not prove that the Greek romances actually influenced the writers of the apocryphal Acts.

STELLA LANGE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

*A Chrestomathy of Vulgar Latin.* By HENRI F. MULLER and PAULINE TAYLOR. D. C. Heath & Company, 1932. Pp. x+315. \$3.60.

The idea of presenting a series of selections to illustrate the development of Vulgar Latin was a good one and the editors have exercised sound judgment in carrying out their plan, though many readers will doubtless miss a favorite text.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Lucian *VH* i. 3: ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωμολοχίας ὁ τοῦ Ὀμήρου Ὀδύσσευς.

Some of the statements in the Preface are open to criticism; e.g., page iii, "Vulgar and Mediaeval Latin are an outgrowth of Classic Latin"; page ix, "The extracts are preceded by a brief note giving, when significant and known, the date of the manuscript," etc., as if only a single manuscript were in question. The Introduction contains too many dogmatic statements and too much speculation for a beginner in the field. The grammatical survey is good, except that the syntax might have been a little fuller; a statement on the use of clauses with *quod*, *quia*, etc., with verbs of saying, believing, and the like, should have been included. Some of the more difficult selections have explanations in the footnotes, but for the most part unusual forms and words not found in Harper's *Latin Dictionary* are given in the Glossary.

The following criticisms and suggestions are made for use in a future edition: On page 82 a common error is repeated in assigning the manuscript of Commodian to the eleventh century; it should be saec. ix. The student will find the inscriptions hard reading with the meager notes provided by the editors. The editing of the Pagan Inscriptions (pp. 85-91) shows signs of carelessness; e.g., No. 4, the symbol X, with a cross-stroke, should be inserted after *nominae*; No. 7, *coiuce* is not in the Glossary; No. 8, *provitu* is incorrectly glossed with *probatu*, instead of with the nominative, *probatu*; *annoro* is not in the Glossary; No. 9, *Praesnte* is glossed with *Praeneste*, (a town of Latium, near Rome); the gloss should be *Praesente* (the name of a consul, C. Brutius Praesens); in the same line *Quintilo* should be glossed with *Quintilio*; the last word should be *amoue* (*rit*), not *amouer* (*it*); No. 11, *annus* for *annos* is not in the Glossary; No. 12, *Maximae* is glossed with *Maximus* instead of *Maxime*, the vocative; No. 14, *aveo* for *habeo* is not in the Glossary; in the same selection read *[q]uem* for *[q]em*; apropos of *quinguinta* in the text, the Glossary contains two errors, *quinguinte*: *quinguinta*; *subulele* is glossed with *suboles* instead of *suboli*; *fecet* for *fecit* is not in the Glossary; No. 16, read *Saturus* for *Satarus*; a note should have called attention to the fact that the inscription has *patri filius* by error for *pater filio*; No. 23, *abes* for *habes* is not in the Glossary. The editors have transcribed the German of Diehl's edition in giving the provenience of the inscriptions, e.g., *Neapel*, *Lucanien*, *Moesien*, *Spalato in Dalmatien*, *Terni in Umbrien*. To speak of the Appendix Probi (p. 91) as containing a list of words accompanied by the correct pronunciation is quite inaccurate. In the selections from the *Peregrinatio* attention might have been called to Aetheria's use of the colloquial present for the future in quoted passages (e.g., p. 125. 27). The equation *quia* = *ut* (p. 126) is not helpful; *ut* is far less common than *quod* and *quia* after words of saying, believing etc.; *hostibus* (p. 127. 10) has practically the same meaning as *hoste* ("army," "host"), which occurs in the *Historia Francorum*; a note on *homo* (p. 128. 14) might well have been added on account of the French *on*; *auroclava* (p. 128. 29), *ceriofalis* (p. 129. 3), *extimare* (p. 129. 4), and *pullo* (p. 129. 11) should be explained in the Glossary. The editors' interpretation of the passage on page



131. 7 is a feat in temporal gymnastics, "As soon as the passage of the Scripture shall have been read there is such a roaring . . . that perhaps it was heard as far as the city"; it is much simpler to explain the construction as a general assumption. The note on page 133. 27 is not apt, "Observe the typical confusion of past and present tenses"; we have here a general assumption with a tense of completed action in the subordinate clause—a strictly classical usage. It is unfortunate that the text of the *Regula Benedicti* (pp. 138–142) was based on Migne. The *Regula* is one of our best texts for Vulgar Latin, but the editions prior to the appearance of Traube's famous work were based on corrupt manuscripts, which had eliminated many of the colloquial features of Benedict's Latin. The new editions contain more than sixty variants in these five pages; only a few need be mentioned here: page 138. 1, *cibus* for *ciborum* (Wölfflin reads *cibi*) in the chapter heading *De mensura cibis*; page 138. 3, *propter diversorum infirmitatibus* for *propter diversorum infirmitates*; page 138. 10, *cenandis* for *cenaturis*; page 139. 27, *usque* for *usque ad*; page 139. 28, a *Pentacosten* for a *Pentacoste*; page 140. 4, *operis* for *opera*; in the same line *minus* makes no sense, it should be *nimius* (*aestatis fervor nimius*); page 140. 7, *absque iustam murmurationem* for *absque iusta murmuratione*; page 140. 8, *ab idus Septembres* for *ab idibus Septembris*; page 140. 18, *mox auditus fuerit signus* for *mox ut auditum fuerit signum*; page 141. 13, *foris oratorium* for *foris oratorio*; page 141. 14 and 15, *dormit, sedit, vacat, datur* for *dormiat, sedeat, vacet, detur*; page 141. 27, *usque secunda vice* for *usque ad secundam vicem*; *prior* does not mean "prior" in the *Regula*; the term is applied to the older monks and is also used of the abbot; page 142. 9 should read *priores minores* (not *iuniores*) *suos diligant*. The statement on page 146, "The manuscript [of Isidore's *De officiis*] is posterior to the ninth century," is far from accurate; there are over twenty manuscripts of this work belonging to the eighth or ninth century; similar statements are made elsewhere in regard to other texts. In the Glossary, *ABCdarius* is defined as a poem of twenty-six (*sic*) stanzas; *Alba Fucens* is identified with *Alba Longa*; *apostare* is cited from the *Regula Benedicti* and is derived from Greek ἀπό and stare, under the influence of *apostatare*; a comparison is made with Petronius' *apoculamus*; the word is also discussed in the Introduction (p. 71)—but all beside the mark; the word actually occurring in the *Regula* is *apostatatare*, not *apostare* (p. 20), a quotation from the Bible though this source is not indicated in the text; *CL* should be glossed with *Claudia*, not *Claudio*; *fuirint* should be *fuirunt*, as a glance at the facsimile on page 76 shows; the Glossary has the correct form *Ternisco* where our editors read *Terminisco* (p. 198. 3); *missa* is not "mass" in the *Peregrinatio; sulphurinam* (p. 136. 28) is not in the Glossary.

In spite of the numerous errors, the book will serve a useful purpose in providing students with an excellent collection of Vulgar Latin texts.

CHARLES H. BEESON



*Early Civilization in Thessaly.* By HAZEL D. HANSEN. ("Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology," No. 15.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933. Pp. xix+203. 4 maps and 85 figs.

In her Preface, the author, with commendable modesty, describes this work as one intended not for the specialist but for the general student of archaeology. The opening chapters appear, at first sight, to be little more than a *réchauffé* of Wace and Thompson's *Prehistoric Thessaly* (1912). But a more critical examination of the text reveals that Dr. Hansen has personally investigated many Thessalian sites and studied Thessalian pottery and other artifacts with no little care, and that she has been able to modify and supplement, at many points, the classic on which her work is chiefly based. She has shown admirable diligence in gathering the crumbs of knowledge that have been unearthed from prehistoric Thessaly in the last quarter of a century. Repeated examination of the early pottery found today in the museums of Athens and Northern Greece has enabled her to adopt a system of classification somewhat simplified from that of Tsountas (Wace and Thompson).

In her handling of the material Dr. Hansen has chosen to adopt the sound method of treating the entire area of Thessaly chronologically rather than by sites. Even the specialist is likely to welcome such an innovation. The information is clearly and systematically presented, and eighty-five figures and four maps provide adequate illustration for the revelations of the text.

We have here an account of Thessalian affairs from about 3000 to 900 B.C., a period wherein fall the Neolithic, the Bronze, and the Iron ages of cultural development. Thessalian I and II, the north Greek Neolithic era proper, extend down to about 2300 B.C. The comparatively brief Epilithic or Chalcolithic period occupies the succeeding three or four hundred years; the Bronze Age runs to 1100 or 1000 B.C. So greatly, however, does our knowledge of the Stone Age in Thessaly surpass that of the subsequent prehistoric periods that, if our author has preserved a proper balance in her treatment, the sum total of our information relative to each of the three eras—Stone, Bronze (including Chalcolithic), and Iron—stands in the proportion of about 13:7:1, respectively.

In the concluding chapters of the book Dr. Hansen displays particular energy and determination in her attempt—assisted chiefly by Childe and Frankfort—to ascertain the precise location of Thessaly in the maze of ancient cultural webs that beset the Balkans. She seeks to unravel the threads that seem to run from Anatolia to far-off Acarnania. Thence we pass to Leucas (where, strangely, no use is made of Dörpfeld's *Alt-Ithaka*), and finally to Southern Italy and Sicily. Likewise, Balkan cultures are traced well to the north, into the upper reaches of the Black Earth region. But the results are disappointing. The all-important ethnic element refuses to let itself be separated from that of cultural diffusion. There is an abundance of more or less isolated facts available, but apparently the time is not yet ripe—though it may be at hand—for drawing a reasonably accurate sketch-map of the early Thessalian world.

On pages 66 f. the author has set forth her views regarding the evolution of the primitive dwelling. She postulates a hut form originally circular, with a gradual alteration to the elliptical and presently to the rectangular. A similar hypothesis is still retained by a fair number of scholars; but a great deal is to be said for the contention of Fimmen, and more recently Boethius, that the round and the rectangular forms are of entirely separate origin. It is certain, at any rate, that we cannot trace the evolutionary steps that ought to connect the one with the other. Dr. Hansen's knowledge of the color systems and the designs of early pottery is unquestioned; but she stands on obviously unsteady ground when she attempts to discuss the technological processes employed in its manufacture. She has, in fact, disregarded the literature of the last twenty years. She is correct, however, in rejecting an absurd theory of Wace and Thompson regarding "black-on-gray" ware, though Frankfort's alternative which she accepts is only partially correct. I would suggest that, in all probability, the black surfaces come into being when the half-cooled vase is rubbed with the point of a stick. The resultant carbon would appreciably penetrate the clay body. The "compression of the particles" by a burnishing tool, as postulated by Frankfort, would not materially affect the color. The term "free-field style" (pp. 154, 161), a Teutonism borrowed likewise from Frankfort, might be replaced by "flying-scroll style." In several places (pp. 63, 112, 164, 194) we read of "clay" bullets. "Terra-cotta" is surely meant; a clay bullet would be as harmless as a divot.

It is quite possible that the fates will mark a work of such high merit as deserving of a second edition. When the time for revision comes, a fair number of small points will be found to stand in need of attention. I have noticed typographical errors on pages 26, 76, 122, 144, 155, 170, 188, 189, 190 (two), 194, and 203. Also, on page 16: for 1896 read 1897; page 18: for *practicable* read *practical*; pages 146 and 147: for *ibid.* (three examples) read *loc. cit.* On page 71 *terra cotta* should be hyphenated for consistency's sake. The "buttresses" (pp. 41, 42) within the walls of houses P, Q, R, and T at Tsangli are obviously not intended as wall-props, and are better named "piers." It looks very much as though they sustained a second storey rather than an ordinary roof of heavy proportions. The figure from Tsani Magoula is said (p. 45) to have "prominent eyes and nose but no mouth." But the last feature seems undoubtedly present in the profile view shown in Figure 22, No. 3. The first type of celt mentioned on page 183 should be designated by "Delta" rather than by "D." Finally, the first sentence of chapter i badly needs stylistic revision.

There is an extremely useful Index and a Bibliography that fills more than four pages. The second edition of Dussaud's *Civilisations préhelléniques* is to be dated 1914 (not 1910). I miss a mention of V. Pârvan's *Dacia* (1928) and of W. A. Heurtley's fine summary of prehistoric Macedonia in *Antiquity* for 1929.

A. D. FRASER

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

Aristotle, "The *Metaphysics*," Books I-IX. With an English translation by HUGH TREDENNICK, M.A. ("Loeb Classical Library Series.") London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1933.

Not to speak of the admirable, almost definitive version of Ross, there is no lack of serviceable French and German translations of the *Metaphysics*. But another was needed for the Loeb Library, and there is little to say of it except that Mr. Tredennick has done an excellent piece of work and that his rendering can generally be trusted except in a few slight oversights and in a few passages that will always be debated and about which every Aristotelian will wish to have his own opinion.

It would be easy to collate Ross and Tredennick and wherever their phrasing differs pronounce magisterially that the one is better than the other. But all that could fairly be said is that one of them emphasizes one aspect of the Greek, the other another. So I will confine myself to the enumeration of a few passages where I think there has been some real, if often slight, misapprehension of Aristotle's meaning: 984 a 29, οὐθὲν ἔδυσχέρανεν ἑαυτοῖς, is not quite "had no misgivings"; 986 b 16, the *qua* is slightly misleading; 987 b 9, he follows Ross in the unique meaning (for the *Met.*) that he gives to παρὰ ταῦτα; 987 b 14, he brackets τῶν εἰδῶν with Gillespie and translates, I think, correctly, but very cautiously (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XIX [1924], 382). 987 b 33, διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκέψιν, "his investigation of logic," is misleading. Even Aristotle doesn't use logic in our sense. "Habit of discussion" or "training in discussion" would be more near the passages of Plato and Isocrates which Aristotle has in mind (988 a). There is a sufficient note on the hopeless ἔξω τῶν πρώτων. 990 b 19, "To us exponents of the forms," begs the question as to Aristotle's identification of himself with the Platonists. I think that it is a complete misunderstanding of the natural force of "we" in φαμέν, λέγομεν, ὑπολαμβάνομεν, and the like throughout Plato and Aristotle. 998 b 15, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, is a formula of argumentative concession that surely does not mean "in the truest sense." 1004 b 26, πειραστική, is not "empirically" nor is it Ross's "critical." 1005 b 22, "To meet logical objections," is not quite in the right tone. They are sophistical annoyances, as Aristotle says (*De interp.* 17 a 36-37; cf. my note on *Rep.* 436 b [Loeb]). 1027 b 35, τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν, by an inadvertence is rendered "the real sense of being," perhaps by a misapprehension of Rolfe's "was wie Mitfolgendes und Wahres Sein hat." Lasson is more explicit, "Von dem Seienden im Sinne des Wahren." 1029 b 2, I do not think that μεταβαίνειν means "advance" here, but will not stop to argue it. 1029 b 6, ἔργον, does not mean function here, but the difficulty, the "*hoc opus, hic labor est*" (cf. *Ethics* 1109 a 24; *Pol.* 1266 b 13). The new Liddell and Scott unnecessarily invents another meaning. Alexander (pp. 465-66) explains this and the preceding passage rightly. 1032 a 9, "Socrates is the same as being Socrates," is not, strictly speaking, correct; Lasson rightly, "Der Begriff des Sokrates." There is a similar inaccuracy in 1039 b 26. But in 1036 a 1-2 the

same technicality is correctly rendered. 1043 b 6, "When we inquire into the matter." The "we" is slightly misleading, as are all translations known to me, because the translators miss the reference to Plato *Theaetetus* 204 A ff., a passage familiar to Aristotle already in the *Topics* and frequently referred to in the *Metaphysics*. The φαίνεται then, as δοκεῖ, often refers to the result of a discussion in a Platonic dialogue. 1032 b 33, διότι, is not "why" but "that." 1047 b 6 is, I think, wrong, and is certainly very obscure in both Tredennick and Ross; Lasson is clear and right, "Damit wäre der Begriff der Unmöglichkeit ausser Augen gelassen." 1050 b 33, ὅσα γε κατὰ λόγον, "That is, if it acts rationally," is misleading (cf. 1048 a 3). 1050 b 37, "There must be something which has much more knowledge than absolute knowledge," is quite mistaken, as are Ross and the German translators. Bonitz (p. 406) seems to imply the right version and Alexander (p. 593) gets it entirely right. It is another case of missing a reference to Plato's *Theaetetus*. (*Vide si tanti est my What Plato Said*, p. 574.)

Strictly speaking, the *Metaphysics* cannot be translated. No juggling of the words, concept, essence, and substance or idea and form, with or without capital letters, will enable the English reader to apprehend precisely the meaning of τί ἐστιν, τί ἦν εἶναι, τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, εἶδος, ἰδέα, λόγος, and μορφή, still less to make allowance for Aristotle's occasional deviations from his own definitions and the mixture of sophistry and psychology in his persistent and obsessed returns to the criticism of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. But what a translation can do has been done, and Mr. Tredennick's brief but helpful notes explain allusions and ellipses that might baffle the unprepared reader, and supply most of the guiding cross-references from one part of the *Metaphysics* to another.

The text rarely attempts more than to inform the reader of really significant variants. The Introduction, though slight, is sufficient.

It interests me that while, like other English scholars, expressing a general awe-struck approval of Professor Jaeger's ingenious hypotheses, he in fact differs from him on the essential point. Aristotle, he says (p. xxx), "is ultimately driven back to the very standpoint which he derides in Platonism. He is emphatic that form cannot exist in separation from matter; and yet the supreme reality turns out to be a pure form. . . . The truth is that Aristotle's thought is always struggling against Platonic influences which nevertheless generally emerge triumphant in his ultimate conclusions." That is a flat contradiction of Jaeger's main contention that Aristotle's evolution was a continuous progress from Platonism to scientific positivism, and it is precisely what I have been trying to say for fifty years.

PAUL SHOREY

## BREVIORA

[The managing editor establishes this subdepartment because of the difficulty of procuring substantial critical reviews of all books, and the impossibility if they were found of printing them in our limited space. It is believed that brief but fair *comptes rendus* will prove more useful than a mere bibliographical notice. Contributions to this department should never exceed a page, and a paragraph is preferable.]

*Der Peripatetiker Ariston von Keos bei Philodem.* Von WILHELM KNÖGEL. (Klassisch-Philologische Studien, herausgegeben von ERNEST BICKEL und CHRISTIAN JENSEN, Heft 5.) Leipzig: Kommissions-Verlag, Otto Harrassowitz, 1933. Pp. 95. Rm. 4.

This is a faithful and useful dissertation that wastes no words and is full of matter. It begins as an exhaustive study of the résumé of Ariston in Philodemus' *Περὶ Κακῶν*, columns x ff., in support of Christian Jensen's article in *Hermes* XLVI (1911), 393 ff. The fragments are quoted, translated, interpreted, and compared in all their important words and ideas with Aristotle on the great-souled man, with Theophrastus' characters, and with the peripatetic tradition generally. The conclusion is that Ariston was a peripatetic. This is confirmed by a discussion and refutation of Gallavotti's thesis that he was a Stoic. The inclusion of Socrates among examples of arrogance is no evidence of Stoicism, for, as Zeller shows, there were censors of Socrates among the Peripatetics.

A third section deals minutely with the style of Ariston's epitome and especially with the characteristics of the diatribe style. A valuable Appendix collects the fragments of Ariston. The Index makes it easy to consult Dr. Knögel's studies of such words as ἀλαζών, αἰθάλης, αἰθέκαστον, ἐπιτομή, μεγαλοψυχία, παντείδημων, ὑπερηφάνια, etc.

PAUL SHOREY

*Sokrates.* By WILLIAM NORVIN. København: Bianco Bogtrykkeri A/S, 1933. Pp. 96.

This is a clear and pleasantly written essay on the Socratic question.<sup>1</sup> There are no footnotes and no quotations, but there is a brief Bibliography of Platonic literature at the end. The work, Professor Norvin tells us, was sketched long ago and meditated in many years of study. It begins with three or four pages on the place of Socrates in European literature, and the disconcerting diversity of opinions about him. It then proceeds to consider Xenophon and Polycrates and the Platonic dialogues as far as the *Theaetetus*.

Xenophon's *Apology*, Professor Norvin thinks, is the earliest extant work of Socratic literature. But Xenophon's account of Socrates is not adequate and it is not the "Socrates of history." It is, like all the Socratic literature, a legend. Xenophon's legend is that Socrates was a good Athenian burgher.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my review of Arthur Kenyon Rogers' *The Socratic Problem in International Journal of Ethics*, XLIV, No. 1 (October, 1933).

Aristophanes' caricature has no historical significance. Plato's *Apology* is obviously not the real speech of Socrates, but Plato's defense of him (p. 31). The main body of the work is devoted to Plato. "Ogsaa Platon skrev en Sokrateslegende, men den var helt hans egen" (p. 23). The Platonic Socrates is discussed under the rubrics, Ethos or the moral idealism that Plato depicted in him; Logos, Eidos, and Daimonion. Professor Norvin does not definitely commit himself on the question as to how far the doctrine of ideas is Socratic. It is impossible to say where the master's thought stopped and where the disciple took over the torch (p. 68). Socrates himself would have ironically evaded the question. His chief concern was the good and the good life. The Daimonion in Plato is an expression of Socrates' deep religiosity and still more of his unconditional religious honesty (p. 93). Plato's lifelong quest for truth is informed by this religious spirit of Socrates, and was developed by the Socratic maieutic.

PAUL SHOREY

---

*The Greek Language.* By B. F. C. ATKINSON, PH.D. 2d and rev. Ed. London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1933. Pp. viii+354.

That a book dealing with the history of the Greek language should reach its second edition within two years of its first appearance must be a steadying influence to the faltering courage of some Greek scholars who seem unduly alarmed about the adversity of present circumstances and are too greatly inclined to despair of the future of Greek studies. Mr. Atkinson has rendered a great service to our discipline and deserves our commendation and thanks for his interesting and inspiring work and for having given us tangible proof of the vitality of Greek and the fascination which it continues to exercise upon the majority of the educated public.

The present edition differs but slightly from the first (cf. my review in *Class. Phil.*, XXVII [1932], 103-4). The author has introduced a few contractions and expansions and has helped enhance the value of the work by accepting some of the corrections suggested by the different reviewers. A few of the Greek passages of the first edition have been replaced by new ones and the Bibliography has been considerably enlarged and brought up to date.

P. S. COSTAS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

*Wörterbuch der Antike, mit Berücksichtigung ihres Fortwirkens.* In Verbindung mit ERNST BUX und WILHELM SCHÖNE; verfasst von HANS LAMER. Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1933. M. 5.80.

This is a cheap, convenient little alphabetic repertory of information about classical antiquity which can be recommended to those who prefer to use German textbooks. There can obviously be little in it that calls for com-

ment in a journal of research. It seems well suited to one of its purposes, to serve, namely, as a portable handbook of reference for the intelligent German layman traveling in Italy. Famous Greek and Roman sayings are given with plain transliteration and the scansion of quoted hexameters is indicated by little dots like those that mark the rhythm of songs in American films.

PAUL SHOREY

*Virgilio minore: Saggio sullo svolgimento della poesia Virgiliana.* By AUGUSTO ROSTAGNI. Torino: Chiantore, 1933. Pp. viii+390.

Distinguished for his studies in Hellenistic poetry, Rostagni turns to a related theme, the poems of the Vergilian Appendix, and expands into a large volume earlier papers published in Italian periodicals. He defends the authenticity of the poems, except in the case of *Copa* and *Moretum*; and he admits that *Aetna* may be a "pseudo-Vergilian parenthesis" in the transition from the lesser to the greater Vergil. Paying scant attention to details of diction and metre, he emphasizes the historical background, the content of the mythical material, the ideas expressed in the poems. The book, therefore, is more easily readable than many other contributions to the study of the problem.

H. W. P.

*Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Libri IV. Tertium edidit CAROLUS HOSIUS.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1932.

The third edition of this useful book is a facsimile reproduction of the second, with few changes, and with eight additional pages of introduction, devoted chiefly to a list of imitations of Propertius occurring in later Latin literature.

B. L. ULLMAN

*M. Tulli Ciceronis ad Atticum epistularum libri sedecim. Fasciculus tertius libros ix-xii continens.* Recensuit H. SJÖGREN. Gotoburgi: Eranos' Förlag, 1932.

The third of the four fascicles of the first critical edition of the *Letters to Atticus* appears with welcome promptness. There is now real hope that the edition will be completed. The first fascicle appeared in 1916, the second in 1929. The present fascicle is based on the same critical principles as its predecessors; no new Preface has been added.

B. L. ULLMAN



